Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Bosshard, Vitor; Wang, Ye; Seuken, Sven (2018). Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. In: Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, 13 July 2018 - 19 July 2018. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 105-113.
Additional indexing
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper), not_refereed, original work |
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Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
Scopus Subject Areas: | Physical Sciences > Artificial Intelligence |
Scope: | Discipline-based scholarship (basic research) |
Language: | English |
Event End Date: | 19 July 2018 |
Deposited On: | 15 Oct 2021 13:50 |
Last Modified: | 06 Mar 2024 14:36 |
Publisher: | International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization |
ISBN: | 9780999241127 |
OA Status: | Hybrid |
Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/15 |
Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:21580 |
Permanent URL
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-207658Download
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