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Unique equilibra in the rubinstein bargaining model when the payoff set is nonconvex


Köhler, W (2006). Unique equilibra in the rubinstein bargaining model when the payoff set is nonconvex. International Game Theory Review, 8(3):469-482.

Abstract

I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

Abstract

I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Business and International Management
Physical Sciences > General Computer Science
Social Sciences & Humanities > Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bargaining
Language:English
Date:March 2006
Deposited On:11 Feb 2008 12:29
Last Modified:24 Jun 2022 09:13
Publisher:World Scientific Publishing
ISSN:0219-1989
Additional Information:Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review 2006, 8(3):469-482. DOI:10.1142/S0219198906001028 © World Scientific Publishing Company. http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198906001028
  • Content: Accepted Version