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From Text to Political Positions on Foreign Aid:
Analysis of Aid Mentions in Party Manifestos from 1960 to 2015

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Looking at texts of election manifestos, this paper examines systematic differences among political parties within and across countries in how they position themselves on foreign aid and in how these manifesto pledges translate into commitments to disburse aid. Conventional wisdom suggests that left-leaning parties may be more supportive of foreign aid than rightwing parties, but also that foreign aid may not be sufficiently electorally salient for parties to stake out positions in campaign materials, such as manifestos. We leverage a new data set that codes party positions on foreign aid in election manifestos for 13 donors from 1960 to 2015. We find that parties differ systematically in how they engage with foreign aid. Left-leaning governments are more likely to express positive sentiment vis-à-vis aid than right-leaning governments. We evaluate the effects of positions on aid outcomes and find that positive aid views expressed by the party in government translate into higher aid commitments, though only for left-leaning parties.

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Introduction

Since the end of World War II, governments justify foreign aid as a response to development needs in poor countries. As ample research has shown, however, donors use foreign aid to further non-developmental interests (e.g. Baldwin 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Yet, other studies have shown that foreign aid depends on political and economic conditions in donor countries (Milner 2006; Dietrich 2016; Heinrich, Kobayashi, Bryant 2016). What we know less about is how political parties and governments discuss aid within the context of domestic electoral politics, or how these discussions relate to aid outcomes. Some have argued that little partisan debate exists in foreign policy and this is why foreign policy is often so consistent (e.g., Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). However, preferences about foreign policy instruments, including foreign aid, trade, military intervention and sanctions, seem to differ by partisanship and to vary across the left-right ideological spectrum (Mintz 1988; Fordham 2002; Milner and Judkins 2004; Milner and Tingley 2015).

Because aid commitments vary over time and across countries, a growing number of scholars have begun to examine these differences in aid policy by looking into variation in political institutions across donor countries as well as the role of ideology within donor countries over time (e.g., Noel and Therien 1995; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Milner 2006; Tingley 2010; Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp 2015; Greene and Licht 2018; Dietrich, Hyde, and Winters 2019; Dietrich, Reinsberg, Steinwand 2019). For example, Tingley (2010) finds that as governments become more conservative, their aid effort falls, but primarily for the poorest recipient countries, while foreign aid to middle income countries is unaffected. Brech and Potrafke (2014) show that left-leaning political parties, when in government, increase foreign aid spending, while right

parties advocate foreign aid cuts. According to Noel and Therien (1995, 2000) domestic political preferences for higher social spending result in higher spending on the poor abroad.

At the same time, we learn that conservative parties embrace foreign aid as an important driver of international development and advocate increases in foreign aid commitments to match the global norm of 0.7 percent of gross national income on foreign aid. This positive stand toward foreign aid becomes manifest in parliamentary speeches (e.g. Heppell, Crines, Jeffrey 2017) and political party manifestos. A positive relationship between conservative ideology and support for aid would, at its face, be at odds with expectations derived from the literature.² A closer look reveals, however, that only a handful of conservative governments actually follow through with their proclaimed support by increasing foreign aid once arriving in office. These include, for example, conservative parties in the United Kingdom in 2009 and Sweden in 2005. (OECD 2015).

In this paper, we seek to resolve this observed tension between party rhetoric and actual aid spending among conservative parties, and thus contribute to a better understanding of the role of ideology and foreign aid. Do parties of different ideological stripes differ in their discussion of foreign aid during electoral party campaigns? If so, how? And, do differences filter through into policy? We answer these questions by systematically examining how political parties discuss foreign aid in their election party platforms during campaigns and whether they ultimately stick to their policy pledges when their party wins and holds office. Understanding why some parties may be more likely to fulfil their aid pledges than others is important for key actors in international

² Recent studies of the connection of government ideology and foreign aid in the United States and Germany indicate that the link between the two variables is more fragile (Gibler and Miller 2012; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Schmaljohann 2015), thus warranting further research.

development. It matters to beneficiary countries because volatility and unpredictability of aid have been associated with aid failure. Knowing whether parties are likely to follow through with their promises can help recipient governments better anticipate future aid flows. The results of our study also matter to donor governments because unexpected cuts in aid spending from peers may undermine the efficacy of their own aid pledge or increase pressures on them to compensate for these cuts.

Comparative elections researchers generally find that electoral platforms reveal preferences about what parties would like to do if elected to office and that these policy positions, conditioned by the electoral system, impact voters' behavior and electoral outcomes (Powell 2000; McDonald and Budge 2005; Ezrow 2010). And there is recent empirical evidence that parties actually do tend to fulfill their electoral pledges (Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Thomson et al. 2017). However, less evidence exists specifically with respect to foreign policy, or indeed, with respect to individual policy areas, at all (c.f., Budge and Hofferbert 1990).³ We want to uncover the relationship between campaign rhetoric regarding foreign aid found in manifestos and actual foreign aid policy. We examine the interaction between ideology and foreign aid commitments. Theoretically, we expect that parties on the left and the right to differ in their discussion of foreign aid with respect to content, sentiment and how this content translates into action. We expect parties of the left to engage more with foreign aid and to discuss it more positively than right parties. We also expect them to follow through on their promises more than right parties as the issue is of greater importance to their voters.

³ Budge and Hofferbert (1990) look specifically at pledges with respect to foreign and defense policy in the US context.

Election manifestos offer the best source of data on cross-national party positions on specific issues across countries and time. Virtually all parties across the democratic world issue detailed manifestos outlining the policy positions that will form the basis of their campaign. Policy pledges made in these documents are often viewed as policy commitments. And should the party win office, parties are expected to give priority to policies written into their manifesto. Because parties all write manifestos for the same purpose — to make a comprehensive statement of the party’s policy priorities in the context of election campaign aimed at their electorate — they offer better data on policy priorities than other elections statements, such as speeches, which may be tailored to particular audiences and do not come with the same level of commitment from the party leadership.

On the basis of a novel coding scheme that accounts for political party sentiment and preferences vis-à-vis foreign aid, we systematically code hundreds of party platforms in their original languages for thirteen of the largest foreign aid donors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland from 1960 to 2015.⁴ These donors account for a vast share of foreign aid. Annually, they hold a share of at least 80 percent of all aid given out by the OECD DAC donors.

Using these data, we examine differences over time and across country in the way that parties discuss aid. In particular, we examine whether parties view foreign aid in a positive or

⁴ Among the five largest aid donors, we are only missing Japan, but Japanese parties did not have a history of writing manifestos prior to 2000, meaning that comparable data are not available for much of our sample (see Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011).

negative light and whether their ideological affinities correlate with how their discussion of aid in an electoral context carries over to the amount they commit to recipient countries. We find that, over time, the amount of space in electoral manifestos dedicated to foreign aid has varied across countries and parties of all political stripes. Left-leaning parties are more likely to positively engage with foreign aid. Right-leaning parties, in contrast, are more likely to discuss aid in a negative way. Parties are also not equally likely to follow through with their expressed sentiment when in government: a positive relationship between foreign aid commitments and mentions of aid in manifestos only holds for left-leaning governments. Right-leaning parties that mention aid positively are less likely to follow through with higher aid commitments. We suggest that right-wing voters are less likely to care about aid and hold parties accountable on this dimension. In doing so, we contribute not only to literature on foreign aid, but also to recent findings on electoral manifestos, regarding both the fulfillment of election pledges (Thomson et al. 2017) and the sentiment of those statements (Crabtree et al. forthcoming). Moreover, we also demonstrate the importance of focusing specific policies – something less commonly done in the literature examining election manifesto content.

