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Quantile stable mechanisms


Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2021). Quantile stable mechanisms. Games, 12(2):43.

Abstract

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

Abstract

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics
Uncontrolled Keywords:matching, contracts, auctions, mechanisms, incentives
Language:English
Date:17 May 2021
Deposited On:23 Aug 2021 10:55
Last Modified:24 Aug 2021 20:00
Publisher:MDPI Publishing
ISSN:2073-4336
OA Status:Gold
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020043

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Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)