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Federalism and Mitigating Climate Change: The Merits of Flexibility, Experimentalism, and Dissonance


Reich, Johannes (2021). Federalism and Mitigating Climate Change: The Merits of Flexibility, Experimentalism, and Dissonance. Transnational Environmental Law, 10(2):263-291.

Abstract

Federalism is ostensibly misplaced to mitigate climate change as a global public concern as it is prone to import the inadequate incentive structures existing at the international level into the domestic domain. Drawing from the legal structures and procedures of Swiss federalism, this article attempts to provide a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between laws designed to mitigate climate change and federalism. It seeks to demonstrate that federalism may support effective policies to mitigate climate change, provided that the architecture of domestic climate change law meets certain criteria. These include considerable federal powers, a degree of institutional flexibility, robust formal channels of influence for subnational actors on policy formulation at the federal level, ample room for regulatory experimentalism at the lower layers of federalism, and the ‘right to act’ conferred on the Federation to avoid political impasse among the constituent units.

Abstract

Federalism is ostensibly misplaced to mitigate climate change as a global public concern as it is prone to import the inadequate incentive structures existing at the international level into the domestic domain. Drawing from the legal structures and procedures of Swiss federalism, this article attempts to provide a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between laws designed to mitigate climate change and federalism. It seeks to demonstrate that federalism may support effective policies to mitigate climate change, provided that the architecture of domestic climate change law meets certain criteria. These include considerable federal powers, a degree of institutional flexibility, robust formal channels of influence for subnational actors on policy formulation at the federal level, ample room for regulatory experimentalism at the lower layers of federalism, and the ‘right to act’ conferred on the Federation to avoid political impasse among the constituent units.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:02 Faculty of Law > Bereich Dekan: Fachgr. & Lehrstühle > Constitutional, Administrative and International Law
Dewey Decimal Classification:340 Law
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Social Sciences & Humanities > Law
Uncontrolled Keywords:Environmental Law, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Federalism and Mitigating Climate Change, Experimentalism, Dissonance
Language:English
Date:1 July 2021
Deposited On:20 May 2021 09:00
Last Modified:25 Jun 2024 01:39
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:2047-1025
OA Status:Hybrid
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/s2047102521000121
  • Content: Published Version
  • Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)