Ideology, Party Aid Mentions, and Aid Spending: a two-part argument

Parties draft manifestos to express their positions and goals in the context of an election campaign. Making specific mentions of aid policy in election manifestos differs from off-hand remarks on the campaign trail, both because manifesto statements represent a carefully considered electoral strategy drafted by the party elites and because specific statements in election manifestos are viewed, by politicians and voters alike, as election pledges to be carried out upon winning

office. Indeed, governing parties do tend to carry out these pledges (Thomson et al. 2017). However, we expect the extent to which parties carry out pledges varies depending on how voters (and in particular, partisans) view particular issues. The literature on party pledges has not, to date, examined the interaction between ideology and particular issues when examining pledge fulfillment, but that is precisely what we do here.

We theorize that statements in manifestos represent both a sincere reflection of party desires, but also what the party leaders feel that voters want to hear from them in the context of an election. Similarly, should a party join government following an election and find itself capable of shaping policy, the policies that it crafts are also both a function of both the party's sincere desires as well as electoral considerations. By having previously emphasized a policy position in a manifesto as part of an electoral campaign, a party raises the costs associated with not following through on policy implementation in that particular area, especially if their core voters care about the policy in question. Thus, both mentions of policy in manifestos and actual policy outcomes when in government are reflections of the underlying sincere desires of the party leaders and party supporters. However, party leaders may also include items in manifestos that are of less concern to their core voters, either because manifestos are meant to be comprehensive documents or because the statements are aimed at attracting the attention of other audiences beyond the party's core supporters. In these instances, the party's costs associated with deviating from the manifesto once in office may be lower. As such, the relationship between the content of the manifesto and a party's actions taken when in government may be attenuated.

Because foreign policy, and, for that matter, foreign aid policy, may be the least salient dimension in the political battle for votes, one might expect parties to underspecify their positions on foreign aid, or for there to be a weaker relationship between manifesto positions and actual

policy outcomes. However, party rhetoric about the importance of foreign aid and its future use can become heated around election day, especially during times of economic hardship (Brech and Potrafke 2014; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016). What is more, a quick glance at party manifestos across donor countries reveals that foreign aid policy is a consistent policy theme, exhibiting interesting temporal, cross-donor, and cross-party variation in terms of space devoted to foreign aid, expressed support for aid and corresponding delivery preferences.

In line with our view of how positions get drafted into manifestos, we argue that the nature of aid mentions in manifestos ought to vary with party ideology, both because of the nature of the aid issue, itself, and because of differing attention that voters on the left and the right pay to it. First, we expect some variation in foreign aid mentions at election time attributable to ideology. Despite rightwing parties' occasional discussion of foreign aid, in general, the literature suggests that leftwing parties are more likely to engage and engage positively with aid. We theorize that the influence of ideology on foreign aid mentions has its origins in domestic ideological cleavages. Specifically, individuals hold different beliefs about the appropriate role of the state in goods and services delivery and these beliefs motivate people to support or oppose foreign aid. Left-leaning individuals value (more) involvement of the state in goods and service delivery. Because foreign aid represents a specific type of international goods and services delivery, left-leaning individuals are likely to hold more favorable views towards foreign aid. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals who champion market efficiency and individual decision-making favor less state involvement. They are more likely to be skeptical about the merits of the state as an international donor, favoring instead individual contributions to charities. They are thus more likely to express negative views of publicly funded foreign aid. Political parties of the right and the left know the beliefs of their voters and take them into account when drafting political party manifestos.

However, the literature also suggests that foreign aid policy has become a policy around which a norm has developed to speak positively, regardless of ideological stripe. Lumsdaine (1993), for example, notes that there has been a steady acceptance among Western donor governments to promote international development. The Millennium Development Goals and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals, are manifestations of this global norm. To Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011) poverty reduction has become institutionalized as a norm that instills global responsibility. Positive mentions of aid may result, in part, from the acceptance of poverty reduction as an increasingly powerful international norm. Yet, as critics have pointed out, in many cases governments pledged support for poverty reduction but failed to act on them, suggesting that poverty reduction may be institutionalized but not implemented equally across the board (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011).

As parties compete over votes we expect them to recognize that poverty reduction has become a global norm, and that foreign aid is the most obvious foreign policy mechanism for promoting it. While some parties, primarily on the left, think that offering aid is the moral thing to do, others simply acknowledge that it has become a global standard that requires them to talk-the-talk to avoid the image of a “nasty” party (Hulme 2015) and strengthen their appeal vis-à-vis moderates. Whether the talk gets implemented once parties govern is, however, a different question. Indeed, it may be that support for foreign aid at times merely serves the purpose of a PR trick, to inject one’s image with morality, without a realistic prospect of matching cheap talk with costly action. Because foreign aid goes to distant places, donor publics, even if they cared, cannot easily verify whether promises were realized.

While some work on party manifestos has begun to look at sentiment in campaign statements, it has not done so with respect to specific policy areas or policy implementation

(Crabtree et al. forthcoming). We suggest that relative to parties on the left, conservative parties are less likely to walk-the-walk and implement the foreign aid pledges made in their manifestos when in government. In other words, left-leaning governments are more likely to increase their aid commitments in line with the (relatively positive) statements they make regarding aid in their manifestos.

There are several reasons why conservatives might be less likely than their left-leaning counterparts to turn positive foreign aid sentiment into higher aid commitments. First, we know that, on average, conservative voters are less supportive of aid increases than their left-leaning counterparts (Chong and Gradstein 2008; Paxton and Knack, 2012; Milner and Tingley 2013; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016; Bodenstein and Faust 2017; Bayram 2017). More importantly, though, we suggest that, compared to their left-leaning counterparts, conservative voters are less likely to consider foreign aid policy to be a priority. If foreign aid is not a priority, the costs associated with cheap talk are lower. We also posit that for left-leaning members of the public, policy positions on foreign aid may be more consequential for making decisions about whom to support in upcoming elections than for their right-leaning voters. While our primary empirical analysis of the conditional effect focuses on manifesto text and aggregate aid commitment data, we probe the plausibility of this mechanism that explains the effect with originally collected public opinion data. Thus, we hypothesize:

H1) Left-leaning parties to be relatively more likely to engage with foreign aid than right-leaning parties in their manifestos

H2) Left-leaning parties to be more likely to mention aid in a positive light than right-leaning parties

And finally,

H3: Aid commitments of left-leaning governments to be more likely to increase with the number of (positive) mentions of foreign aid in their election manifestos, compared with right-leaning governments.

Before we proceed to testing our hypotheses, it is important to state what it is that we are not arguing. We are not arguing that (positive) aid mentions in political party manifestos cause (more) aid commitments. In fact, we perceive variation in how political parties talk about aid to result from similar processes as what makes parties commit to more or less aid once in government office. We believe that the authors of party manifestos think about aid in ways that is similar to how the party-turned- government will think when deciding about foreign aid commitments. As a result, our empirical strategy does not try to uncover a causal relationship between the mentions of foreign aid in manifestos and the level of aid commitments. Instead, we are interested in how much aid mentions and aid commitments overlap, controlling for variables associated with aid commitments. This informs us of the degree to which parties' actions correspond to their official election statements, which is the central question of this research paper.

Data

To examine these hypotheses, we have coded party's foreign aid positions over time across thirteen countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland from 1960 to

2015.⁵ For party positions on foreign aid, we require humans to carefully code the text because we want to capture the sentiment – positive or negative – behind the position.⁶ We also want to understand whether parties discuss conditions applied to aid, or what the objectives are associated with foreign aid. Only human coding allows us to get at nuance regarding preferences and ultimately, a better understanding of the foreign aid decision-making process.

