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Modeling hostage-taking: on reputation and strategic rationality of terrorists


Nax, Heinrich H (2008). Modeling hostage-taking: on reputation and strategic rationality of terrorists. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(2):158-168.

Abstract

This article takes a fresh look at hostage-taking from a game theoretic standpoint. A new model is developed that shows why conventional government deterrence strategies may fail.

Abstract

This article takes a fresh look at hostage-taking from a game theoretic standpoint. A new model is developed that shows why conventional government deterrence strategies may fail.

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3 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Sociology
Dewey Decimal Classification:300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Social Sciences & Humanities > Sociology and Political Science
Social Sciences & Humanities > Safety Research
Social Sciences & Humanities > Political Science and International Relations
Uncontrolled Keywords:Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science, Safety Research, Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Language:English
Date:12 February 2008
Deposited On:24 Nov 2020 10:16
Last Modified:25 Nov 2020 21:00
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:1057-610X
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701812886

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