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Nax, Heinrich H (2014). A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities. Games, 5(4):191-203.
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Sociology |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | cooperative games, core, externalities, multiple membership, stability |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 21 October 2014 |
| Deposited On: | 27 Nov 2020 11:02 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Mar 2025 04:39 |
| Publisher: | MDPI Publishing |
| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |
| OA Status: | Gold |
| Free access at: | Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply. |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040191 |
Nax, Heinrich H