The majority of studies that investigate the relationship between ideology and aid commitments rely on the conventional right-left ideology scale from the MARPOR project⁷ suggesting that more left-leaning parties advocate for more aid. However, this aggregate measure subsumes numerous domestic and foreign policy dimensions and does not explicitly consider

⁵ Text files of election manifestos were downloaded from the MARPOR website: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>.

It is worth noting that the manifesto project has categories that consider foreign aid (categories 107 and 109:

Internationalism: Positive and *Internationalism: Negative*), however these categories also consider statements on a wide variety of other topics such as international courts, global governance, statements about the UN, and statements about global resource planning. The coding of these variables is, thus, not appropriate for our purposes as we cannot know what proportion of statements in these categories relate to aid.

⁶ While there are sentiment dictionaries suited to measuring negativity and positivity in political texts (e.g., Soroka 2014) it is unclear how these would work on texts specifically about foreign aid. Off-the-shelf sentiment dictionaries are generally not well-suited to specific, technical policies (Loughran and McDonald 2011) where human coders are often more accurate. To give one example, the word “eradicate” is listed as a negative word in the commonly used Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, but a sentence suggesting that “increasing aid would help eradicate global poverty and disease” presents aid in a positive light.

⁷ Formally known as the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)

political party positions on foreign aid.⁸ We believe that isolating party preferences on foreign aid enables us to not only understand the extent to which positions in favor of or against foreign aid correspond with existing aggregate right-left measures, but also understand how they relate to actual giving of aid. The coding of party positions on foreign aid allows us to provide a better test of hypotheses linking ideologically driven positions on foreign aid to outcomes.

We undertook the coding of manifestos in several steps. First, we parsed the original party manifestos into domestic and international/foreign policy-related sentences. To isolate these international sentences we employed undergraduate students from the University of Essex to identify and record all sentences engaging with an international policy issue. We required student coders to either be native speakers or speak the language fluently. At the end of this process, we were able to extract every sentence from a manifesto that involved international policy or outcomes. With this information we can examine the extent to which parties differ on the amount of text devoted to foreign issues. In a subsequent step, we asked two students to separately identify all sentences devoted to foreign issues that touched the topic of foreign aid in a given manifesto. With this information we can examine the extent to which parties differ on the amount of text devoted to foreign aid policy across all foreign policy. Finally, we asked the two students to independently code all foreign aid related sentences as either positive, negative, or neutral in sentiment. In the appendix (Appendix A) we present a series of examples of positive, negative and

⁸ Alternatively, the MARPOR project provides two “internationalism” categories, one positive and one negative.

These categories cover mentions of foreign aid, but also many other items such as references to international institutions, global governance, and need for international courts. Our measure only correlates with their *internationalism (Pos-Neg)* variable at $R = 0.54$. While related, the coding of our variable clearly differs from the less precise measure available in the existing data.

neutral mentions of foreign aid. After each coder has coded all of the relevant statements, we calculate the number of aid statements (total, positive, and negative) and the number of words in these statements for each coder by country. The variables we employ use the mean of the two coders. However, to determine whether the coders are able to accurately code manifesto content, we present the correlation between our variables, calculated separately for each coder and within each country – the mean correlation is 0.86 with the highest values for the variable capturing overall amount of discussion related to aid. Correlations are also very high for positive aid statements and somewhat lower for negative aid statements, which is understandable as there are fewer of them. Indeed, both coders agree that no Spanish manifestos mention aid negatively. Overall, we are confident that our coders were able to code the statements. We include the coder correlation matrix in the appendix (Table B1).

Manifesto space devoted to foreign aid does not change much over time, ranging between one and two percent (or approximately seven sentences) on average. If we look only at manifesto text devoted to international issues, foreign aid content ranges between seven and 15 percent. To assess how statements regarding foreign aid vary with party ideology, across country and over time, we estimate a series of OLS regressions. Specifically, we take manifestos as our unit of analysis and calculate our dependent variable as the number of sentences about foreign aid per 1,000 words. We regress this dependent variable on a measure of government ideology, country fixed-effects and time period fixed-effects (as well as party fixed effects in robustness tests), clustering our standard errors on parties. Our primary ideology measure is a trichotomous recoding of the standard MARPOR left-right (rile) scale for ease of interpretation — left, center, and right. In total, we estimate four models using four dependent variables --- total aid sentences, positive aid sentences, negative aid sentences, and positive minus negative aid sentences Figure 1 depicts

the effects (with 95% CIs) of shifting ideology from left to right on foreign aid mentions in manifestos across our four models. The x-axis depicts the change in the number of statements mentioning foreign per 1000 words of text. Each horizontal line presents the effects from a separate model using a different operationalization of the dependent variable, *foreign aid mentions*, and the y-axis has no meaning. The depictions of these model effects are stacked to facilitate comparison of these ideology coefficients for the different measures of our dependent variable across the models. The specific operationalizations are labeled above the line. We report the regression tables in the appendix.⁹¹⁰

⁹ See Tables C1-C3 in the appendix along with more detailed descriptions of the models including regression equations. We also run the same set of models using the original “rile” scale and find the similar results, which we report in the appendix. We lose statistical significance on foreign aid mentions using the *Num Positive Statements* dependent variable with the continuous measure of ideology, but the effects remain statistically significant when using the number of negative mentions, as well as positive minus negative mentions. Some may argue that we are losing information by using a trichotomous rather than a continuous measure, but this assumes that movements in the continuous measure are real and not an artefact of the measurement process. Given the difficult nature of measuring ideology, we are not convinced that this is the case. We favor presenting the trichotomous measure both because it is less susceptible to measurement error and because it eases interpretation, but we are comforted that our substantive results hold when using the continuous measure.

¹⁰ In Figure 2 in the appendix we show the distribution of positive and negative aid mentions over time.

Effect of Ideology on Aid Mentions

Moving from Left to Right




Figure 1: Effect of Ideology on Aid Mentions. Expected Values from Four OLS Models with 95% Confidence Intervals.

We find no overall statistically significant effect of ideology on the number of aid mentions, *Number Total Aid*, and therefore little support for H1. Right party are slightly less likely to mention aid than left parties, but not significantly so, as indicated by the 95% confidence interval crossing the vertical line at zero. The average manifesto is roughly 14,000 words, meaning that right parties, on average, have less than one fewer sentence about aid than left parties in their manifestos.¹¹ The effect on the number of positive mentions of aid, *Positive*

¹¹ The coefficient on *Ideology* in this model is -0.028 and a move from left to right is a change of two units, meaning the point estimate of the effect is calculated as $-0.028 \times 2 \times 14 = -0.784$. This is the point estimate displayed graphically in the top line.

