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Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions


Bosshard, Vitor; Wang, Ye; Seuken, Sven (2018). Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. In: Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, 13 July 2018 - 19 July 2018. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 105-113.

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Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper), not_refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Event End Date:19 July 2018
Deposited On:15 Oct 2021 13:50
Last Modified:06 Mar 2024 14:36
Publisher:International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
ISBN:9780999241127
OA Status:Hybrid
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/15
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:21580
  • Content: Published Version