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THESPIAN MUSINGS BEYOND ABHINAVAGUPTA THE EMOTIONAL AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF THE ACTOR 2¹

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Introduction

As so frequently repeated in studies on Indian theatre, the actor is nothing but a vessel in his contribution to aesthetic experience, a *pātra* carrying the elixir of *rasa* to the audience, yet untouched by it. Since Bharata's seminal "Treatise on Theatre", the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (NŚ), and especially in its eleventh-century commentary by Abhinavagupta, the *Abhinavabhāratī* (ABh), the experience of a work of drama has been configured as a tasting, a savouring of the flavour of the play, the *rasa*, wrapped in literary garb by the playwright and presented on stage by the actor. While the spectator experiences the specific flavour of the play – granted that it is properly communicated through a configuration of elements known as determinants, consequents, and transitory states² – the actor is commonly believed

¹ This paper is the fruit of a close and lasting collaboration between the two authors, Elisa Ganser and Daniele Cuneo, the former being responsible for the first half (pp. 137-160), the latter for the second (pp. 161-183). The present contribution is the continuation of our ongoing research on the thespian experience, whose first instalment focused squarely on Bharata and Abhinavagupta. Elisa Ganser wishes to acknowledge the Swiss National Science Foundation for generously funding research for the present article in the framework of the project Performing Arts and Religious Practices in Classical and Medieval Sanskrit Literature (Department of Indian Studies, University of Zurich). We wish to thank Manasicha Akepi-yapornchai and Naresh Keerthi for their insightful suggestions.

² In order to fully appreciate the complexity of the emotional experience of actors beyond Abhinavagupta, we must have a baseline: the comprehension of some technical terms concerning theatrical emotionality. As endlessly reiterated in secondary sources, it all starts with Bharata's *rasasūtra*: *vibhāvānubhāvavya-*

to be excluded from the experience of *rasa*. This represents a mainstream position in Indian dramatic sources, which was popularized through a prima facie reading of Abhinavagupta as India's Diderot. However, his view of the actor's aesthetic and emotional experience is actually much more complex and nuanced than it first seems: on the one hand, it is constructed in direct opposition to more extreme Stanislavski-like stances, such as that of his predecessor Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, who believed *rasa* to be in the actor; on the other hand, it intersects with theological and philosophical positions in which Śiva-the-actor plays a central role.³ In the present article, we will concentrate more on Abhinavagupta's posterity⁴ and on how his ideas about the actor's experience were developed, borrowed, countered, discussed, or ignored in later dramaturgy.⁵

bhicārisamyogād rasanīpattiḥ, namely, “*Rasa* is produced by the union of determinants (*vibhāvas*), consequents (*anubhāvas*), and transitory states (*vyabhicāribhāvas*)”. The three basic technical terms are: 1) the *vibhāvas* (“determinants”), the factors that elicit the arousal of an emotion in a causal sense; 2) the *anubhāvas* (“consequents”), the immediate consequence and reactions of a felt emotion; and 3) the *vyabhicāribhāvas* (“transitory states”), a set of thirty-three complementary emotional states that supplement and “tinge” the basic emotion (*bhāva*), which is not directly mentioned in the *sūtrā*. From the amalgamation of all these factors on the stage, the *rasa* is “produced”. For instance, in the representation of the emotion of sadness (*śoka*) for the sake of the *rasa* called *karuṇa*, the *vibhāvas* would be events such as the death of a dear one, the loss of wealth, or imprisonment; the *anubhāvas* would be reactions such as tears and laments; and the *vyabhicāribhāvas* would be emotional states such as agitation, despair, and gloominess (on this example, see NŚ prose after 6.61).

³ We have analysed this in greater detail in another essay. See Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming.

⁴ In our investigation of conceptions of thespian emotionality beyond Abhinavagupta, we must however delimit our field of inquiry by excluding the unwieldy and utterly important domain of Bengali Vaiṣṇavism, with its creation of the intentionally paradoxical figure of the actor-devotee-spectator, as well as the *mare magnum* of contemporary performance traditions of South Asian theatre and dance (including the ‘elephant in the jungle’ that is Kūṭiyāṭṭam). For a minimal bibliography on both topics, see note 10 in Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming.

⁵ Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the *rasa* theory, with its almost exclusive focus on *rasa* as the beatific experience of the spectators, is well known amongst

Since the time of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, a twofold discourse on emotionality has been carried on by theatre's theorists. On the one hand, there are the *rasas*, the eight aesthetic emotions that the poet capably construes through the appropriate configuration of determinants, consequents, and transitory states, an inventory of which is given by Bharata for every emotional state. These elements, which allow one to instil an emotion into the fictional story, are not only the concern of the poet, but they are also, crucially, the domain of the actor. The actor's task is to bring them to life on stage, the premise being that, in order for the *rasas* to be grasped and enjoyed by the spectators, they need to be given visible form through enactment, *abhinaya*.⁶ On the other hand, the "embodied" form of emotions on

scholars of Sanskrit aesthetics. However, in order to understand the specificity of the thespian experience according to sources beyond Abhinavagupta, we need at least to survey his understanding of the three-layered process that leads the spectator to the savouring of *rasa* (*rasāsvāda*). In fact, the three steps of this process resurface again and again in the second millennium, sometimes with a different nuance and often in different contexts. This triad consists of: 1) *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* 'generalization' of the portrayed emotions, i.e. the process by which emotions become devoid of all spatial-cum-temporal qualifications as well as bereft of any reference to a specific individual, be it the fictional character, the performer, the spectator himself, or anyone else (see ABh ad NŚ 6, prose after 31, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 278; on this 'unrelatedness' as a temporary shattering of the painful limits of individuality, see, for instance, Cuneo 2013, 64); 2) *hṛdayasaṃvāda*, the emotional correspondence, a form of emotional involvement activated by the sympathy of the spectators, excited in turn by the beauty of the representation; and 3) the *tanmayī-bhāva*, the complete identification with the narrated emotional situation. At the end of this process, the self of the spectator is as if suspended in the beatific experience of *rasa*, a detached-cum-involved savouring of an emotion that has been turned into pure emotionality without place, time, or subject: a truly *alaukika* experience, completely different from any other ordinary experience. (On the numerous details that we have skipped here, see the Sanskrit text in ABh ad NŚ 6, prose after 31, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 266ff., and at least the translations by Gnoli 1968 and Pollock 2016).

⁶ This indeed corresponds to the central meaning given to acting, *abhinaya*, according to its etymological derivation. See NŚ 8.6-7: *abhipūrvas tu nīndhātur ābhimukhyārthanirṇaye | yasmāt padārthān nayati tasmāt abhinayah smṛtaḥ || vi-bhāvayati yasmāc ca nānārthān hi prayogataḥ | sākḥāṅgopāṅgasamyuktas tasmād*

stage requires another level of emotionality from the actor, called *sattva* by Bharata and the later tradition. *Sattva* is defined by Bharata as originating in the mind and as being produced through an act of concentration of the actor's mind (NŚ prose after 7.93: *sattvaṃ nāma manaḥprabhavam | tac ca samāhitamanastvād ucyate | manasaḥ samādhaū sattvanīṣpattir bhavati*). *Sattva*, Bharata explains, is especially useful for producing a group of states called *sāttvikabhāvas*, independently of the actor's momentary mood. As Bharata states:

Among the [emotions], how could pain, consisting in crying, be represented by someone not in pain, or pleasure, consisting in rapture, by someone not happy? This alone is an [actor]'s *sattva*, thanks to which [he] can show tears or horripilation, be he in pain or happy. On this basis, the *sāttvikabhāvas* are defined. And they are “paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, stammering, tremor, change of colour, tears, and fainting. These are the eight known as *sāttvika[bhāvas]*”. (NŚ 7.94)⁷

Over the centuries, a variety of positions has developed among Bharata's commentators and other dramatic theorists as to this tension between the emotionality of the story-world, shared by the audience in their sympathetic response to the play, and that of the actor, as a common person but also as a skilled interpreter of the dramatic character, capable of reproducing in his own body – at will, i.e. through an act of mindfulness – the symptoms indicative of the character's strongest emotions. Based on the twofold discourse on

abhinayaḥ smṛtaḥ ||. On the spectrum and breadth of *abhinaya* in Indian theatre, see Ganser 2007.

⁷ NŚ prose after 7.93: *tatra duḥkhaṃ nāma rodanātmakam tat katham aduḥkhitena sukhaṃ ca praharsātmakam asukhitena vābhineyam? etad evāsya sattvaṃ yat duḥkhitena sukhitena vāśruromāñcau darśaiyitavyau iti kṛtvā sāttvikā bhāvā ity abhivyākhyātāḥ | ta ime – stambhaḥ svedo 'tha romāñcaḥ svarabhedo 'tha vepathuḥ | vaivarnyam āsrupralaya ity aṣṭau sāttvikā matāḥ* || (NŚ 7.94). The passage is slightly longer and presents some textual variants. We have discussed at length its possible interpretations in Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, § 5.1.1.

rasa and *sattva* outlined so far, the questions revolve, firstly, around how the actor deals with theatrical *rasa*: does he, in some peculiar situations and under given circumstances, experience emotions aesthetically, and how does this translate to the stage and affect his acting? Secondly, how does his personal affective experience – his love for his wife, his aversion to his everyday tribulations etc. – interfere with, overlap, reflect, or become attuned to the play’s fictional emotions, thanks to the conscious mastering of his *sattva*, the mental origin and substratum of emotions at large?

In the following three sections, we deal respectively with 1) a catalogue of views on the possibility or impossibility of actors experiencing *rasa*; 2) two long, complex, and partially parallel passages from Hemacandra’s *Kāvyañuśāsana* (12th c.) and Śārngadeva’s *Saṅgītaratnākara* (13th c.) – along with its commentary, Kallinātha’s *Kalānidhi* (15th c.) – on the relation between *sattva* and *prāṇa* (the vital breath), as crucial in the manifestation of the *sāttvikabhāvas* – passages that are tentatively understood as issuing from a common source, i.e. the lost seventh chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī*; and 3) an analysis of a passage from Kumārasvāmin’s commentary on the *Pratāparudrīya*, which represents a small encyclopaedia of views on *sattva* in Sanskrit aesthetics throughout the centuries preceding the author. Our Conclusion will attempt to buttress the main findings of our contribution, especially its attempt to reconstruct a lost portion of a South Asian premodern theory of the thespian experience.

1. Thespian *rasa helter-skelter* (naṭarasacarcā)

This section is conceived as a properly arranged storage room of some Sanskrit passages from authors who worked independently of or after Abhinavagupta and expressed their views on the issue of the thespian’s emotional involvement in terms of *rasa*. It therefore aims at tracing a history of the debate around the figure of the actor beyond Abhinavagupta. In its admittedly cursory and potentially ex-

pandable nature, it also constitutes an attempt to shed further light – if only indirectly, by way of contrast – on the two maximalist positions highlighted in our previous paper. It will moreover showcase some simple differences of doctrines, some direct connections of historical indebtedness, as well as some open divergences of opinion and conception with regard to the actors’ experience, this inextricably mysterious form of consciousness and its necessarily double nature, suspended in the margins of ordinary life and theatrical play.

