Understanding Incentives in Combinatorial Auctions under Incomplete Information
Bosshard, Vitor. Understanding Incentives in Combinatorial Auctions under Incomplete Information. 2022, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Additional indexing
| Item Type: | Dissertation (cumulative) |
|---|---|
| Referees: | Seuken Sven, Lubin Benjamin, Bichler Martin |
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics
UZH Dissertations |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 000 Computer science, knowledge & systems |
| Scope: | Discipline-based scholarship (basic research) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2022 |
| Deposited On: | 19 Jan 2023 10:08 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Mar 2024 14:38 |
| Number of Pages: | 124 |
| Additional Information: | Bosshard Trajano de Lucena, Vitor |
| OA Status: | Closed |
| Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:23111 |
Bosshard, Vitor