Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further


Meylan, Anne (2020). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:Epub ahead of print.

Abstract

Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability.

Abstract

Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability.

Statistics

Citations

Altmetrics

Downloads

1 download since deposited on 16 Feb 2021
1 download since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Social Sciences & Humanities > History and Philosophy of Science
Language:English
Date:2020
Deposited On:16 Feb 2021 12:21
Last Modified:17 Feb 2021 21:01
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:0031-8205
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12709

Download

Closed Access: Download allowed only for UZH members