The intrinsic limit of the catalogue offered hereafter lies in the partial analysis of the various aesthetic theories that motivate and buttress the various views concerning the actor. In particular, for the first two cases – the most important ones, the two pairs of authors that are Dhanañjaya-Dhanika and Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra – their open, “possibilistic” views of the actor’s emotional involvement as aesthetic experience do show a stark and illuminating contrast with regard to the more maximalist views of Lollaṭa and Abhinavagupta. However, it is not possible here to treat, at any length, their very different and distinctive theories of the epistemology and ontology of *rasa*, which imbue, qualify, and potentially explain their views of the actor.⁸

Around the end of the tenth century, the *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya and its commentary, Dhanika’s *Avaloka*, offered the first extant comprehensive reformulation of dramaturgy since Bharata. Their aesthetic theory, whose primary focus is the experience of the spectator, does contemplate the possibility of the actor relishing the *rasa*. However, this is envisaged as an option, not a necessary element per se for the success of the play. The pivotal passage is *Daśarūpaka* 4.42cd, which reads: “The actor is not excluded from tasting by way of the aesthetic realization of the subject matter of poetry (*kāvya-rthabhāvanāsvādo nartakasya na vāryate*)”.⁹ Dhanika comments

⁸ For a few recent references, see Pollock 2016, 154-180, Ollett 2020 and Patel 2020 on Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, and Pollock 2016, 239-247 and Restifo 2019 on Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra.

⁹ We do agree with the hypothesis held by Pollock 2010 and 2016 (and already

thereupon: “The actor does not experience *rasa* on the basis of a real-world *rasa*, for when he is acting, the woman he is perceiving as an object of sexual pleasure is not his own wife. But there is nothing stopping him, as he ‘actualizes’ [‘realizes,’ *in our understanding*] the subject matter of the literary work, from savouring the literary *rasa* just as the rest of us do” (Pollock 2016, 177).¹⁰ Without entering into the details of the theory, it is clear that the emotion from which the actor is not excluded is the aesthetic emotion (*kāvya-rasa*, also called *nāṭya-rasa*) that pertains to a spectator and not any worldly, common emotion (*laukika-rasa*), being that of the story-world or his own. Such workaday emotion as for one’s wife (the *bhāva* in

proposed by several scholars before him, such as Raghavan 1978, 469) that the idea of *bhāvanā* in Dhanañjaya-Dhanika is borrowed from, or at least closely linked with, the conception of *bhāvanā* in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. However, we agree with Reich’s philosophical investigation of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka as close to Vedānta rather than to Mīmāṃsā, built in part against the background of the recent debate between David 2016 and Ollett 2016. Accordingly, if Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s *bhāvanā* is the aesthetic counterpart of *bhāvanā* in Vedānta, i.e. “the process of developing and refining a state of awareness, often through meditation, and often via a preliminarily stage mediated by language” (Reich 2018, 548), we prefer to render the term as “aesthetic realization”, or simply “realization”, in the stead of “actualization”. This translation aims at highlighting the mental process that *bhāvanā* consists of and at veering away from any reference to an “actual” production or effectuation of something, which lies at the heart of the Mīmāṃsaka meaning of the term *bhāvanā*. Moreover, along the lines of this veritable process of aesthetic distillation, the identification of *bhāvanā* and *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* should constantly be kept in mind.

¹⁰ *Avaloka* ad *Daśarūpaka* 4.42, p. 220: *nartako 'pi na laukikarasena rasavān bhāvet | tadānīm bhogyatvena svamahilāder agrahaṇāt | kāvyārthabhāvanāyām tv asmadādivat kāvyarasāsvādo 'syāpi na vāryate |* Although it does not add much, the text of the two commentators is also worth recording here. Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha comments (p. 220): *nanu rāmādyanukāryam anukurvan nartako 'pi rasavān bhavati | tad rāmādigatalaukikarasena rasavattve hi yujyate | tatrāha kāvyārtheti | so 'pi na laukikarasena rasavān | kiṃ tarhi? asmadādivat kāvyaraseṇety arthaḥ |* Bahurūpamiśra, who directly comments on the *Daśarūpaka*, without explicitly passing through the *Avaloka*, so to speaks, briefly states (p. 127): *nartako 'pi na laukikarasena rasavān bhavet | svamahilām bhuñjanasya laukikasya yo rasa na tena rasavān nartaka ity arthaḥ |*

Abhinavagupta's terminology) is explicitly excluded, as this would indeed interfere in the play's performance.

Another work that deserves to be mentioned here is the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, two Jain authors, direct pupils of Hemacandra, the renowned twelfth-century polymath who authored the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*.¹¹ With regard to the experience of the actor, the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* displays a position similar to that of the *Daśarūpaka-Avaloka*: it is indeed possible for the actor to savour the aesthetic experience, though only sometimes.¹² The authors of the text knew the *Abhinavabhāratī* and they were thus well aware of the existence of the *pātra* view, expressed there, that the performers remain untouched by any emotional commitment to *rasa*.¹³ Therefore, their “possibilistic” openness towards the actor's aesthetic involvement is perhaps a stance directly aimed against Abhinavagupta and conceivably indebted to the position of the *Daśarūpaka*. In the auto-commentary to the seventh verse of the third chapter, they in fact write: *na ca naṭasya raso na bhavatīti ekāntaḥ*.¹⁴ “And it is not that there can be no *rasa* for the actor. This would be an absolute [and thus flawed] assertion”.¹⁵ The reason they give for the possibility of *rasa* in the actor leans on convincing examples taken from the universally shared phenomenology of life and art: “Courtesans, in their desire for monetary gain, make a display of sexual pleasure

¹¹ On Hemacandra and his contribution to our present concern, see § 2.

¹² Possibly as a consequence of their Jain “propensity to integrate multiple possibilities and positions at once”, as argued by Restifo 2019, 11, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra generally have a very open view on the locus of *rasa* and they argue (*svopajñāṭikā* ad 3.7, p. 142): *rasaś ca mukhyalokagataḥ prekṣakagataḥ kāvyasya śrotranusandhāyakadvayagato veti* |. “As for the *rasa* itself, it is located in the main characters, in the spectator in the case of drama, and in the listener and reader both in the case of a work of poetry” (Pollock 2016, 242). As noticed by Pollock 2016, 399, n. 17, the word *anusandhāyaka* is ambiguous and could also denote the composer of the literary work, i.e. the author.

¹³ See Restifo 2019, *passim*.

¹⁴ *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* 3.7 (*svopajñāṭikā*), p. 142, line 16.

¹⁵ We are indebted to Restifo 2019 for recognizing the implicit reference to the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda*.

and the like in order to please someone else, but they can sometimes experience the highest degree of pleasure themselves. Singers too are sometimes themselves delighted.¹⁶ In the same way an actor, imitating the *rasa* of the erotic thwarted in Rama, for example, may well on occasion come to identify with him completely” (Pollock 2016, 243).¹⁷ “Identification” (*tanmayībhāva*) with the emotion of the enacted character corresponds to the third and last step in Abhinavagupta’s analysis of the aesthetic experience, in which, after the “generalization” (*sadhāraṇīkaraṇa*) and “emotional correspondence” (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*), a spectator is led directly to the savouring of *rasa*. As argued in our previous paper, although he may have access to the first two steps, this final step evades the actor lest he be totally engrossed in the aesthetic experience and even access the reality of the character and his most uncontrollable states, such as loss of consciousness or even death, which would lead directly to failure in mastering one’s own acting technique. The *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*’s reference to *tanmayībhāva* as possible for the actor seems to be a direct

¹⁶ These two examples question and echo two positions held in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. The first is that, according to Abhinavagupta, courtesans are always faking emotions, *yathā veśyā dhanārthinī kṛtakāṃ ratim ādarśayati* (ABh ad NS̄ 6.71, vol. 1, p. 322), and the second that singers get engrossed in the subject matter of their songs, going through the aesthetic stages of emotional correspondence (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*) and even identification (*tanmayībhāva*) (NS̄ 4.263cd-264ab, vol. 1, p. 173). With regard to the latter, the position of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra is more nuanced, since the root *rañj-* can refer to an emotional “colouring”, but also to a more general form of pleasure, close to entertainment.

¹⁷ *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* 3.7 (*svopajñāṭikā*), p. 142: *paṇyastriyo hi dhanalobhena pararatyartham ratyādi vipaṅcayantyaḥ kadācit svayam api parāṃ ratim anubhavanti | gāyanās ca paraṃ rañjayantaḥ kadācit svayam api rajyante | evaṃ naṭo ’pi rāmādigataṃ vipralambhādy anukurvāṇaḥ kadācit svayam api tanmayībhāvam upayāti eveti |*. On the fact that emotional involvement is a mere possibility and no necessity, as it would be in the Stanislavskian view on actoriality, see *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* 3.151 (*svopajñāṭikā*), p. 188: *prahr̥ṣṭo ’pi hi rāmeṇa rudite rodati, na tu hasati. viṣaṅgo ’pi ca hasite hasati, na tu rodi[tī]tyādi |*. “Even though he may be happy, he weeps when Rama is supposed to weep, and does not laugh; though he himself may be sad, he laughs when Rama is supposed to laugh, and does not weep, and so forth” (Pollock 2016, 246).

reply to its absence in Bhaṭṭa Tauta's account, as it was given and seemingly seconded by Abhinavagupta. This absence of identification is the very kernel of the fully controlled emotionality of the actor as reconstructed in our account of the *Abhinavabhāratī*.¹⁸

Our brief inventory continues with Śārṅgadeva's monumental *Saṅgītaratnākara* (13th c., Maharashtra), a text that focuses mainly on dance and musical practice and treats aesthetic theory only marginally. Unsurprisingly, as the *Saṅgītaratnākara* borrows extensively from the *Abhinavabhāratī* throughout its discussion of music and dance, it follows Abhinavagupta's stance with an elegant and pithy rephrasing: *sāmājikas tu lihate rasān pātraṃ naṭo mataḥ*. "The spectator drinks up the *rasas*, while the actor is considered to be [just] a vessel".¹⁹ Along similar lines, Kallinātha's commentary, the *Kalānidhi* (15th c., Karnataka) glosses this passage: *yathā loke pānakādirasasya caṣakādikam ādhāratvena, na tu tadāsvādajñātrtvena | evaṃ naṭo 'pi rasāsvādako na bhavati |*, "Just as in the world, a cup or any other container for drinks such as the *pānaka* has the function of a support, and not of a cognizer of the [drinks'] savouring, in the same way neither is the actor a savourer of *rasa*".

Another text that follows Abhinavagupta's view of the actor, albeit disagreeing with him on several other matters, is the ambitiously encyclopaedic *Bhāvaprakāśana* by Śāradātanaya (13th century, Tamil Nadu).²⁰ It clearly states: *pratyakṣavat sadasyebhyo naṭā yad anukurvate || tasmān naṭeṣu na kvāpi rasasyāśrayatā bhavet |*, "Since actors enact [the plays] as if directly visible to the audience, they cannot ever be the locus of *rasa*".²¹ As to the locus of *rasa*, the text does generally follow the standard view: *ataḥ sāmājikasyaiva*

¹⁸ See Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, § 4.

¹⁹ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1361ab, p. 401.

²⁰ On the aesthetic theory, the cultural milieu, and the scholarly project of Śāradātanaya, see the rich introduction of the edition by Yadugiri Yatiraja and Ramaswami Sastri, Cox 2013, and Cox 2016, 56-90.

