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Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem


Mennle, Timo; Seuken, Sven (2021). Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 191:105144.

Abstract

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.

Abstract

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics
Dewey Decimal Classification:000 Computer science, knowledge & systems
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Economics and Econometrics
Language:English
Date:1 January 2021
Deposited On:09 Aug 2021 16:38
Last Modified:15 Aug 2021 08:03
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-0531
OA Status:Hybrid
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144

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