Aid, is statistically significant and substantively much stronger, providing strong support for H2. Right parties, on average, make 1.4 fewer positive statements about aid than left parties. Interestingly, they also make more negative statements, *Negative Aid*, as indicated by the third line on the graph, and their negative statements outweigh their positive statements. Right parties make, on average 1.8 more negative statements than positive statements compared with leftwing parties. The coefficient on *Positive-Negative Aid* represents the effect of positive statements after subtracting negative statements. Again, the right-left effect is negative and statistically significant. Overall, there is variation in how parties discuss aid in their manifestos as a function of ideology, with leftist parties slightly more likely to mention aid and significantly more likely to mention aid positively. Right parties, on the other hand, are more likely to discuss aid in a negative light.¹²

Foreign aid outcome data and analysis

To evaluate H3 we measure what parties actually do when in power compared to what they said that they would do. If parties' electoral programs reflect their plans for governing, we

¹² In the appendix (Figures C1 and C2) we offer descriptive visualizations of two of our main dependent variables – Aid Mentions and Positive Aid Mentions. We see substantial variation across countries in how often parties mention aid. Parties in Norway, Sweden, Canada, the U.S., and Germany tend to mention aid more and tend to mention it more positively. Parties in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, France and Spain make fewer mentions, and therefore also fewer positive mentions. The time trends are not overly strong, but there does seem to be quite a number of mentions in the early period, a large drop, followed by a significant increase again from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s. The late 1990s experience a drop again, followed by relatively high numbers of mentions in the most recent years.

would expect parties to implement policies that are in line with their preferences as stated in their manifestos. Thus, our primary independent variable is the number of mentions of foreign aid in the texts of manifestos per 1000 words.¹³ And we seek to determine whether these mentions are correlated with actual aid commitments. Since decisions to allocate aid are made annually by governments as a whole, and not necessarily by individual parties, we need to ensure that our analyses are conducted at the country-year level. We convert our manifesto and party ideology variables, which are measured at the party-election level, to the country-year level. Additionally, to measure ideology, we take advantage of the left-right estimates provided by ParlGov (www.parlgov.org), which is also our source for cabinet composition data and parliamentary seat shares. ParlGov constructs its ideology measures by rescaling existing expert survey data on party positions. When constructing our manifesto and ideology variables we focus on the parties in government. We report our findings for the main left-right dimension here, but we also use the state-market economy dimension and the liberty-authority dimensions, with results reported in the appendix. The results are the same regardless of what dimension we used.¹⁴

¹³ We have also estimated models without weighting by manifesto length and weighting by number of sentences and the results hold regardless of weighting.

¹⁴ The United States is dropped from models that use a ParlGov measures of ideology as they are not in the ParlGov data. Dropping the United States in these models is also prudent for substantive reasons. It is the only pure presidential democracy in our sample. Party platforms, issued at presidential nominating conventions, are not necessarily viewed as policy commitments in the same way that electoral manifestos in most European countries are. Budgeting generally, and specifically regarding foreign aid operate differently in the US than in European parliamentary democracies. For all of these reasons, we exclude the US from our models.

We must also take into consideration which governing parties are important when considering cases of coalition government. One might assume that the party of the prime minister is best placed to convert its stated manifesto positions into policy. But in coalition governments parties may first-and-foremost control the ministries in which they and their constituencies are more interested (Laver and Shepsle 1996). The party in charge of the ministry responsible for aid, then, might have a greater interest in aid than other government parties and greater ability to translate promises into action. But, of course, coalition oversight mechanisms mean that no one party is likely to fully implement its policy program (Martin and Vanberg, 2011).

We take three different approaches to measuring aid positions in government – we use the aid mentions of the prime minister’s party, the aid mentions of the party holding the aid ministry, and the average aid mentions of all parties in government weighted by their legislative seat share. Moreover, we look at all mentions of aid as well as only positive aid mentions. For the ideology measures, we weight each government party’s ideology by its share of legislative seats controlled by all government parties. Empirically, the aid mentions of the prime minister’s party seems to correlate the strongest with aid commitments, but, the seat share-weighted mentions and the aid ministry mentions also work in a similar manner. In Table 1 we report models that use the prime minister’s aid mentions, both total mentions and positive mentions, and we report models using the other measures in Appendix D.

Each aid measure in the model is based on the election manifesto from the previous election. Finally, there can be multiple cabinets in a year. Sometimes a government resigns and parties are expected to agree upon a new cabinet in the absence of an election. In most cases, the parties in government do not change significantly. Still, the potential of multiple governments in

a year complicates the construction of our measures based on a government. We average our measures across any governments in office during a year.

Dependent variable. For our dependent variable we use total aid commitments, given in millions of US Dollars. The data are from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System which lists aid commitments by project from 1990 until the present. The projects are either of bilateral character or channeled through international organizations. We sum up the aid commitments by donor to get a total of all commitments by year. The benefit of using the OECD CRS data, though only available from 1990 onwards, is that it represents the most complete data in terms of donor reporting. The longer OECD DAC foreign aid time series is subject to considerable levels of underreporting during the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁵ We opt for coverage quality at the expense of over time coverage. Of course, using these data mean that we are only looking at commitments rather than actual aid disbursements, and these two figures could differ. The disbursement data is of higher quality after 2001 and since 2001 the correlation between aid commitment and disbursement is $R=0.92$. Figure F1 in the appendix plots the relationship between commitments and disbursement during this period.

In addition to using simple aid commitments, we also consider commitments as a percentage of GDP (models 5 and 6) and as a percentage of population (models 7 and 8).¹⁶

¹⁵ Other comparable data sets such as the one generated by AidData draw on OECD DAC data for the earlier years. Where AidData surpasses the OECD DAC data in coverage is in the project information available across various aid sectors, especially for the years 1990 onwards.

¹⁶ As a percentage of GDP, aid is never very large. In our sample, it ranges from .05% to just about 1%. Aid does show a bit of an increase over time. In the 1990s, aid as a percentage of GDP averaged between 0.20% and 0.30%.

Models 3 and 4 include a lagged dependent variable to account for within country autocorrelation in aid commitments. The results are very similar across all of these different model specifications and operationalizations of the dependent variable.

Control variables

We control for other economic and political variables that might affect a donor's aid commitment decisions. We include a variable for *GDP* as large countries tend to contribute more aid than small countries (but we drop this variable in models 5 and 6 that use commitments as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable). Next, we include *GDP growth* as aid might increase with economic growth. As a measure of a country's wealth, we include the log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Wealth should have a positive association with aid commitments — donor countries with higher GDP per capita should give more foreign aid, controlling for their size. As another measure of donor economic conditions, we include the unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labor force. If a donor is facing their own economic problems in terms of out of work populace, the government might shift spending from foreign aid to domestic problems. These variables all come from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

We also control for the number of terrorist attacks in a donor country. Attacks, especially foreign ones, might convince politicians to divert money away from foreign efforts and again to

Since 2009, it has consistently averaged 0.40% or more. There are also some differences across types of countries. Scandinavian countries in our sample (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) average between 0.50% and 0.63% over the sample. The Anglo-American countries (U.S., Canada, and the UK) average around 0.20% with other countries (France, Germany, and Finland) all around 0.28%.

focus on domestic ones. This data is drawn from the *Global Terrorism Database*. We sum up the total number of attacks in a donor country in each year. Likewise, migration into a donor country might affect their giving of foreign aid (Bermeo and Leblang 2015). Donors with larger inflows of immigrants might be more willing to give more foreign aid than donors with smaller inflows. We take this variable from the OECD's *International Migration Database*, logging the total inflow of migrants.

We include two variables meant to capture other possible omitted factors in the global environment that may both drive mentions of aid in manifestos and the level of aid commitments. The first variable is the number of deaths resulting from natural disasters, lagged and logged. More disasters may lead parties everywhere to talk more about aid in their manifestos and commit more, as well. We also include the lagged total number of aid mentions across all parties in a given year. With this variable we attempt to measure the overall trend of foreign aid salience. Taken together, these two variables capture otherwise unmeasured global trends that may covary with both average aid mentions in manifestos (unrelated to ideology) and aid commitments.

Lastly, we control for the number of parties in government. It may be that the presence and size of coalition governments affects aid commitments beyond how we count mentions of foreign aid when measuring our primary independent variable. On the one hand, more parties in government could mean more veto players (Tsebelis 2002), which would make it harder for the prime minister, or any actor, to commit aid or follow through on manifesto promises. On the other hand, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) find that coalitions lead to higher government spending because parties engage in compromise to appease coalition members. While the veto players argument predicts large coalitions to make fewer commitments or be less likely to convert

manifesto promises into policy, the Bawn and Rosenbluth argument points in the opposite direction. It suggests that coalition governments might commit more aid, or make commitments so long as at least one party in government makes aid a priority. In addition to simply controlling for the number of coalition partners, we therefore also estimate a model (reported in the Appendix D) for which we subset the data to include only coalition governments. Our results for the interaction stay the same in this particular subset of the data.