²¹ *Bhāvaprakāśana*, chapter 2, pp. 39 (line 22)-40 (line 1).

rasasyāśrayatā sthitā |, “Thus it is only the spectator who is established to be the locus of *rasa*”.²²

A very celebrated work in the second millennium is the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* of Viśvanātha (14th-15th c., Odisha). His position on the actor’s emotional involvement seems to represent a bridge between Abhinavagupta’s denial of the aesthetic experience and Lollaṭa’s acceptance of it, though the terminological use of the expression *bhāvanā* probably does suggest an indebtedness to the *Daśarūpaka* and its commentary.²³ Viśvanātha states: “As he displays the nature of Rāma and the like merely by means of his expertise, training, and so forth, the actor should not be savouring the *rasa*. But by ‘realizing’ the subject matter of the poetical text, he might as well receive the name ‘spectator.’”²⁴ The commentary explains: “Conversely, if the actor in his turn were to show that he has obtained the nature of Rāma and the like himself, by way of ‘realizing’ the meaning of the poetical text, then he might be reckoned among the audience as well”.²⁵ The passage remains slightly ambiguous as to whether the

²² *Bhāvaprakāśana*, chapter 6, p. 153, line 14. See, again, for instance, a passage from Cox 2016, 68: “First of all, in its clear insistence on the presence of *rasa* in the awareness of the spectator, the passage takes its mark from the post-Abhinavagupta era of aesthetic theory”.

²³ On the connection between Dhanañjaya-Dhanika’s *bhāvanā* and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s *bhāvanā*, see note 8.

²⁴ *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.18ab-19, p. 120 (in the edition by Kṛṣṇa Mohan Thakur): *śikṣābhyaśādīmātreṇa rāghavāder svarūpatām || darśayan nartako naika rasasyāsvādako bhavet | kāvyārthabhāvanenāyam api sabhyapadāspadam ||*.

²⁵ Viśvanātha’s *Sudhākara* ad *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.18ab-19, p. 120: *yadi punar naṭo ‘pi kāvyārthabhāvanayā rāmādisvarūpatām ātmano darśayet tadā so ‘pi sabhyamadhyā eva gaṇyate* |. The pioneering translation by Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra, *The Mirror of Composition*, rendered more freely and maybe differently: “That is to say – if, on the other hand, through his realizing the import of poetry, he enacts the character of Rāma as if he felt it to be his own, then he – the actor – too is reckoned among the audience – and whatever we may remark of them, applies so far to him”. The *Locana* of Anantadāsa and the *Vijñāpriyā* read, respectively (p. 84): *sabhyamadhyā eva gaṇyate | etāvataḥ sabhyaniṣṭa eva rasaḥ ity arthaḥ*; and *sa yadā kāvyārthabhāvakaḥ syāt tadā so ‘pi sāmājiko bhaved iti* |. The *Vivṛti* by Rāmācāraṇa Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya adds some clarifying remarks on *śikṣā* and *abhyāsa*

actor is deemed to actually experience the *rasa* or he is just amenable to be called spectator metaphorically because of his activity, though the former option seems more probable.

A lesser-known work, the Keralan treatise by Sarveśvarācārya entitled *Sāhityasāra*, seems to be based on the account of the *Daśarūpaka* and its commentary, at least as far as the experience of the actor is concerned. One passage reads: *kāvyaṛthabhāvanāsvādo nartakasyāpi vartatām*.²⁶

As advertised at its beginning, the nature of this section is cursory and simply indicative of a variety of opinions by a selection of authors with respect to the possibility that the actor might be the locus of *rasa*, or at least experience the *rasa* while realizing the emotional state of the character he is enacting. What does this entail from the point of view of the actor's technique? How does he deal with his own emotional sphere while at the same time portraying that of the character in a detached manner, or realizing it as his own? As we have shown in our previous paper, the key for explaining such processes as part of the enactment is *sattva*, the purest aspect of the mind, which – in Abhinavagupta's very nuanced understanding – accounts for the capacity of the actors to keep a dynamic, creative, but also detached-cum-involved posture.²⁷

(p. 90): *guruto grahaṇam śikṣā | śikṣitārthasya muhur anuṣṭhānena saṃskārātīśayo 'bhyāsaḥ | mātrapadena kāvyārthabhāvanāvyavacchedaḥ | ayam api nartako 'pi | sabhyapadāspadam sabhyapadavācyaḥ |*. The modern commentary *Lakṣmī* by the editor Krsna Mohan Thakur (1947) adds (p. 120): *kāvyaṛthabhāvananeti | kāvyārthabhāvanena abhinīyamānakāvyaṛthajñānena abhinayaṃ darśayann iti śeṣaḥ | ayam api nartako 'pi | sabhyapadāspadam sabhyapadavācya 'ṅgikriyata iti śeṣaḥ | tathā ca śravyakāvye 'pi kāvyārthabhāvanayā vācako hi rasāsvādayitā syād evety ūhanīyam |*. Particularly interesting, as it further blurs the lines between audience and performer, is the closing remark on the possibility of the presence of *rasa* even in someone who recites a piece of poetry.

²⁶ Sarveśvarācārya's *Sāhityaśāstra* 5.73ab, p. 55.

²⁷ However, "le *sattva*, on le sait, peut-être un autre nom du *manas*, l'esprit" (Bansat-Boudon 1992, 362, n. 349). This being the case, *sattva* is simply the source of emotionality *tout court* for every embodied being. But it also designates the capacity to control this very internal organ, which determines a cleaving distinc-

2. Abhinavagupta's vital breath, lost and found (prāṇātmakasattvacarcā)

In this second section, we will investigate the thespian musings of three Sanskrit authors, Hemacandra, Śārṅgadeva and Kallinātha. By following the *fil rouge* of *sattva* as the psychophysical engine behind the *sāttvikabhāvas*, we will argue for a common source for these speculations, the now lost-and-found seventh chapter of Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī*. In this chapter, the Kashmirian master had in all probability further expounded his ideas on *sattva* and the emotional involvement of the actor. In a subsequent chapter, in fact, he alludes to his views on the twofold nature of *sattva* as unmanifest – an emotional state abiding in the consciousness – and as manifested – a bodily modification consisting in the eight psychophysical reactions. As Abhinavagupta suggests, this was a topic he dealt with in greater detail in his commentary on the seventh chapter:

In this regard, moreover, the unmanifest *sattva*, not descended from the two planes of consciousness (*saṃvit*) and vital breath (*prāṇa*), has to be known only on the basis of the chapter on the *bhāvas* (i.e. NŚ 7). And its qualities (*guṇa*) that have attained the limits of the body – horripilation and the others – have also been stated to some extent there [in the chapter on the *bhāvas*].²⁸

tion between people of low nature and people of high nature in ordinary life, and wannabe actors and superior performers in the theatrical domain. For an analysis of the polysemic nature of *sattva* and the different levels at which it works, see Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming § 5, especially § 5.2.6.

²⁸ ABh ad NŚ 22.3, vol. 3, p. 152: *tatra cāvyaktaṃ saṃvitprāṇabhūmidvayānīpatitaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhāvādhyāyasamśrayatvenaiva vijñeyam | tasya ca ye guṇā dehaparyantāṃ prāptā dharmā (corr. dharmā) romāñcādayaḥ te 'pi tatraivoktāḥ kiṃcit |*. On our interpretation of this passage on the unmanifest *sattva* as comprehending the double plane of consciousness and *prāṇa*, see Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, n. 117.

The crucial element Abhinavagupta adds here to Bharata's account of *sattva* is *prāṇa*, the vital breath, acting as a hinge at the frontier between the subtle and material planes. Even if it participates in the unmanifest dimension of *sattva*, the vital breath allows for communication between the two spheres (*ibid.*, 153: *cittavṛttirūpaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhūkāyasaṃkrāntaprāṇadehadharmatāvaśād bhavad api bhāvādhyāye rasādhyāye ca vitatya nirūpitam* |, “That *sattva*, which consists in a mental mood, and also exists on account of its being a property of the body when *prāṇa* is transferred to the gross body, has been described in detail in the chapter on the *bhāvas* and in that on the *rasas*”). As we propose, the specification that *sattva* is, in its first unmanifest stage, a *cittavṛtti* might suggest that what is intended here is a general theory of how emotions translate to a physical form.

In another chapter, the first, Abhinavagupta alludes to a thespian technique that uses the conscious control of *prāṇa* and its placing in eight different bodily stations in order to produce, at will, the visible manifestations of the eight *sāttvikabhāvas*. It is worth repeating the passage here:

Should one place the breath between the eyebrows, one has paralysis; tears relate to the eyes; perspiration [when the breath is placed] in the heart; tremor, in the anus; horripilation, in the forehead; change of colour, in the face; stammering, in the throat; fainting, in the interior of the nose.²⁹

Without entering the details of the soteriological implications that Abhinavagupta attributes to the actors in mastering this complex technique of mind-breath control, we may now read a passage in Hemacandra's discussion of *sattva*, and how *prāṇa* participates in it.

²⁹ ABh ad NŚ 1.23, p. 17: *nyasyet prāṇaṃ bhruvor madhye stambho bāṣpaś ca cākṣuṣaḥ | svedo hṛdi guḍe kampaḥ pulako mūrdhni vaktrataḥ | vaivarṇyam svaritaṃ kaṇṭhe pralayo nāsikāntare* ||.

Scholars of Sanskrit dramaturgy and poetics know all too well the importance of the Jain polymath Hemacandra (12th c., Gujarat) in reconstructing the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta.³⁰ For instance, the importance of the *Kāvyañuśāsana* with regard to the commentary on the *rasasūtra* cannot be overestimated.³¹ We hazard here the bet that a passage of Hemacandra's text, with no direct parallels in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, may be a witness for another chapter as well, the mostly lost seventh chapter of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.³² Even if it were possible to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that Hemacandra's theory does not contain ideas that preserve the thought of Abhinavagupta, the text would still prove to be important in itself as it would

³⁰ Already Rāmakrishna Kavi, the first editor of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, included some variants gleaned from Hemacandra. In his review of the first volume of the Gaekwad Oriental Series, which came out one year later than the editio princeps in 1927, De first denounced Kavi's silent use of Hemacandra in editing the sixth chapter of the ABh (De 1927, 865-866). After these early efforts, the list of scholars who perused the *Kāvyañuśāsana* is very long. Here we might just recall Gnoli, our *paramaguru*, with his pioneering *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (1968), and Kulkarni, whose collected essays are called *Abhinavabhāratī Text Restored and Other Articles* (2003). As an entryway to Hemacandra's contribution to Sanskrit poetics, see Tubb 1998. A somewhat outdated but quite rich study of the *Kāvyañuśāsana* is Upadhyay 1987.

³¹ Another glaring example concerns the discussion of the nature of dance, parts of which were incorporated by Hemacandra in his discussion of dramatic genres in the eighth chapter of his sub-commentary [*Kāvyañuśāsana*-] *Viveka*. These passages were in all probability used by Kavi to edit the fourth chapter of the ABh, which went unnoticed in secondary literature. As a consequence, some of Hemacandra's readings found their way into all successive editions of the ABh. For a discussion thereof, see Ganser forthcoming.

³² The idea is not originally ours, as Kulkarni (1998, 33) has already stated: "Hemacandra's discussion of the *sāttvikas* [...] is surely enough based, to the best of our belief, on the missing portion of the *Abhinavabhāratī* (ch. VII) dealing with the *sāttvikabhāvas*". However, we are trying to give a wider contextualization to the passage within our study of the actor's emotional involvement in Abhinavagupta and beyond. This portion of the *Kāvyañuśāsana* has been translated into English by Patwardhan (reproduced in Kulkarni 2003, 193-197) and into German by Both (2003, 240-245).

represents an original, theoretical development on the concept of *sattva* as the emotional organ of human beings and probably also as the actor's faculty to mould one's own emotional expressivity. Such a theoretical transformation might in turn be a reflection of a development in the reality of training and practice among the troupes of actors in late medieval India.

