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How to argue with a pragmatist


Logins, Artūrs (2024). How to argue with a pragmatist. Inquiry, 67(1):384-399.

Abstract

According to recently popular pragmatist views, it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper, I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction.

Abstract

According to recently popular pragmatist views, it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper, I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Health Sciences > Health Policy
Uncontrolled Keywords:Health Policy, Philosophy
Language:English
Date:2 January 2024
Deposited On:08 Feb 2022 13:25
Last Modified:26 Apr 2024 01:40
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:0020-174X
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2021.1919199
Project Information:
  • : FunderSNSF
  • : Grant IDPZ00P1_186137
  • : Project TitleGraded Epistemology