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Köhler, W (2006). Unique equilibra in the rubinstein bargaining model when the payoff set is nonconvex. International Game Theory Review, 8(3):469-482.
I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Business and International Management
Physical Sciences > General Computer Science Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Bargaining |
| Scope: | Discipline-based scholarship (basic research) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2006 |
| Deposited On: | 11 Feb 2008 12:29 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Jan 2025 04:30 |
| Publisher: | World Scientific Publishing |
| ISSN: | 0219-1989 |
| Additional Information: | Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review 2006, 8(3):469-482. DOI:10.1142/S0219198906001028 © World Scientific Publishing Company. http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198906001028 |
| Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:1903 |
Köhler, W