The textual corpus of the *Kāvyañuśāsana* is organized into three levels, each composed by Hemacandra: 1) the *mūla*, the root text in brief aphorisms; 2) the *Alaṃkārācūḍāmaṇi*, a relatively short commentary that provides definitions and offers the main ideas; and 3) the *Viveka*, a long commentary that provides exemplifications and further discussions. Numerous passages in all three levels are taken more or less verbatim from previous authors.³³ The portion under discussion revolves around aphorism 53 of the second chapter of the *Kāvyañuśāsana*. The most important level for our present discussion is the *Alaṃkārācūḍāmaṇi* (p. 144-147), but it is worth quoting the *mūla*, as it is just one line of text listing the familiar *sāttvikas*.

The eight psychophysical states are paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, stammering, tremor, change of colour, weeping, and fainting.
|| 2.53 ||³⁴

The commentary on this time-honoured list of psychophysical reactions offers a complex interpretation of the term *sattva*, which is here plainly equated with *prāṇa*, the vital breath, depicted as the connecting element between mind and physical body.

What is called *sattva* is an object consisting of *prāṇa*, the vital breath, because of the etymology “[*sattva*] is the place in which the

³³ For a summary of Hemacandra's sources, see Kulkarni 1983. For a short treatment of Hemacandra's style of textual reuse, see Cuneo 2017, 238-239.

³⁴ *stambhasvedaromāñcasvarabhedakampavaivarnyāśrupralayā aṣṭau sāttvikāḥ* | (*Kāvyañuśāsana*, *mūla* 2.53, p. 144).

mind resides (from the root *sad*, ‘to sit’)[, i.e. the *prāṇa*]”,³⁵ because of the predominance of the quality of *sattva*,³⁶ and because of its goodness.³⁷ The *sāttvika* [states] [are so called because of the *taddhita* suffix in the sense:] “located in that (*tatra bhavāḥ*)” [*sattva*]. The term *bhāva*, ‘emotional state,’ has to be supplied [from a previous aphorism as coordinated with *sāttvikāḥ*].³⁸ And these [*sāttvika-bhāvas*] are the mental modes (*saṃvedanavṛtti*) such as delight etc. when they are displaced to the plane of the vital breath (*prāṇa*),³⁹

³⁵ The idea that the mind resides within *prāṇa* is probably a reference to the doctrine of sheaths (*kośa*), or at least it is understood like that by Kumārasvāmin (see below, n. 92).

³⁶ The reference is to the three qualities of Sāṃkhya: *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. For a discussion of the thespian *sattva* as a quality of Sāṃkhya, see Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, § 5.2.5. The concept of *sattva* is indeed commonly understood as the *guṇa* of Sāṃkhya; for instance, as Viśvanātha states in the *Sudhākara*, his auto-commentary on the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (3.134): *sattvaṃ nāma svātmaviśramaprakāśakārī kaścanāntaro dharmah* | Various commentators closely follow this line of reasoning. Anantadāsa’s *Locana* comments (p. 138): *kaścanāntaro dharmah* | *sa ca paragataduḥkharṣādibhāvanāyām atyantānukūlāntaḥkaraṇatvam* | *tasya ca samāhitamanastvena rāghavādisamānad* [sic!] *āntaratvam* | The *Vijñāpriyā* comments (p. 138): *ātmaviśrameti* | *rajastamo ’dhīnavikārārāhityena ātmanah sthitiḥ viśrāmaḥ* | *tatprakāśaḥ tadutpattis tatkārity arthaḥ* | Rāmacaraṇa Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya’s *Vivṛti* comments (p. 144): *svātmani eva viśrāmo yasya sa rasādīḥ, tasya prakāśa udbodhas tatkāri* | The modern commentary *Lakṣmī* adds (p. 216): *svātmani sāmājikātmani evaṃ viśrāmo ’vasthitir yasya sa rasādīḥ tasya prakāśa udbodhaḥ tat kartuṃ śīlaṃ yasya sa tathoktaḥ* | *āntaro dharmah sa ca paragataduḥkharṣādibhāvanāyām atyantānukūlāntaḥkaraṇatvam* | *tasya ca samāhitamanastvena rāghavādisamānād āntaratvam* | *sāṃkhyakārikāyām apy uktam ’sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam’ ityādi* | On *sattva* as the main *guṇa* of the mind when it is devoid of *rajas* and *tamas*, see also a late and interesting text, Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara’s *Rasapradīpa*, p. 18: *anubhāvalakṣaṇam āha dhanikaḥ – anubhāvo vikāras tu bhāvasūcanātmakaḥ iti* | *sāttvikās tv etadantargatā eva teṣām api ratyādīkāryatvād bhinnatayā pratipādanam tu niyatakāraṇasattvajanitatvāt* | *tallakṣaṇam tu – rajastamobhyām asprīṣṭam manah sattvam ihocyate* | *nirvṛttaye śya tadyogāt prabhavānti sāttvikāḥ* | *iti* | *asya rasasyeti prakṛtaparāmarśaḥ* |

³⁷ The term *sādhutva* is understood as a possible synonym of *sattva*.

³⁸ In this usage, *vartate* is a synonym of *anuvartate* (see Tubb-Boose 2007, 166).

³⁹ By paraphrasing this passage as the opinion of “others” (*kecit*, see below note 94), Kumārasvāmin’s *Ratnāṇa* confirms that the *sāttvikabhāvas* are basic-

and they are different from those that are external and corporal, such as the physical tears, etc. They are emotional states, insofar as they are brought to the fore by a determinant (*vibhāva*) – which is associated with those very [*sthāyibhāvas*], such as delight, and is the object of intense rumination⁴⁰ – and are understood by means of the

ly to be equated with the *sthāyibhāvas* when they are transferred from the mental plane to the plane of *prāṇa*, another name of which is *sattva*. Patwardhan must have found this theoretical twist unsettling, as he smooths it out by rendering it as follows: “The *sāttvikabhāvas* are associated with the emotions (or psychic states) such as *rati* (love) etc., which arise (or emerge) from the bed-rock (*bhūmi*) of the vital force” (Kulkarni 2003, 93). This analysis of the compound *prāṇa-bhūmiprasṛtaratyādīsamvedanavṛttayaḥ* disregards the relationship between the stable states, *prāṇa*, and the psychophysical states, as established both by the *Viveka* sub-commentary and, more crucially, by two parallels in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. The *Viveka* reads: *ratyādayaś cītavṛttiviśeṣāḥ pūrvam saṃvidrūpāḥ samullasanti | tata ābhyanāprāṇān te svarūpādhyāsenā kaluṣayanti |*. This might be rendered as: “Specific mental modes such as delight, etc. first manifest as forms of consciousness, then they affect the internal vital breaths by the superimposition of their own natures”. This idea might well constitute a parallel with ABh ad NŚ 22.3, p. 152: *tatra cāvyaaktaṃ saṃvitprāṇabhūmidvayānīpatitaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhāvādhyāyasaṃśrayatvenaiva vijñeyam |* (see above, note 28). It is this textual parallel that triggered Kulkarni’s idea that the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* might preserve here some lost passages from the seventh chapter of the ABh (see Kulkarni 2003, 77-78). Cf. also ABh ad NŚ 22.3, vol. 3, p. 153: *saṃvedanarūpāt prasṛtaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad vicāritaṃ | anyat tu dehadharmatvenaiva sthitaṃ |*.

⁴⁰ Here Patwardhan (in Kulkarni 2003, 94) translates: “They are produced only by the *vibhāvas* associated as causes with the emotions or psychic states as *rati* (love), etc. and are beyond the pale of aesthetic experience (*aticarvaṇāgocareṇa*)”. Apart from understanding the prefix *ati-* in the sense of “beyond, transgressing” and not as “excessive, intense”, which we prefer here, the main problem in Patwardhan’s translation is that he appears to take the *sāttvikabhāvas* as being “beyond the pale of aesthetic experience”, whereas *aticarvaṇāgocareṇa* must be construed with the singular *vibhāvena*. The intense rumination on the *vibhāva* might in turn be connected with the spectator, the character, or the actor. The first candidate, the spectator, might not be intended here as the active agent of an aesthetic experience as conceived in Abhinavaguptian terms (called variously *carvaṇā*, *āsvāda*, *rasanā*, *bhoga*, *visrānti*, *camatkāra*, etc.), since the object of the rumination would then have been the *rasa*. By contrast, the actor would probably not be entitled to aesthetically taste a determinant that is not his own. The character seems to be most likely intended here as the one lingering intensely, or ruminating, though in a non-aesthet-

consequents (*anubhāvas*).⁴¹

Hemacandra continues by illustrating how the displacement of *prāṇa* across the elements that constitute the material body produces the psychophysical reactions. Is he talking about the mastery of *sattva-prāṇa* on the part of the actor that allows for the “voluntary” manifestation of seemingly “involuntary” reactions? Or is he talking about the spontaneous flow of *prāṇa* in the truly “involuntary” manifestation of psychophysical reactions? Or possibly both at the same time? These questions are better left open for the time being.

To illustrate: a group of mental modes transferred to the *prāṇa* in which the earth part predominates becomes paralysis, i.e. consciousness is paralysed. When it is transferred to the [*prāṇa*] in which the water part predominates, we have tears. On the basis of the proximity between *prāṇa* and the element of fire, *prāṇa* can affect [fire] in two ways, intensely or weakly; that is why there are two types [of results, i.e.] perspiration and change of colour. And it is because of this [conjunction of *prāṇa* with the elements] that these appellations are used.⁴² When [*prāṇa*] affects ether, there is fainting, which is a loss of consciousness. According to the experts on Bharata,⁴³ when wind moves independently,⁴⁴ since it can pervade [the body]

ic way, on the determinant of his emotion, which then might be thought to trigger the transfer of the stable state to the *prāṇic* level, and eventually also to the gross, bodily level, producing those symptoms that, in real life, are the spontaneous consequents of intensely felt emotions.

⁴¹ *Kāvyaṅśāsana, Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi*, p. 144-145: *sīdaty asmin mana iti vyutpatteh sattvaguṇotkarṣāt sādhutvāc ca prāṇātmakam vastu sattvam, tatra bhavāḥ sāttvikāḥ | bhāvā iti vartate | te ca prāṇabhūmiprasrataratyādisaṃvedanavṛttayo bāhyajaḍarūpabhautikanetrajalādivilakṣaṇā vibhāvena ratyādigatenaivātica-rvaṅgocarenāḥṛtā anubhāvaiś ca gamyamānā bhāvā bhavanti |*

⁴² This statement remains partially enigmatic.

⁴³ It is extremely tempting to see an allusion to Abhinavagupta and his *Abhinavabhāratī* in this reverential reference to the masters of theatrical knowledge.