Models

Our primary variables of interest are those capturing aid mentions, ideology and the interaction of the two. Beyond the controls mentioned above, all our models include country level fixed effects to control for any country-specific factor that is not included. We also cluster the standard errors at the country level. We include dummy variables for each 5-year period to control for any time effects. Because of data availability, the models cover the years 1990 to 2015.

Results

In Table 1 we determine whether our manifesto variables, *Total Aid Mentions (per 1000 words)* and *Positive Aid Mentions (per 1000 words)*, are correlated with foreign aid commitments in our sample for different operationalizations of our dependent variable -- aid commitments (models 1 and 2), aid commitments with a lagged dependent variable (models 3 and 4), aid commitments as a percentage of GDP (models 5 and 6) and aid commitments as a percentage of donor country population (models 7 and 8). In these models, we specifically look at mentions by the prime minister's party, but Appendix D reports models using government seat share weighted mentions and aid ministry party mentions. Our argument suggests that we should not expect to see an

average effect of our manifesto variables but rather a conditional effect with leftist parties “walking-the-walk” while conservative parties simply “talking-the-talk”, but not translating their support of foreign aid into higher aid commitments while in office. The argument therefore implies an interaction effect between aid mentions and ideology.

Table 1: Prime Minister's Party: The Effects of Manifesto Measures on Aid Commitments as Percentage of GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Commitments All Mentions	Commitments Pro Mentions	Lagged Dep Var All Mentions	Lagged Dep Var Pro Mentions	Commitments/ GDP All Mentions	Commitments /GDP Pro Mentions	Commitments /Pop All Mentions	Commitments/ Pop All Mentions
Commitment, Lagged			0.411*** (0.088)	0.415*** (0.092)				
Average aid words/all words by PM party	1350.055** (559.055)		880.600*** (252.539)		0.189*** (0.044)		0.000** (0.000)	
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats	72.299 (61.036)	40.399 (40.403)	31.113 (38.653)	11.875 (29.817)	0.007 (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Average aid words/all words by PM party X Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats	-396.248** (167.990)		-256.786*** (77.869)		-0.049*** (0.013)		-0.000* (0.000)	
Mean Pro Aid_tot pm		1534.511** (605.264)		1035.579*** (271.749)		0.237*** (0.042)		0.000** (0.000)
Mean Proaid_tot pm X Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats		-443.937** (180.754)		-295.935*** (83.815)		-0.062*** (0.013)		-0.000* (0.000)
Unemployment, total	-114.683** (48.982)	-126.493** (50.718)	-92.449** (39.094)	-101.280** (40.376)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
GDP	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)			-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
GDP growth	14.640 (31.925)	14.232 (31.408)	16.235 (33.150)	16.520 (32.883)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Log GDP per capita	-3974.902 (2280.355)	-4221.273* (2184.415)	-3743.889 (2200.901)	-3969.431* (2141.070)	-0.108 (0.178)	-0.128 (0.168)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
# Terrorist incidents	-1.413 (1.279)	-1.277 (1.332)	0.815 (1.032)	0.900 (1.078)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Logged Immigration	-504.022** (199.371)	-531.603** (196.804)	-394.864** (152.215)	-413.096** (152.123)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)

Global aid mentions	211.854 (283.845)	199.407 (273.882)	-206.140 (307.408)	-227.280 (296.782)	0.034 (0.038)	0.033 (0.037)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Logged Disaster Deaths	-35.575 (40.944)	-29.029 (41.708)	5.996 (47.767)	10.863 (48.267)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Number Party Cabinet	113.149 (68.647)	115.176 (69.551)	70.537 (49.967)	67.616 (50.420)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	46597.712* (24213.726)	49671.029* (23158.795)	43258.003* (23871.724)	45972.039* (23273.653)	1.515 (1.857)	1.791 (1.735)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
N	237	237	227	227	237	237	237	237
Clusters	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
R ²	0.812	0.810	0.840	0.840	0.559	0.557	0.652	0.639

Note: Models include country fixed effects and half-decade dummies (not shown to conserve space). Standard errors are clustered by country.

We observe that aid mentions (both total and positive) by the prime minister’s party are statistically associated with aid commitments. While the ideology variable is not statistically significant, the interactions between ideology and aid mentions are negative and statistically significant across the models, as predicted by our argument. These relationships are very similar when we look at mentions by the party holding the development ministry and the weighted mentions by all parties in government. Because it is easier to interpret interactive effects by plotting the effects, Figure 2 presents the marginal effects of *Total Aid Mentions* and *Positive Aid Mentions* at different levels of ideology on aid commitment.

Marginal Effects of Aid Mentions on Aid Commitments by Government Ideology




Figure 2: Marginal Effect of an Additional Standard Deviation in Aid Mentions per 1000 words by the Prime Minister’s Party Manifesto on Aid Commitments (Millions of USD) by Ideology with 95% confidence intervals.

The left panel of Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of an additional standard deviation in aid mention conditional on government ideology, while the right panel of Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of *Positive Aid Mentions*. The graphs show that predicted aid commitments increase with aid mentions by parties in left governments, but not with aid mentions by parties in right governments, where there is even possibly a weakly negative relationship. We find statistically significant differences for leftwing governments, but not for center-right governments, indicated by the lower bound of the confidence interval crossing zero. Moreover, additional difference-of-means tests reveals that mean average effect of an additional standard deviation in aid mentions for leftwing governments is statistically significantly different from the average marginal effect for rightwing governments for both aid mentions and positive aid mentions ($p=0.018$ for aid mentions and $p=0.014$ for positive aid mentions), something we cannot determine from looking at the figure alone.

As expected, the effects are even stronger when looking at positive mentions. The rug plot at the bottom of the figure presents the density of the data across the range of government ideologies. Because there are a few data points that extend beyond 5, we truncate the scale because of the scarcity of data points at the far right. The figures suggest that, for the most leftwing governments, one additional standard deviation in positive aid mentions in a manifesto is associated with an increase of roughly 1 billion US dollars in foreign aid commitments, but a small decrease in commitments for a rightwing government.

We interpret these findings to suggest that parties on the left may be more likely to follow through with their commitment on foreign aid. Conservative parties, on the other hand, may engage with foreign aid, and may do so in a positive way, but they ultimately do not feel the need to follow-through with their electoral promises when it comes to state-run foreign aid.

Probing Plausibility of the Conditional Effect of Party Rhetoric and Outcomes

We suggest that the difference in policy implementation records between the left and right may result, in part, from the possibility that parties of the left are more likely to raise foreign aid positions in public, prior to elections, than their right-leaning counterparts; that constituents of conservative parties are less likely to consider foreign aid a policy priority than constituents of parties on the left; and that policy positions on foreign aid may be more consequential for making decisions about whom to support in upcoming elections for left-leaning voters than for their right-leaning counterparts.

To probe the plausibility of this explanation we incorporate relevant questions into the Aid Attitudes Tracker (AAT) survey¹⁷ administered in Germany from November 9 to December 4, 2017, following the parliamentary elections in September. The sample comprises 6,108 respondents and is nationally representative. The first question asks: “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending? The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” We focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). Of people who identified with parties on the left (Die Grünen, Die Linke, and SPD) an average of 32 percent said that their party had adopted a policy position on foreign aid prior to the elections.¹⁸ Of respondents who identify with the right end of the spectrum (Alternative für Deutschland, CDU/CSU,¹⁹ and FDP) only an average of 21 percent had heard

¹⁷ The AAT is a nationally representative public opinion survey that tracks changes in attitudes across countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) over time.

