Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Quantile stable mechanisms


Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2021). Quantile stable mechanisms. Games, 12(2):43.

Abstract

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

Abstract

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

Statistics

Citations

Altmetrics

Downloads

62 downloads since deposited on 23 Aug 2021
7 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics
Uncontrolled Keywords:matching, contracts, auctions, mechanisms, incentives
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Date:17 May 2021
Deposited On:23 Aug 2021 10:55
Last Modified:25 Apr 2024 01:38
Publisher:MDPI Publishing
ISSN:2073-4336
OA Status:Gold
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020043
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:21437
  • Content: Published Version
  • Language: English
  • Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)