⁴⁴ By relying only on Hemacandra’s text, the expression *vāyusvātantrya* seems unclear. Patwardhan (Kulkarni 2003, 194) states: “We expect *vāyu-anugrahe* on the analogy of *tejas-anugraha* and *ākāśānugraha*”. Both 2003, 241 attempts a dif-

slightly, in a moderate way or intensely, the condition is threefold in terms of the states of horripilation, tremor, and stammering. On the contrary, external paralysis and the like are consequents, corporal qualities, and by conveying the intermediate *sāttvika* states, they actually convey delight, aversion, and other [emotional states].⁴⁵ This is the established thesis.⁴⁶

Much of the difficulty of this passage resides in understanding the exact mechanics of *prāṇa* with regard to the emotions, on the one hand, and material elements, on the other. Our understanding of some crucial terms, such as *anugraha* (“to affect”, “to favour”, “to seize”, “to be infused with”), and their actual functioning (what is the direction of this “influence”? Is it the *prāṇa* that affects the elements or the other way around?)⁴⁷ has benefited from our reading

ferent solution and translates the passage as follows: “Aber entsprechend seinem [des Lebensodem] langsamen, mittleren oder heftigen Eindringen unter der Vorherrschaft des (Elements) Wind sind die Zustände dreifach: Gänsehaut, Zittern, das Versagen der Stimme, so (verkünden) die Kenner (des Lehrbuchs) von Bharata”. However, the parallel passage of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, and especially the *Kalānidhi*, sheds light on the intended meaning by clarifying that *prāṇa* indeed consists of the element of wind (*vāyu*), which sometimes moves freely throughout the body (*svapradhāna* or *svatantra*) when it does not rest on the other elements (see below, SR 7.1650cd-1653, and notes 67-70). The parallel explanation of this process and the common lexicon used suggest a common source for both, most probably our lost-and-found *Abhinavabhāratī*.

⁴⁵ Note that *rati* is the first in the canonical list of the eight *sthāyībhāvas*, while *nirveda* is first in Bharata’s list of the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas*. Therefore, the compound *ratinirvedādi* refers to the entire group of *bhāvas*, with the exception of the eight *sāttvikas* that have a twofold nature.

⁴⁶ *Kāvyaṇūsāsana, Alaṃkāracūḍāmaṇi*, p. 145-147: *tathā hi | pṛthivībhāgapradhāne prāṇe samkrāntas cittaṅganaḥ stambho viṣṭabhacetanatvaṃ | jalabhāgapradhāne tu bāṣpaḥ | tejasas tu prāṇanaikatyaḍ ubhayathā tīvrātīvratvena prāṇānugraha iti dvidhā svedo vaivarṇyaṃ ca | taddhetutvāc ca tathāvya-vahāraḥ | ākāśānugrahe gatacetanatvaṃ pralayaḥ | vāyusvātantrye tu tasya mandamadhyotkrṣṭāveśāt tredhā romāñcavepathusvarabhedabhāvena sthitir iti bharatavidyaḥ | bāhyās tu stambhādayaḥ śarīradharmā anubhāvāḥ | te cāntarālikān sāttvikān bhāvān gamayantaḥ paramārthato ratinirvedādigamakā iti sthītam |*

⁴⁷ The two expressions *prāṇānugrahe* and *ākāśānugrahe* seem to indicate that

of the parallel passage in the *Saṅgītaratnākara* and its commentary *Kalānidhi*, which moreover provides further insight into the connection between the emotionally altered consciousness and the vital breath.

The *Viveka*, the third textual level of the *Kāvyaṅuśāsana*, offers some clarifications on this portion of the *Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* and provides the reader with poetic examples for a plurality of *sāttvika* manifestations. It shows once again how the emotions are 1) born in the mind and, 2) through the intermediary stage of the vital breath, 3) reach the body with the production of the external reactions, unless these are kept restrained by a conscious effort at concealment.⁴⁸ Besides containing examples for each of the psychophysical states, which do not shed particular light upon the subject under scrutiny, this portion of the *Viveka* is often difficult to understand and it presents several textual problems. Therefore, we shall interrupt here our investigation of this passage.

In order to conclude this incursion into Hemacandra's work as a possible source of Abhinavagupta's take on the workings of *sattva* and/or as an independent source for the historical fluctuations of this dense concept, let us try to take stock of what the text adds to our knowledge of *sattva* and its dynamics. First and foremost, Hemacandra identifies *sattva* with *prāṇa*, while simultaneously giving an etymological derivation, highlighting its connection with the *sattva-guṇa* of Sāṃkhya, and drawing an equivalence between *sattva* and *sādhutva*, an utterly positive association whose full connotations cannot be spelled out on the strength of the text alone.

the relation between *prāṇa* and the elements is on the same level and that the action designated by the root *anu-grah-* goes both ways ("embrace"?).

⁴⁸ With regard to a Prakrit example on the attempt of a young girl to conceal the stirrings of her heart in front of an elder, Hemacandra explains: "In this case, delight, descended from its [purely] mental form, does not become external and does not culminate in corporal alterations. Thus, it is described by the poet as reposing only on the plane of the vital breath". (*atra ratir manorūpatvāc cyutā bāhyā bhautikavikāraparyavasāyini ca na jāteti prāṇabhūmāv eva viśrāntā varṇitā* |, *Viveka*, p. 145)

Secondly, Hemacandra clearly traces the three-step course that leads emotions from their origin within the mind through the plane of the vital breath to their external manifestation at the corporal level. Thirdly, Hemacandra depicts a one-to-one correspondence between eight combinations of *prāṇa* with the five elements and the eight *sāttvikabhāvas*. As hinted above, this taxonomy could be interpreted as both a descriptive outline of the manifestation of the *sāttvikabhāvas* and a prescriptive indication regarding the semi-yogic technique that actors should master in order to manifest the psychophysical reactions.

Searching for explicit or implicit parallels in Abhinavagupta's discussions of *sattva*, we do not find in the *Abhinavabhāratī* an exclusive and straight-up identification between *sattva* and *prāṇa*, although *prāṇa* is indeed already a pivotal element in the dynamics of *sattva* and is clearly linked with the thespian production of the *sāttvikabhāvas* in the commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.23 reported above.⁴⁹ Secondly, as already mentioned, we do find hints of a three-step progression of the emotional course, with some striking lexical similarities, in the passage stating: "the unmanifest *sattva* is not descended from the two planes of consciousness and vital breath".⁵⁰ The third implicit step is obviously the plane of the body in which *sattva* would be manifested in a gross form. As to the third and last point made by Hemacandra, i.e. the details of the circulation of *prāṇa* in connection with the material elements for the production of the eight *sāttvikas*, we do not find any parallel in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Nonetheless, as we have seen, in the commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.23, Abhinavagupta offers a different circulation pat-

⁴⁹ In other words, it seems that in Abhinavagupta's understanding, *sattva* is not identical with *prāṇa*, but *prāṇa* is a form or a stage of *sattva*, the intermediate stage that connects the inner emotional core to the outer emotional manifestation. Hemacandra's straightforward identification between *sattva* and *prāṇa* might not be an innovation, but another rendering of Abhinavagupta's theory, based on the crucial importance of the vital breath as the veritable engine of the *sāttvikas*.

⁵⁰ ABh ad NŚ 22.3, cf. above, notes 28 and 39.

tern for *prāṇa* in the production of the *sāttvikas*, a pattern in which the vital breath's field of movement is the physical body itself. For instance, horripilation is produced by placing the *prāṇa* in the forehead, while placing it in the heart causes perspiration.⁵¹ It is only a matter of speculation and educated guess as to whether these two ways of understanding the relation between the vital breath and the *sāttvikas* are completely separate theories (and acting techniques), one upheld by Abhinavagupta and the other by Hemacandra, or two aspects of a more complex picture, which was described in the lost portion of the *Abhinavabhāratī* and whose outline can be gleaned only by piecing together the elements we now find in the two separate texts.

If we were to accept the second hypothesis, on the grounds that the other elements introduced by Hemacandra do find resonance in Abhinavagupta's text, we might try and combine the two dynamics of *prāṇa* by pairing them with the two domains of discourse that Abhinavagupta had in mind: theatre and the world. To be clearer, it is conceivable that the mechanics of *prāṇa* that we find in Hemacandra is a description of how the psychophysical reactions come about in the world, as the examples for the manifestations of each *sāttvikabhāva* in the *Viveka* suggest. For instance, when the news of her husband's death reaches her, tears run down the face of a warrior's wife. According to the subtle physiology sketched above, this happens because the emotion of grief born in her mind reaches the level of *prāṇa*, which gets then mixed with the element of water and produces tears at the level of the body. These are the dynamics of *sattva* in the real world, which explains how emotions move us and reach the body, through *prāṇa*. Conversely, an actress does not really have the emotion of grief and has to employ her mastery over her own *sattva* in order to direct her *prāṇa* to her eyes and produce the *sāttvikabhāva* that theatrical tears are. These are the other mechanics of *prāṇa*, those hinted at in the first chapter of the *Abhinabhāratī*,

⁵¹ See note 29 above.

that are the purview of the actor's technique and that fully resonate with Bharata's definition of *sattva* as *manaḥsamādhāna*. This double-sided reconstructed picture of the discourse on *sattva* would be bound to remain in the realm of those alluring hypotheses that only further research might prove or disprove, were it not for an additional piece of evidence coming from a later, thirteenth-century source on dance and music, the *Saṅgītaratnākara* of Śārṅgadeva.

As already alluded to in the first section, with regard to both Śārṅgadeva's and his fifteenth-century commentator Kallinātha's views on the actor as a vessel unable to be touched by *rasa*, the *Saṅgītaratnākara* and the *Kalānidhi* follow the *Abhinavabhāratī* quite closely in matters of aesthetics.⁵² It is therefore not a complete surprise that its section on the *sāttvikabhāvas* shows striking similarities with Hemacandra, since both take Abhinavagupta as their primary source of inspiration. Now, the fact that the *Saṅgītaratnākara* and the *Kalānidhi* do not appear to know Hemacandra, but employ the same ideas and vocabulary to talk about the connection of *sattva*, *prāṇa*, and the emotions, pleads for their common indebtedness to another source, namely the *Abhinavabhāratī* and its lost chapter on the *bhāvas*. Although the text of the *Saṅgītaratnākara* and *Kalānidhi* do not add much to the already delineated voyage of *sattva* throughout the mind-body complex, they help clarify a few difficulties in the *Kāvyānuśāsana* and, more importantly, they help us reconstruct the history of the transmission of the *Abhinavabhāratī* beyond Hemacandra.⁵³ What is more, they provide addition-

⁵² Śārṅgadeva's indebtedness to the *Abhinavabhāratī* is explicitly declared in the initial verses of the first chapter of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, where the author pays homage to his predecessors; see SR 1.19. Some of Abhinavagupta's positions on specific topics related to dance are also restated in the chapter devoted to it, the seventh. On Kallinātha's direct access to the *Abhinavabhāratī* independently of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, see Ganser forthcoming, § 4.1.

⁵³ This disproves Pollock's suggestion that "aside from a group of thinkers all working in late twelfth-century Gujarat [...] no succeeding writer on aesthetics had access to the New Dramatic Art" (Pollock 2016, 189). On other sources that incorporate parts of the *Abhinavabhāratī* beyond Gujarat and beyond the twelfth c.,

al evidence for the survival of the (now lost) commentary on chapter 7 (and possibly 8) of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in medieval India.⁵⁴

The *Saṅgītaratnākara* is organized into three main sections covering the topics of singing (*gīta*), instrumental music (*vādyā*), and dancing (*nṛtta* or *nartana*). The discussion on aesthetics comes in the last chapter, on dancing, after the description of the movements that form part of its technique and the genres of dance. The section starts with a description of the *rasas*, the *sthāyibhāvas*, the *vya-bhicāribhāvas*, and, finally, the *sāttvikabhāvas*. The discourse on *sattva* and *prāṇa* that parallels the passage in Hemacandra is, just like in the *Kāvyaṅuśāsana* itself, part of the explanation of the *sāttvikabhāvas*. The discussion, spanning SR 7.1645cd-1654, unfolds as follows:

Now comes the definition of the *sāttvikas*:

When consciousness is altered through states such as delight and the others previously mentioned, it imposes itself on the vital breath, and the vital breath reaches⁵⁵ the body. At that time, these alterations, such as paralysis and others, arise in the body. || 7.1645cd-1646 ||⁵⁶

In the *Kalānidhi*,⁵⁷ the commentator explains the process of the *sāttvikabhāvas*' production, here outlined in stunning brevity, as a

see Ganser forthcoming, § 4.1, and Cox 2013.