¹⁸ A more detailed breakdown by party is offered in the respective tables (Table G1-G3) in Appendix G.

¹⁹ The CDU/CSU has held the German Ministry for Cooperation and Development since 2013.

their party adopt a position on foreign aid. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is 19 percent. These data provide prima facie evidence that left-leaning voters are more likely to be aware of their parties foreign policy positions than their right-leaning counterparts.

Subsequently, we ask: “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?” Of people who identified with parties on the left an average of 24 percent said that foreign aid spending was a priority for their party. Among respondents identifying with right parties we find fewer people stating that foreign aid is a priority issue for their party. The average across parties is 14 percent. These data substantiate our claim that left-leaning members of the public are more likely to think of foreign aid as a priority issue for their party than right-leaning members of the public.

Finally, we ask respondents about the importance of foreign aid for their decision to support parties: “Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.” The answer choices included “very important,” “important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” “unimportant,” “not at all important,” and “don’t know.” Of people who identified with parties on the left an average of 40 percent across parties said that the party position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party. Of respondents who identify with parties on the right, the same average percentage across parties is only 24 percent of people. This difference in answers between right and left political parties suggest that for members of the public who identify with parties of the left, foreign aid positions are more important in their decision to support the party than for members of the public who support parties of the right. The implications for party leadership would be that, in light of these differences, parties of the left feel more pressure to implement their proposed policies than their conservative counterparts.

Conclusion and Future Directions

We have explored the impact of ideology on a party's foreign aid position in its electoral manifesto and how these positions translate into action. On the basis of newly collected data on party positions on foreign aid, we find evidence that parties discuss aid differently in their manifestos. Leftist parties are more likely to discuss aid positively than rightist ones. We argue that this pattern results from ideological differences in how voters view the state in goods and service delivery: the left is more in favor of state-funded development assistance than the right. The parties, in turn, anticipate their constituents' perceptions and formulate corresponding party positions. This lends support for existing work that associates left parties with greater aid efforts.

We also find that leftist parties are more likely to follow through with their electoral commitments regarding aid than parties of the right – that is, their positive mentions of aid are less likely to translate into action. We find evidence that as the number of pro-aid mentions in manifestos increase, left parties commit more while right parties do not change behavior. Existing research examining party pledges in electoral manifestos conducted at the aggregate level finds no impact of ideology on parties' willingness or ability to fulfill promises (Thomson et al. 2017). Our research suggests that aggregate level analysis could mask interesting variation at the policy level when it comes to the relationship between ideology, action and what is stated in the election platform.²⁰ Lastly, we have offered evidence from German public opinion data to suggest that voters supporting left vs right wing parties have different views regarding the importance of aid. Leftwing voters state that they are more likely to pay attention to their parties' positions on aid, believe it is a priority for their party, and find it important when considering their own support of

²⁰ Although it is worth noting that we are not looking at pledges, per se, but rather mentions of aid. The differences could be less stark if we were to code pledges in the same manner as Thomson, et al (2017).

the party. Thus, leftwing parties have a greater incentive to take seriously what they put in their electoral manifestos with respect to aid.

Overall, we hope that the new data set on aid mentions will be useful to other scholars who want to better understand whether and how parties communicate their positions on foreign aid before elections and how these positions influence policy outcomes. While scholars of party politics and elections have long used electoral manifestos as a source of data to understand ideology and political competition, they have been underutilized as a source of data in understanding foreign policy and international politics. We have demonstrated that they provide a useful source of data on policy positions with respect to foreign aid that relate to aid outcomes for at least some parties.

These hypotheses cannot be tested with the current state of the data on foreign aid commitments over time and across donors as conventional data sets do not code foreign aid along these dimensions. To understand what the politics of foreign aid are about, it is therefore important to look beyond available commitment data to other sources that reveal what political parties are advocating in foreign aid.

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Supplementary Appendix

Appendix A

Examples of aid mentions in select party manifestos in the United States and United Kingdom:

Positive Mentions:

- “We will target foreign assistance to high-impact goals: fostering the rule of law through democratic government;” 2008 Republican manifesto, United States
- “With his latest budget, the President is fulfilling his historic commitment to request \$4 billion over three years for the Global Fund, and the President remains committed to robust funding for PEPFAR and the Global Fund in the future.;;” 2012 Democrats manifesto, United States
- “We will help at least 11 million children in the poorest countries gain a decent education, improve nutrition for at least 50 million people, who would otherwise go hungry; and help at least 60 million people get access to clean water and sanitation, to stop terrible diseases;” 2015 Conservative Party manifesto, United Kingdom
- “Globally we are pressing for a doubling of aid backed by getting international agreement to an International Finance Facility as supported by the Commission for Africa.” 2008 Labour Party manifesto, United Kingdom

Negative mentions:

- “Decades of massive aid have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries where it has often propped up failed policies and corrupt rulers;” 2008 Republican Party manifesto, United States
- “The Clinton administration has diverted aid from our friends to support U.N. operations and social welfare spending in the Third World.” 1996 Republican Party manifesto, United States

Neutral mentions:

- “Eighty percent of our bilateral aid goes to the poorest countries;” 1992 Conservative Party manifesto, United Kingdom
- “Many of the world’s biggest challenges are from violent conflict to rapid population growth to environmental threat are caused or exacerbated by global poverty and inequality.” 2001 Labour Party manifesto, United Kingdom

Appendix B: Correlation of Measures of Aid Mentions Across Coders

Table B1 presents the correlation of our three measures of aid mentions when constructing them on the basis of only one coder rather than both. The lower correlations on Neg-Aid result from lower numbers of negative mentions. The UK is missing because both coders agree that there are no negative aid mentions. Spain is missing because one coder says there is only one negative aid mention while the other coder codes no negative mentions. Thus, there is a high level of agreement between coders. The negative correlation in Ireland is also due to coders agreeing that there are very few negative mentions, but disagreeing what statements are, in fact, negative.

Table B1: Correlations between Coders of our Three Measures of Aid Mentions: Any Aid Mentions, Positive Aid Mentions, and Negative Aid Mentions.

Country	Aid	Pro-Aid	Neg-Aid
United States	0.997	0.983	0.991
Canada	0.967	0.965	0.757
United Kingdom	0.987	0.989	.
Ireland	0.989	0.980	-0.034
France	0.944	0.625	0.974
Spain	0.769	0.695	.
Germany	0.970	0.900	0.500
Finland	0.982	0.818	0.987
Sweden	0.940	0.925	0.244
Norway	0.942	0.864	0.899
Denmark	0.945	0.846	0.952
Australia	0.982	0.970	0.762
New Zealand	0.968	0.963	0.893

Appendix C -Part I: Regression Tables for Ideology and Manifesto Measures

These tables present the effects of ideology on aid mentions, controlling for country and time period effects (Table C1 and C3) and party and country effects (Table C2). We do not include party fixed effects in the main models because much of the variation we wish to explain is across party rather than within party, but we find similar effects in Table C2 when we do. In some cases, they are stronger than the results with time-period fixed effects presented in the main paper. We cannot include both party and time-period fixed effects in the same model. Given the electoral cycle, if we were to include both party and time period fixed effects, we would only have one or two observations per party within each time period, greatly limiting the variation in the dependent variable and leading to unstable estimates. The models in Tables C1 and C3 take the following form:

$$Y_{p,e} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 X_{p,e} + \rho_c + \zeta_t + \varepsilon_{p,e}$$

where p indicates party, e indicates election, ρ_c , is a country-specific fixed effect, and ζ_t is a five-year time-period fixed effect. Y captures our manifesto specific measure of language use regarding foreign aid and X is a manifesto specific measure of ideology. The models in Table C2 follow a similar form:

$$Y_{p,e} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 X_{p,e} + \rho_c + \zeta_p + \varepsilon_{p,e}$$

where ζ now becomes a party-specific fixed effect.

