Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2021). Quantile stable mechanisms. Games, 12(2):43.
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | matching, contracts, auctions, mechanisms, incentives |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 17 May 2021 |
| Deposited On: | 23 Aug 2021 10:55 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2021 20:00 |
| Publisher: | MDPI Publishing |
| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |
| OA Status: | Gold |
| Free access at: | Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply. |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020043 |
Chen, Peter