⁵⁴ There is in fact a lacuna spanning most of chapter 7 and chapter 8 in all extant manuscripts of the *Abhinavabhāratī*.

⁵⁵ Our translation of *tanoti* as 'reaches' is an attempt at a sufficiently neutral rendering of a term that the commentator interprets in more than one way (see below).

⁵⁶ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1645cd-1646: *atha sāttvikalakṣaṇam – uktai ratyādī-bhir bhāvaiḥ saṃvid vikriyate yadā || 1645 || prāṇe 'dhyasyati sātmanam dehaṃ prāṇas tanoti saḥ | tadā stambhādayo dehe vikārāḥ prabhavanty amī || 1646 ||*.

⁵⁷ Sometimes, in accordance with our understanding of the text, we have modified the punctuation of the edition referenced in the notes. Despite the inelegance of the choice and the risk of imprecision in some fringe cases between referencing, rehashing, and commenting, we have marked what we took as *pratikas* in bold in

causal chain in four steps: 1) consciousness abides in itself without an object; 2) the presence of emotive states alters that consciousness; 3) that altered consciousness superimposes itself on *prāṇa*; 4) the *prāṇa* so modified reaches the body, producing the *sāttvika* states, such as paralysis and others.

Now the [author] states the definition of the *sāttvikabhāvas* in the following section. As to verses 1645cd-1646: **When consciousness**, i.e. “knowledge” not turned towards an object, **is altered**, i.e. is turned towards a particular object through the stable **states such as delight and others**. **That** altered consciousness **imposes itself**, i.e. superimposes itself – which actually means “the shape of self-consciousness” – **on the vital breath**, that particular wind that is the cause of life and that moves within the body. **The vital breath reaches the body**, i.e. the gross body; to explain: [it] turns [the body] into itself, insofar as the shape of consciousness has been imposed on that [vital breath]. It produces the idea of itself⁵⁸ on the body. This is the meaning. Here the word “itself”, which is found in the first sentence, has to be supplied by repeating it in this sentence, since otherwise there would be no new element and therefore the sentence would be syntactically incorrect.⁵⁹ This is the explanation if the verbal form *tanoti* is taken in the sense of *karoti* (“it makes”).

order to simplify the readability of the translation and to highlight the workings of the commentary.

⁵⁸ The term *ātman* in *ātmabuddhi* is ambiguous. It might be used as a pronoun and refer to *prāṇa*, as our translation suggests, or it might refer to the Self, the *ātman*. However, in this context, the Self would be a synonym of consciousness (*saṃvid*), and consciousness has just imposed itself on *prāṇa*; it has, so to say, impregnated it. Thus, the two interpretations would not make a significant difference in the understanding of the overall passage.

⁵⁹ In this first interpretation of the *Kalānidhi*, the commentator is forced to assume the term *ātmānam* twice, with the two verbs *adhyasyati* and *tanoti*. His reasoning is that, by interpreting *tanoti* as *karoti* the construction requires a double accusative: “it makes the body itself”; we need a new sentence focus, a new element, a *vidheya* in the technical Mīmāṃsā sense of “the new information given in a sentence”, as opposed to *anuvāda*, the part of the sentence we already know about from the context.

If, on the contrary, it is taken in the sense of “extension”, there is no need to supply again the meaning [of the word “itself”]. The sense would be: the vital breath expands the body. **It reaches the body**, it extends it, it increases it by means of the shape of the vital breath. The one and only final meaning that should be understood is: it produces the idea of itself on the body. As to the passage with the expression “**then paralysis and the others**”: precisely when it [i.e. the vital breath] imposes itself⁶⁰ on the body in this manner, **these alterations**, such as paralysis and others, **arise in the body**. Thus the causal network in the production of the *sāttvika*[*bhāva*]s has been shown. The expression “**alteration in the body**” shows that paralysis etc. that are external are also the consequents of delight and the other [stable emotions]. The paralysis etc. that are internal, on the contrary, must be understood to have only the nature of *sāttvikas*.⁶¹

In these last lines, after the analysis of the whole causal process that leads to the production of the physical externalization of internal emotions, the commentator Kallinātha introduces the distinction

⁶⁰ The word *ātman* in this sentence could refer to three possible referents: the Self (*ātman*), consciousness (*saṃvit*), or the vital breath (*prāṇa*) on which consciousness has been superimposed. But the general understanding of the workings of *sattva* would not change.

⁶¹ *Kalānidhi*, p. 466-467: *atha sāttvikabhāvān lakṣayitum āha – athetyādīnā | uktair ityādi | ratyādībhīr bhāvaiḥ sthāyibhāvaiḥ, saṃvid viṣayānabhimukhaṃ jñānaṃ yadā vikriyate viṣayaviśeṣābhimukhikriyate | sāv vikriyamānā saṃvit prāṇe śarīrāntaścāre jīvananimitte vāyuvīśeṣe, ātmānaṃ svasaṃvidākāram ity arthaḥ, adhyasyati āropayati | sa prāṇo dehaṃ sthūladehaṃ ātmānaṃ tanoti adhyastasaṃvidākāram karoti | deha ātmabuddhiṃ janayatiṭy arthaḥ | atrātmānaṃ iti pūrpavākyasthaṃ padam āvṛtīyāsmīn vākye yojanīyam | anyathātra vidheyābhāvād asaṃgatīḥ syāt | tanoteḥ karotyarthāśrayaṇatva evaṃ vyākhyānaṃ | vistārārthaṭve tv arthāvṛttir na karaṇīyā | sa prāṇo dehaṃ tanoṭīti bhāvaḥ | dehaṃ tanoti vistārayati prāṇākāreṇa vṛddhiṃ karoti | deha ātmabuddhiṃ janayatiṭi sa eva phalito 'rtho 'vaṅantavyaḥ | tadā stambhādāya iti | yadaivaivaṃ paramparayā dehe cātmādhyāso bhavati tadā stambhādāyo 'mī dehe vikārāḥ prabhavanṭīti sāttvikoṭpattau sāmagrī darśitā | dehe vikāra ity anena bhāyānām stambhādīnām ratyādyanubhāvatvam api darśitaṃ bhavati | āntarānām tu stambhādīnām sāttvikavam evety avagantavyam || 1645-1646 ||.*

into internal and external *sāttvikas*, which is clearly implied in the next two verses of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*. According to an equation already established by Abhinavagupta, he recognizes and clarifies the twofold nature of the psychophysical states: in their internal form, they can be equated to mental moods, and as such they are brought about by the *vibhāvas*; in their external manifestations, they are equated to their own symptoms and thus participate in the category of *anubhāvas*.⁶² The difference between the internal *sāttvikas* and the other *bhāvas* seems to lie in the latter's link to *prāṇa*, the vital breath, which in the next passage is basically equated with *sattva*.

This being the case, as they are determined through the determining factors (*vibhāva*) that are proper to delight and the other [stable states] that are being savoured, and as they are revealed (*anubhāvita*) by bodily paralysis etc., the internal states manifest on the basis of the vital breath on which consciousness has been imposed. These must be recognized as *sāttvikabhāvas*, since they manifest on the basis of the vital breath that is *sattva*. || 7.1647-1648 ||⁶³

Kallinātha comments:

As to the passage starting with “**This being the case**”, “**this being the case**” means in the aforementioned way, i.e. when alterations such as paralysis and the others arise in the body. **Proper to delight and the other [stable states] that are being savoured** means connected with them; the meaning is that they are each time delimited differently for the various stable states. **They are determined**, i.e. produced, **through determining factors** such as pleasure gardens and the like. **They are revealed (*anubhāvita*)**, i.e. they are made

⁶² See Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, § 5.2.1.

⁶³ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1647-1648: *evaṃ sati svādyamānaratyādīsvair vibhāvakaiḥ | vibhāvītā dehasaṃsthaiḥ stambhādyair anubhāvītāḥ || 1647 || adhyastasaṃvidi prāṇe prakāśante 'ntare bhavāḥ | ete syuḥ sāttvikā bhāvāḥ sattvapraṇāprakāśanāt || 1648 ||*. As with the previous verses, we are translating in accordance with the understanding of the commentator, even when his interpretations might look far-fetched.

to be experienced, by alterations such as **bodily paralysis etc.** The meaning is that they are manifested. **They manifest**, i.e. they become visible, **on the basis of the vital breath**, i.e. resorting to the vital breath, **on which consciousness has been imposed**, which is the way of understanding the compound (*adhyastasaṃvidi*). **The internal states** means the states that are produced in the stated manner as internal, i.e. as within consciousness. **These must be recognized as *sāttvikabhāvas***, since they manifest on the basis of the vital breath that is *sattva*, i.e. on the basis of the vital breath called *sattva*.⁶⁴

After interpreting *sattva* as the vital breath, thanks to which the internal *sāttvikas* reach the body and manifest as external symptoms, Śārngadeva gives two additional interpretations for *sattva*, which are also provided by Hemacandra and reflected in the *Ratnāpaṇa*.⁶⁵

Alternatively, *sattva* is also the quality stated in Sāṃkhya, or it is said to be goodness. In this context, goodness is understood as [the fact of] having pure vital breath and body. The *sāttvika* states are understood by the sages as abiding in that *sattva*. || 7.1649-1650ab ||⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *Kalānidhi*, p. 467-468: *evaṃ sāttvyādi. evaṃ saty uktaparakāreṇa dehe stambhādiṣu vikāreṣūtpanneṣu | svādyamānaratyādisvair iti | svādyamānās ca te ratyādayas ca teṣāṃ svaiḥ sambandhibhiḥ. ratyādīnām pratiniyatair ity arthaḥ | vibhāvakair lalanodyānādibhir vibhāvītā utpāditāḥ | dehasaṃsthaiḥ stambhādyair vikārair anubhāvītā anubhāvvyatvaṃ prāpitāḥ | prakāśitā ity arthaḥ | adhyastasaṃvidīti | adhyastā saṃvid yasminn iti tathoktas tasmin | prāṇe prakāśanta iti | prāṇam āśritya pratibhāsanta ity arthaḥ | antare bhavāḥ iti | uktaparakāreṇāntare 'ntarātmani bhavāḥ sambhūtāḥ | ete bhāvāḥ sattvapraṇāprakāśanāt sattvākhye prāṇe prakāśanāt sāttvikāḥ syuḥ || 1647, 1648 ||.*

⁶⁵ For the *Ratnāpaṇa*, see next section.

⁶⁶ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1649-1650ab: *sāṃkhyokto vā guṇaḥ sattvaṃ sādhutvaṃ vā tad ucyate | nirmalaprāṇadehatvaṃ sādhutvaṃ iha saṃmatam || 1649 || tatra sattve bhavāḥ bhāvāḥ sāttvikāḥ saṃmatāḥ satām |.* The commentary just adds that these are two other interpretations, belonging to others, of the meaning of the word *sattva*, and that there are in total three views on that matter. *Kalānidhi*, p. 468: *matāntarāśrayaṇena sattvaśabdasyārthāntaraṃ darśayati – sāṃkhyokto vetvyādi | tatreti | triṣu pakṣeṣu |.*

Having given these two alternative interpretations of *sattva*, Śārṅgadeva goes back to the interpretation he prefers, the one that identifies *sattva* with *prāṇa*, and connects *prāṇa* with the elements, just like in Hemacandra's text. However, unlike Hemacandra, Śārṅgadeva links it only with four of them, while the fifth element, wind (*vāyu*), is absent, since it is directly equated with *prāṇa* as the commentary explains.

