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Frequent job changes can signal poor work attitude and reduce employability


Cohn, Alain; Maréchal, Michel André; Schneider, Frédéric; Weber, Roberto A (2021). Frequent job changes can signal poor work attitude and reduce employability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(1):475-508.

Abstract

We study whether employment history provides information about a worker’s “work attitude”, that is, the tendency to act cooperatively and reliably in the workplace. We conjecture that, holding all else equal, frequent job changes can indicate poor work attitude and that this information is transmitted through employment histories. We find support for this hypothesis across three studies that employ complementary laboratory, field, and survey experiments, as well as in labor market panel data. First, a tightly controlled laboratory labor market experiment demonstrates that prior employment information allows employers to screen for reliable and cooperative workers and that these workers obtain better employment outcomes. Secondly, we conduct a field experiment that varies the frequency of job changes in applicants’ resumes and find that those with fewer job changes receive substantially more callbacks from prospective employers. Thirdly, a survey experiment with human resources professionals confirms that the resume manipulations in the field study create different perceptions of work attitude and that these largely account for the callback differences. Finally, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesized relationships in empirical labor market data. Our work highlights the potential importance of job history as a signal of work attitude in labor markets, and points to a potential cost of frequent job changes.

Abstract

We study whether employment history provides information about a worker’s “work attitude”, that is, the tendency to act cooperatively and reliably in the workplace. We conjecture that, holding all else equal, frequent job changes can indicate poor work attitude and that this information is transmitted through employment histories. We find support for this hypothesis across three studies that employ complementary laboratory, field, and survey experiments, as well as in labor market panel data. First, a tightly controlled laboratory labor market experiment demonstrates that prior employment information allows employers to screen for reliable and cooperative workers and that these workers obtain better employment outcomes. Secondly, we conduct a field experiment that varies the frequency of job changes in applicants’ resumes and find that those with fewer job changes receive substantially more callbacks from prospective employers. Thirdly, a survey experiment with human resources professionals confirms that the resume manipulations in the field study create different perceptions of work attitude and that these largely account for the callback differences. Finally, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesized relationships in empirical labor market data. Our work highlights the potential importance of job history as a signal of work attitude in labor markets, and points to a potential cost of frequent job changes.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:General economics, econometrics and finance
Language:English
Date:16 February 2021
Deposited On:25 Jan 2021 15:49
Last Modified:19 Feb 2021 02:13
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISSN:1542-4766
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa017
Related URLs:https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/115782/

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