Table C1: Effect of Trichotomous RILE Ideology on Multiple Manifesto Measures

	(1) Num Total Aid	(2) Num Pos Aid	(3) Num Neg Aid	(4) Pos-Neg Aid
Ideology	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.051** (0.022)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.064*** (0.024)
Norway	0.137 (0.182)	0.011 (0.174)	0.021 (0.179)	-0.010 (0.177)
Denmark	-0.330* (0.180)	-0.336** (0.163)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.341** (0.161)
Finland	-0.165 (0.203)	-0.237 (0.170)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.248 (0.167)
France	-0.576*** (0.165)	-0.529*** (0.151)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.527*** (0.150)
Spain	-0.585*** (0.160)	-0.569*** (0.146)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.559*** (0.144)
Germany	0.065 (0.162)	-0.060 (0.148)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.055 (0.147)
United Kingdom	-0.195 (0.172)	-0.150 (0.161)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.135 (0.156)
Ireland	-0.457*** (0.164)	-0.400*** (0.151)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.391*** (0.149)
United States	-0.073 (0.166)	-0.059 (0.153)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.061 (0.150)
Canada	-0.071 (0.214)	-0.041 (0.204)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.043 (0.202)
Australia	-0.457*** (0.173)	-0.399** (0.159)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.391** (0.156)
New Zealand	-0.521*** (0.170)	-0.466*** (0.156)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.459*** (0.154)
1965-1969	-0.048 (0.094)	-0.048 (0.091)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.050 (0.091)
1970-1974	-0.247** (0.115)	-0.216* (0.114)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.217* (0.114)
1975-1979	-0.163 (0.115)	-0.172 (0.112)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.170 (0.112)
1980-1984	-0.060 (0.112)	-0.104 (0.109)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.107 (0.110)
1985-1989	0.011 (0.113)	-0.061 (0.105)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.072 (0.105)
1990-1994	0.070 (0.142)	-0.032 (0.130)	0.040** (0.020)	-0.073 (0.133)
1995-1999	-0.140 (0.114)	-0.129 (0.115)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.124 (0.115)
2000-2004	0.049 (0.138)	0.023 (0.131)	0.001 (0.007)	0.022 (0.131)
2005-2009	0.021 (0.124)	-0.025 (0.119)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.039 (0.119)
2010-2013	-0.055 (0.126)	-0.107 (0.121)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.110 (0.121)
2014-2016	0.044 (0.108)	0.024 (0.110)	0.013* (0.008)	0.011 (0.110)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R ²	0.197	0.191	0.070	0.186

Note: Sweden and 1960-1964 are reference categories. Figure 1 is based on the results presented in this table.

Table C2: Effect of Trichotomous RILE Ideology on Multiple Manifesto Measures with Party and Country Fixed Effects (Fixed Effects Not Displayed)

	(1) Num Total Aid	(2) Num Pos Aid	(3) Num Neg Aid	(4) Pos-Neg Aid
Ideology	-0.117*** (0.042)	-0.121*** (0.039)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.128*** (0.041)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R ²	0.372	0.381	0.293	0.388

Table C3: Effect of Continuous RILE index on Multiple Manifesto Measures

	(1) Num Total Aid	(2) Num Pos Aid	(3) Num Neg Aid	(4) Pos-Neg Aid
Right-Left Ideological index	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)
Norway	0.143 (0.182)	0.016 (0.174)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.177)
Denmark	-0.333* (0.176)	-0.337** (0.159)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.341** (0.158)
Finland	-0.164 (0.202)	-0.236 (0.169)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.247 (0.168)
France	-0.578*** (0.162)	-0.529*** (0.148)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.526*** (0.146)
Spain	-0.581*** (0.159)	-0.564*** (0.146)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.554*** (0.144)
Germany	0.066 (0.157)	-0.055 (0.144)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.048 (0.142)
United Kingdom	-0.201 (0.173)	-0.156 (0.162)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.141 (0.157)
Ireland	-0.453*** (0.161)	-0.392*** (0.148)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.380** (0.146)
United States	-0.081 (0.160)	-0.063 (0.147)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.062 (0.144)
Canada	-0.068 (0.213)	-0.038 (0.201)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.038 (0.199)
Australia	-0.462*** (0.166)	-0.396** (0.151)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.384** (0.148)
New Zealand	-0.518*** (0.167)	-0.460*** (0.153)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.450*** (0.151)
1965-1969	-0.047 (0.095)	-0.048 (0.091)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.050 (0.092)
1970-1974	-0.244** (0.113)	-0.210* (0.111)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.208* (0.111)
1975-1979	-0.160 (0.112)	-0.164 (0.109)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.159 (0.109)
1980-1984	-0.063 (0.109)	-0.103 (0.105)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.104 (0.105)
1985-1989	0.012 (0.112)	-0.056 (0.103)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.064 (0.103)
1990-1994	0.067 (0.137)	-0.030 (0.125)	0.037* (0.019)	-0.067 (0.128)
1995-1999	-0.146 (0.110)	-0.130 (0.110)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.122 (0.110)
2000-2004	0.049 (0.134)	0.029 (0.127)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.030 (0.127)
2005-2009	0.023 (0.123)	-0.020 (0.117)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.032 (0.118)
2010-2013	-0.052 (0.126)	-0.102 (0.120)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.104 (0.120)
2014-2016	0.057 (0.106)	0.045 (0.107)	0.008 (0.007)	0.037 (0.106)
Constant	0.741*** (0.227)	0.682*** (0.216)	0.013* (0.008)	0.670*** (0.214)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R ²	0.196	0.188	0.079	0.183

Note: Sweden and 1960-1964 are reference categories. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix C – Part II: Country and Time Fixed Effects: Figures C1 and C2 below plot the fixed effects from models 1 and 2 in the Appendix Table C1 (above). They offer descriptive visualizations of two of our main dependent variables – Aid Mentions and Positive Aid Mentions. We see substantial variation across countries in how often parties mention aid. Parties in Norway, Sweden, Canada, the U.S., and Germany tend to mention aid more and tend to mention it more positively. Parties in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, France and Spain make

fewer mentions, and therefore also fewer positive mentions. The time trends are not overly strong, but there does seem to be quite a number of mentions in the early period, a large drop, followed by a significant increase again from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s. The late 1990s experience a drop again, followed by relatively high numbers of mentions in the most recent years.