It rests predominantly on the four elements, starting with earth; sometimes, when it is predominant, the vital breath moves within the body. || 7.1650cd-1651ab ||⁶⁷

As for the passage concerning “**the four, etc.**”, **it, the vital breath** in the form of wind, [rests] **on the four elements, starting with earth**, i.e. earth, water, fire, and ether in succession; **sometimes, when it is predominant**, i.e. when wind itself is predominant, **it moves within the body**. This is the syntactic connection.⁶⁸

The next statement in the *Saṅgītaratnākara* is again very close to Hemacandra's formulations, where *prāṇa* is said to combine with the different elements and thereby produces the different external *sāttvikabhāvas*.

When it is located in the earth, it produces the state of paralysis; from the vital breath situated in water, tears; from the one situated in fire, change of colour and perspiration; [and] from the one positioned in ether, fainting is produced. Thereafter, when it is independent (*svatantra*), as it assumes a slow, moderate, or violent form, it produces, respectively, horripilation, tremor, and stammering.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1650cd-1651ab: *catvāri kṣmādibhūtāni prādhānyenāvalambate* || 1650 || *kadācit svapradhānaḥ san dehe prāṇaś caraty ayam* |.

⁶⁸ *Kalānidhi*, p. 468: *catvārītyādi* | *ayaṃ prāṇo vāyurūpaś catvāri kṣmādibhūtāni* *prthivyaptejākāśāni paryāyeṇa* | *kadācit svapradhāna* *svātmā vāyur eva pradhānaḥ san dehe caratīti sambandhaḥ* |.

⁶⁹ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1651cd-1653: *yadādhyāste dharāṃ stambhaṃ bhāvaṃ*

Apart from connecting the five elements with the eight *sāttvika-bhāvas* in identical ways, the *Saṅgītaratnākara* helps us understand the *Alaṃkāracūḍamaṇi*'s puzzling statement about the *svātantrya* of wind – which probably has to be identified as *prāṇa* itself also in Hemacandra's text, as Śārṅgadeva uses the same term (*svatantra*), which Kallinātha notes as being itself predominant, without resting upon the other elements.

At this juncture, the author explains the manifestation of the states, such as paralysis etc., when the vital breath rests upon the earth and the other [elements]: **when it is located, etc.** As to the passage “**from [the vital breath] situated in water, tears**”, the expression “are produced” has to be supplied. From the vital breath **situated in fire, change of colour and perspiration** are produced. This is the syntactic connection. From the vital breath **positioned in ether, fainting is produced. Thereafter**, after that, **this** vital breath, i.e. wind, is **independent**, i.e. is predominant, without resting upon earth and the other elements. With reference to the passage “**As it assumes a slow, moderate, or violent form, respectively**”: when the wind that is the vital breath is slow, it **produces horripilation**; a moderate wind produces **tremor**, and a violent wind produces **stammering**. The respective sequence should be understood in this way.⁷⁰

bhāvayate tadā || 1651 || *prāṇāj jalasthād aśrūṇi tejasthāt tu vivarṇatā* | *svedaś cākāśaniṣṭhāt tu pralayo jāyate tataḥ* || 1652 || *svatantra 'sau kramān mandamadhyaṭivratvabhedabhāk* | *romāñcam vepathum atha svarabhedam ca bhāvayet* || 1653 ||.

⁷⁰ *Kalānidhi*, p. 468-469: *tatra prāṇasya pṛthivyādyavalambane stambhādibhāvodbhāvanam āha – yadādhyāsta ityādi. jalasthād aśrūṇīti* | *jāyanta ity adhyāhāryam* | *tejasthāt prāṇād vivarṇatā svedaś ca jāyata iti saṃbandhaḥ* | *ākāśaniṣṭhāt prāṇāt tu pralayo jāyate* | *tato 'nantaram asau prāṇo vāyuh svatantraḥ pṛthivyādyavalambya* [corr.; °avalambya Ed.] *svaprādhānyena vartamānaḥ* | *kramān mandamadhyaṭivratvabhedabhāḡ iti* | *mandah prāṇavāyū romāñcam bhāvayet* | *madhyo vāyur vepathum bhāvayet* | *atha tīvro vāyuh svара-bhedam ca bhāvayed iti kramo draṣṭavyaḥ* |.

Finally, before providing a list of determinants and consequents for every *sāttvika* state, Śārṅgadeva adds an interesting remark about the production of the external symptoms of the *sāttvikabhāvas* in the body, reiterating their twofold nature as internal and external, and introducing a further distinction in the emoting agents, according to their capacity to control the external production of the *sāttvikas* as bodily alterations such as real tears etc.

The external paralysis etc. obtain easily on the body of those men who mistake the body for the self. On the contrary, they are not easily produced for those who do not have this false conception. || 7.1654 ||⁷¹

As Kallinātha clarifies, the process of producing the *sāttvikabhāvas* from the connection of *prāṇa* with the four elements or from *prāṇa* alone was completely internal, while their external manifestation is a further step – one that is facilitated, so to say, by the *erroneous* identification of the body and self, and only impeded by correct insight into the nature of consciousness.

As to the passage beginning with “**The external** etc.”, in the way explained previously, the *sāttvika* states that are paralysis, etc. are exclusively internal. **The external paralysis etc.** are consequents, as they are alterations in that [body]. Those who think that the self is nothing but the body are called “**those who mistake the body for the self**”. The sense is that they are foolish. **For** these men, [the external *sāttvika* states] **obtain easily in the body**. They quickly appear as soon as a determinant is present. This is the meaning. **For those who do not have this false conception**, who regard the self as separate from the complex of body, senses, etc., **they**, i.e. the external paralysis etc., are not easily produced. They do not arise from the simple presence of a determinant. This is the meaning.⁷²

⁷¹ *Saṅgītaratnākara* 7.1654: *bāhyāḥ stambhādayo dehe nṛṇāṃ dehātmanāninām | sulabhā durlabhās tv ete satām anabhimāninām ||*

⁷² *Kalānidhī*, p. 469: *bāhyā ityādi | uktaprakāreṇa stambhādayaḥ sāttvikā*

To wrap up what we have learned from this close analysis of these two passages of Hemacandra and Śārṅgadeva-Kallinātha, it is no overstatement to conclude that the similarities are too evident to exclude a common source. The lost (and now partially found) portion of Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī* is the only candidate we know that meets any set of minimal historical requirements, such as 1) being known to both authors as the point of reference for scholarship on actoriality and 2) employing a very similar technical terminology. As to the details about the nature and dynamics of *prāṇa* as the crucial element in the movement from inner emotions to outer expressions, the *Sanḡītaratnākara* and its commentary confirm and clarify the three focal elements that are found in Hemacandra (the *prāṇa-sattva* equation, the three-layer externalization process, and the correspondence between the connection of *prāṇa* with the elements and the *sāttvikabhāvas*). As mentioned above, these elements present both similarities and differences with the *prāṇa* dynamics as found in the extant portions of the *Abhinavabhāratī*. However, now that we understand Hemacandra-Śārṅgadeva-Kallinātha as relying on a common source, the proposal of a post-Abhinavaguptian historical development to be attributed to a single known author seems far less likely. Nevertheless, the sceptics might always postulate the existence of a common source different from the *Abhinavabhāratī*, a text that predates Hemacandra (and maybe even Abhinavagupta), that is the source of the new theoretical development, and that is now lost to history. This historical scenario cannot be completely ruled out. All things considered, though, as of now the *Abhinavabhāratī* remains the most likely candidate. Therefore, this historical reconstruction sheds a different, more possibilistic light on our

*ābhyanarā eva | tadvikāratvenānubhāvā bāhyāḥ stambhādayaḥ | dehā-
tmamānināṃ deham evātmānaṃ manyanta iti tathoktāḥ | pāmarā ity arthaḥ |
teṣāṃ nṛṇāṃ dehe sulabhāḥ | vibhāvasadbhāvamātreṇa śīghraṃ prādurbhavantīty
arthaḥ | ete bāhyāḥ stambhādayo 'nabhimānināṃ satāṃ dehendriyādivya-
tīrīktāmadarśināṃ dehe tu durlabhāḥ | vibhāvasadbhāvamātrān nodbhavantīty
arthaḥ ||.*

daring proposal of the existence, in Abhinavagupta's theory, of the dual dynamics of *prāṇa-sattva*: 1) the ordinary path of the world, accounting for the externalization of emotions in real-life situations, and 2) the extraordinary path of the thespian craft, accounting for the almost uncanny capacity of actors to produce, at will, the external symptoms of emotions that they are not actually "feeling" in the full sense of the term.

3. *The conceptual bazaar of sattva* (naṭasahrdayasattvacarcā)

This last section is a lightly annotated and contextualized translation of one of the richest passages on the nature(s) of *sattva* within Sanskrit dramaturgy, which will further enlighten our historical appraisal of the second-millennium understandings of this concept. It is a portion of the commentary of Kumārasvāmin (early 15th century), the son of the celebrated author Mallinātha, on the verse listing the *sāttvikabhāvas* in Vidyānātha's *Pratāparudrīya* or *Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa*, a fourteenth-century "treatise of poetics that at the same time functioned – as loudly proclaimed in the title itself – as an encomium to his patron, Prataparudra, king of Warangal" (Pollock 2016, 255).⁷³

The relatively short passage of the *Ratnāpaṇa*, "Le marché de pierreries" (Filliozat 1967, vii), is a veritable treasure trove of interpretations on what *sattva* is supposed to be according to various named and unnamed interpreters – some of whom can easily be identified (like Dhanika and Hemaçandra), while others remain more shadowy figures. As is the case in the first part of the discussion, on the possibility of the actor experiencing the *rasa*, with its

⁷³ The text of the *Pratāparudrīya* boasts a French translation by Filliozat 1967 along with a "traduction très abrégée et libre du commentaire de Kumārasvāmin" (Filliozat 1967, xx). The passage on the *sāttvikabhāvas* dealt with here is found on pp. 134-136. For our translation, however, we follow V. Raghavan's 1979 edition of the Sanskrit text.

cursory and ancillary nature, and the second part, with its venture of retrieving lost portions of the *Abhinavabhāratī* through the *Kāvya-nuśāsana* and the *Saṅgītaratnākara-Kalānidhi*, the *Ratnāpaṇa* finds its place here in order to highlight other possible avenues of research into the history of *sattva* and illuminates and nuances Abhinavagupta's grand theory through the prism of other possible takes on the same concept.

In particular, the most interesting insight offered by the passage under consideration concerns how the first and possibly favourite interpretation of *sattva* that Kumārasvāmin offers betrays the (indirect?) influence of Dhanika and focuses on the attribution of *sattva* to the spectator, an issue we have not yet tackled directly. In this reading, *sattva* becomes a form of emotional empathy, a sort of equivalent of Abhinavagupta's *sahrdayatva* ("connoisseurship"), and even a substitute for the whole three-layer aesthetic process sketched at the outset of the present study.⁷⁴

Let's now move to the text and its translation. Vidyānātha starts by introducing the verse on the *sāttvikabhāvas* with a general definition of *sattva* that is already reminiscent of Dhanika's definition of the term (see below).