Figure C1: Predicted Effects – Aid Mentions by Country and Time Period Per 1,000 Manifesto Words




Figure C2: Predicted Effects – Positive Aid Mentions by Country and Time Period Per 1,000 Manifesto Words

Table D1: Aid Ministry Party: The Effects of Manifesto Measures on Aid Commitments as Percentage of GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Avg pro aid total pm	731.271					1383.667**	1669.432**
	(635.636)					(486.514)	(740.124)
Avg alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats	29.675	93.688	53.458	125.483	61.611		
	(65.442)	(90.156)	(78.840)	(80.909)	(58.409)		
Avg pro aid total pm <i>X</i>							
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats	-194.435						
	(184.742)						
Average aid words/all words by aid ministry party		281.640					
		(263.016)					
Average aid words/all words by aid ministry party <i>X</i>							
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats		-317.752**					
		(104.911)					
Avg Pro Aid Total Devt			293.599				
			(229.705)				
Avg Pro Aid Total Devt <i>X</i>							
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats			-309.082**				
			(117.052)				
Average aid words/all words by gov weighted by seats				1901.890			
				(1428.860)			
Average aid words/all words by gov weighted by seats <i>X</i>							
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats				-583.877			
				(386.980)			
Avg pro aid total seats					1283.078		
					(1722.376)		
Avg pro aid total seats <i>X</i>							
Average alt. right-left score by gov weighted by seats					-416.887		
					(473.223)		
Avg state market seats						15.010	
						(52.010)	
Avg pro aid tot pm <i>X</i> mean state market seats						-395.915**	
						(146.762)	


74.197

Avg liberty authority seats							(45.295)
Avg pro aid total pm X Avg liberty authority seats							-636.482**
							(277.257)
Unemployment	-87.659	-131.208**	-144.212**	-129.082**	-144.272**	-127.253**	-127.446**
	(54.050)	(54.077)	(58.535)	(58.509)	(58.376)	(50.290)	(51.710)
GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	37.454	-8.465	-7.094	1.575	1.264	13.445	9.273
	(28.711)	(37.592)	(37.045)	(32.717)	(33.018)	(31.361)	(33.292)
Log GDP per capita	-6519.553**	-1857.618	-2469.087	-3230.120	-3490.804*	-4269.753*	-3331.056
	(2446.879)	(2293.205)	(2070.884)	(1941.798)	(1905.298)	(2204.212)	(2284.058)
# Terrorist Incidents	-4.171**	-0.918	-0.881	-0.894	-0.877	-1.225	-1.400
	(1.786)	(1.040)	(1.105)	(1.388)	(1.394)	(1.300)	(1.349)
Log immigration	236.339	-525.002**	-558.341**	-495.134*	-529.280**	-531.579**	-519.841**
	(246.225)	(225.142)	(230.360)	(225.439)	(223.102)	(194.854)	(203.317)
Global aid mentions	-372.543	394.823	385.946	333.294	348.474	197.065	246.620
	(451.481)	(312.389)	(302.537)	(277.654)	(267.229)	(273.047)	(276.924)
Logged Disaster Deaths	-32.626	-59.613	-53.010	-54.178	-47.384	-28.693	-34.202
	(39.481)	(48.090)	(48.696)	(46.483)	(46.992)	(41.986)	(38.436)
Num Party Cab		254.572**	252.305**	233.859**	244.344**	117.037	89.087
		(106.169)	(93.976)	(79.789)	(80.030)	(66.981)	(95.785)
Constant	65475.192**	24762.381	31682.940	38489.710*	41868.580*	50280.754*	40287.708
	(27076.346)	(23156.505)	(20863.017)	(20208.426)	(19636.695)	(23338.507)	(24332.878)
N	146	241	241	252	252	237	237
Clusters	9	12	12	12	12	12	12
R2	0.892	0.796	0.794	0.791	0.789	0.811	0.811

[Note: Models include country fixed effects and half-decade dummies (not shown to conserve space). Standard errors are clustered by country]


Appendix F:

Figure F1: Relationship Between Aid Commitments and Disbursement



This figure presents the relationship between aid commitments and disbursements from 2002 through 2016. The dashed line represents the 45-degree line, denoting a 1:1 relationship between commitments and disbursements. The solid line is the regression line. Triangle markers denote leftwing governments, open circles represent centrist governments, and crosses represent rightwing governments.

Figure F2: Total positive and negative aid mentions over time



Appendix G: Detailed Evidence by Party from the Aid Attitudes Tracker.

This appendix describes the AAT in greater detail. As stated in the manuscript the first question asks: “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending? The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” On average 21 percent of respondents said that they had heard about their party adopt a foreign aid position, while 36 percent said that they did not hear their party adopt a position. 42 percent of the respondents said that they did not know.

In Table G1 below, we focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). We focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). Of people who identified with parties on the left as e.g. Die Grünen, 38 percent said that their party had adopted a policy position on foreign aid prior to the elections, while of respondents linked to Die Linke 34 percent said that their party had adopted a position. On the conservative end of the party spectrum we find that people are less likely to have heard their party articulate a position on foreign aid. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland only 18 percent heard their party adopt a position on foreign aid. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is 19 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 25 percent noted a policy position expressed in the run-up to the elections while among respondents who identified with the CDU/CSU 29 percent noted a policy position on foreign aid. These data provide prima facie evidence that left-leaning voters are more likely to be aware of their parties foreign policy positions than their right-leaning counterparts.

Table G1. Answers to Question “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending?”

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't Know (%)
Die Grünen	38	30	32
Die Linke	34	33	33
SPD	25	39	36
CDU/CSU	29	34	37
FDP	19	46	35
AfD	18	48	34

The second relevant question asks: “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?” The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” On average 15 percent of the respondents said that, yes, foreign aid was a priority for their political party, while 52 answered that it was not a priority. 33 percent of the respondents answered that they did not know.

In Table E2 below we focus reporting on the six parties: Of people who identified with parties on the left as e.g. “Die Grünen,” 28 percent said that foreign aid spending was a priority for their party, while 27 percent of respondents linked to “Die Linke” said that foreign aid was a priority issue. Among respondents identifying with parties of the right we find fewer people stating that foreign aid is a priority issue for their party. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland only 13 percent think that foreign aid is a priority issue, while for the FDP the percentage of respondents is 11 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 18 percent believed that foreign aid was a priority issue in the run-up to the elections, while among respondents who identified with the CDU/CSU 20 percent suggested that it was a priority for their party. These data substantiate our claim that left-leaning members of the public are more likely to think of foreign aid as a priority issue for their party than right-leaning members of the public.

Table G2. Answers to Question “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?”

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't Know (%)
Die Grünen	28	45	26
Die Linke	27	46	26
SPD	18	55	27
CDU/CSU	20	53	28
FDP	11	69	20
AfD	13	63	24

Finally, we ask respondents about the importance of foreign aid for their decision to support parties: “Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.” The answer choices included “very important,” “important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” “unimportant,” “not at all important,” and “don’t know.” On average, 27 percent of respondents finds foreign aid to be very important or important for whether they support the political party, while 32 percent say that the topic was neither important nor unimportant. 20 percent of respondents said that foreign aid was unimportant or not at all important for their decision to support the party. 20 percent indicated that they did not know.

In Table E3 below, we focus reporting on the six parties. Of people who identified with “Die Grünen,” 47 percent said that the party position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party. For respondents who identify with “Die Linke” 40 percent said that the party’s position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party a priority issue. Among respondents identifying with parties of the right we find fewer people stating that foreign aid positions matter for party support. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland 20 percent think that a foreign aid position is very important or important for deciding whether to support the party. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is slightly higher at 22 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 33 percent believed that a party position on foreign aid was very important or important for their decision to support the party, while that percentage of respondents was at 31 percent for respondents identifying with the CDU/CSU. This difference in answers across political parties suggest that for members of the public who identify with parties of the left, foreign aid positions are more important in their decision to support the party than for members of the public who support parties of the right. The implications for party leadership would be that, in light of these differences, parties of the left feel more pressure to implement their proposed policies than their conservative counterparts.

Table G3. Answers to Question Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.”

	Very important (%)	Important (%)	Neither important, nor unimportant (%)	Unimportant (%)	Not at all important (%)	Don't know (%)
Die Grünen	8	39	33	6	4	11
Die Linke	7	33	36	8	6	10
SPD	4	29	37	8	8	14
CDU/CSU	4	25	36	13	9	12
FDP	3	19	41	16	13	9
AfD	6	14	28	16	21	14