Here come the psychophysical states. *Sattva* is how the internal organ is made to be (*bhāvita*)⁷⁵ when there occurs a "realization" (*bhāvanā*) of another's feelings of pleasure etc.⁷⁶ The psychophys-

⁷⁴ On the three-layer aesthetic path in Abhinavagupta's theory, see note 5 above. For a discussion of *sahrdayatva* and its possible equation with *hrdayasaṃvāda*, the second step of the aesthetic path, see Cuneo-Ganser forthcoming, note 64. For a minimal bibliography on *sahrdayatva*, see Cuneo 2013, 64-65, note 46.

⁷⁵ We opted for a clumsily literal and vague translation, which leaves space for various interpretations and further semantic shifts such as "realized", "perfumed", "influenced", "processed", "refined", "impregnated". On Dhanāñjaya-Dhanika and our rendering of *bhāvanā*, see note 9.

⁷⁶ As a first approximation, according to Vidyānātha, *sattva* is an empathic faculty of the mind that allows for the reproduction of another's feelings in one's own "psychophysical organism". As it is almost certain that it is Dhanika's theory that lies behind Vidyānātha's definition here, we have opted for our rendering of

ical states are so called as they are due to that [*sattva*]. Paralysis, fainting, horripilation, perspiration, change of colour, tremor, tears, and stammering: these are the well-known eight psychophysical states.⁷⁷

The *Ratnāpaṇa* starts the gloss thereupon by mentioning the reason why this group of states is mentioned separately, which is the crux of the whole passage, though they belong to the previously treated group of consequents (*anubhāvas*) of emotions:

To begin with, even if the psychophysical states, in the form of effects, are also well known to be consequents – insofar as they function, just like sidelong glances and the like, as clues to the emotional states – they have been treated separately, just as one mentions both brahmins and renouncers [to indicate that renouncers form a special group], even when the renouncers referred to are all brahmins (*brāhmaṇaparivrājakanyāya*). By defining *sattva*, the author is stating the special reason for this treatment.⁷⁸

Kumārasvāmin continues by expounding on Vidyānātha’s definition of *sattva* and hence *sāttvikabhāva*:

The sense is that *sattva* is the utmost attunement (*atyantānukūlatva*) of the internal organ in terms of “realization” of another’s pleasure, pain, and other feelings by means of such instruments as acting. The author then states the meaning of the suffix in the term *sāttvika* by

bhāvanā based on the insights offered by Reich 2018 against Pollock’s translation of *bhāvanā* as “actualization”, even if this reading already steers the text towards the interpretation of Kumārasvāmin (see again note 8).

⁷⁷ *Pratāparudrīya*, p. 158: *atha sāttvikabhāvāḥ. paragatasukhādibhāvanā-bhāvitāntaḥkaraṇatvaṃ sattvam | tato bhavāḥ sāttvikāḥ | stambhaḥ pralayaromāñcau svedo vaivarnyavopathū | asru vaisvryam ity aṣṭau sāttvikāḥ parikīrtitāḥ ||*.

⁷⁸ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 158: *atha sāttvikānām api kāryabhūtānām kaṭākṣādivat bhāvasaṃsūcanātmakatvenānubhāvatve siddhe 'pi teṣām brāhmaṇaparivrājakanyāyena pṛthagupādāne 'śadhāraṇakāraṇam āha – paragateti |*. On the maxim of the *brāhmaṇaparivrājakanyāya*, see Jacob 1907: 37.

saying that [they are] “**due to that [sattva]**”. The sense is that the psychophysical states are brought about thanks to the *sattva*.⁷⁹

Kumārasvāmin then concludes his reasoning and seals the distinction between consequents and psychophysical states, quoting Śāradātanaya’s *Bhāvaprakāśana*.

It is just through an internal organ of such kind [i.e. emotionally attuned] that the sidelong glances and the like are realized. That is the reason why they belong only to the group of consequents, not to the psychophysical states.⁸⁰ This has been taught in the *Bhāvaprakāśa*: “*Sattva* is that utmost attunement (*atyantenānukūlyena*) of the mind, thanks to which there is the realization of somebody’s mental state (*tadbhāvabhāvana*) by means of a consequent of another’s pleasure, pain, or the like.

The *sāttvikas* are so called as they are brought about due to that [*sattva*].

Though they do belong to the group of consequents, they are defined separately, because they are produced through *sattva*, and they are taught as paralysis and the other [things]”.⁸¹

⁷⁹ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 158: *abhinayādīmukhenānyagatasukhaduḥkhādibhāvanāyām antaḥkaraṇasyātyantānukūlatvaṃ sattvam ity arthaḥ | pratyaīartham āha – tata itī | sattvena nirvṛtā bhāvāḥ sāttvikā ity arthaḥ |*.

⁸⁰ The line of reasoning is hard to follow here. In our understanding (*contra* the rendering in Filliozat 1963, 134), the author is already implicitly talking about two kinds of *sattva*: the *sattva* of the spectator and the *sattva* of the actor. All *anubhāvas* require that the spectator uses his *sattva*, i.e. his sensitivity, in order to realize the emotional situation that is being thus represented. But it is only the *anubhāvas* that belong to the specific group of *sāttvika* that require the *sattva* of the actor in order for them to be produced on stage, while the sidelong glances are just a question of bodily enactment.

⁸¹ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 158: *anenaivaṃvidhenaivāntaḥkaraṇena kaṭākṣādayo bhāvayanta itī teṣāṃ anubhāvataiva na sāttvikatvaṃ itī bhāvāḥ | tad uktaṃ bhāvaprakāśe – “parasya sukhaduḥkhāder anubhāvena cetasaḥ | atyantenānukūlyena yena tadbhāvabhāvanam || tat sattvaṃ tena nirvṛtāḥ sāttvikā ity udīritāḥ | anubhāvatasāmānye saty apy eṣāṃ prthaktayā || lakṣaṇaṃ sattvajatvād dhi te ca stambhādayaḥ smṛtāḥ ||” itī |* Cf. *Bhāvaprakāśana*, p. 14, lines 2-6 with some small variants: *parasya sukhaduḥkhāder anubhāvena cetasaḥ | tadbhāvabhāva-*

By explaining the enigmatic term *tadbhāvabhāvana*, Kumārasvāmin tips his hand by showing that in this first interpretation, he is discussing the *sattva* belonging to the spectators,⁸² even if the technical designation *sāttvika* for a set of *anubhāvas* depends on their being produced by the actor's *sattva*.

In this context, the “realization” of somebody's mental state means being in a condition of identity. This has been taught [in the *Bhāvaprakāśa*]:⁸³

“As it comes to consist of the experience of pain and the like that belong to Rāma or other characters, it is the state of mind of the spectator that is meant by the expression *tadbhāvabhāvana*”.

And this is how the states such as paralysis become psychophysical states: mental states such as attachment and aversion, produced by the sight of an emotive situation, reach a different condition due to a special cause produced by the utmost attunement of the spectator's mind, which has the form of an identification with the emotive situation and is designated by the word *sattva*. And those [mental states that are the *sāttvikabhāvas*] are suggested by the external, non-mental, material, and corporeal consequents, such as paralysis and others, that consist of the effects of those [internal states]⁸⁴ and thus are conveyed by the term *sāttvika*.⁸⁵

*nam yena bhavet tadanukulataḥ | tat sattvaṃ tena nirvṛtāḥ sāttvikā ity udīritāḥ |
anubhāvatvasāmānye saty apy eṣāṃ pṛthaktayā || lakṣaṇaṃ sattvajatvād dhi te 'pi
stambhādayaḥ smṛtāḥ ||* It is worth quoting the verses that precede this passage, as they also focus on *sattva* (p. 13, lines 22-24 and p. 14, line 1): *manaḥ sattvaṃ
adhiṣṭhāya tattadindriyagocarān || buddhim āśliṣya viṣayān anubhūṅkte svabhā-
vataḥ | tridhā sattvaṃ bhaved buddhijñānānandavibhedataḥ || tadbhāvabhāvanā-
tmā syāt paraduḥkhādisevayā |*

⁸² A slightly ambiguous clue in this direction was the expression *abhinayādīmukhena* “by means of instruments such as enactment” in the very definition of *sattva*.

⁸³ Cf. *Bhāvaprakāśana* p. 13, lines 17-18 with significant variants: *rāmādyāśri-
taduḥkhāder anubhūtes tadātmatā | sāmājikasya manaso yā sa bhāva iti smṛtaḥ ||*

⁸⁴ Another possible translation for *svakāryabhūtaiḥ* would be: “that consist of one's own effects [i.e. the spectator's effects]”. This would highlight even more strongly the attribution of *sattva* to the spectator in Kumārasvāmin's theory.

⁸⁵ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 158: *atra tadbhāvabhāvanaṃ nāma tanmayatvenāvasthānaṃ*

Kumārasvāmin concludes this first interpretation of *sattva* by quoting Hemacandra on the well-known division between external and internal emotional states. However, the latter's theory on their production by way of *prāṇa*, which stands out for its absence here, will be tackled in Kumārasvāmin's second interpretation of Vidyānātha's verse.

And the result of this whole process is that what is ultimately suggested are the [stable and transitory] states, such as delight and aversion. This has been taught by the master Hemacandra: "External paralysis and the like are consequents that are corporal attributes, and by conveying the internal but intermediate states, they actually convey delight, aversion, and the rest. This is the established thesis". And this is how the group of stable and transitory states reaches the level of the mind within a living being and thus engenders the *sāttvika* quality, in its double nature, external and internal, insofar as it is either an effect or a cause. This is the core idea.⁸⁶

Before moving on to alternative interpretations envisioned by the author, it behoves us to remark how the supportive quotes from the *Bhāvaprakāśa* are paraphrases of Dhanañjaya's *Daśarūpaka* (DR) 4.4-5ab and its commentary, the *Avaloka* (AL), by Dhanika – the real source of this conception of *sattva* as the spectator's emotion-

| *tad uktam – "rāmādyāśritaduḥkhāder anubhūtes tadātmanā | sāmājikasya mana-
so bhāvas tadbhāvabhāvanam ||" iti | evaṃ ca vibhāvādidarśanajanyā anurāga-
nirvedādimanovṛtayo vibhāvāditanmayibhavanarūpeṇa sattvaśabdābhidheyena
sāmājikamanaso 'tyantānukūlyajanyenāsādhāraṇakāranenāvasthāntaram āpa-
nnāḥ stambhādayo bhāvāḥ sāttvikabhāvā bhavanti | te ca svakāryabhūtaiḥ ata eva
sāttvikapadapratipādyair bhāyair jaḍair bhautikair śāriraiḥ stambhādibhir anu-
bhāvaiḥ sūcyante |*

⁸⁶ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 158: *tathā ca ratinirvedādibhāvā eva sūcitā bhavantīti phal-
litam | tad uktam ācāryahemacandreṇa – "bhāyās tu stambhādayaḥ śārīradharmā
anubhāvāḥ, te cāntarālikān bhāvān gamayantaḥ paramārthato ratinirvedādigama-
kā iti sthitam" iti | evaṃ ca sthāyisaṃcārisaṅgha eva jīvasya manomayāvasthāṃ
prāpya kāryakāraṇarūpeṇa dvividhaṃ bhāyam āntaraṃ ca sāttvikaguṇaṃ sampā-
dayatīti rahasyam |*

al empathy – as clearly flagged by some signature terms, such as *tadbhāvabhāvana* and *atyantānukūlya* or its synonyms.⁸⁷ An excerpt from the passage is worth quoting in order to highlight the clear borrowings between the texts:

DR: “Emotion” is the permeating of one’s feeling (*tadbhāvabhāvana*) by things such as pleasure or pain. AL: “Emotion” is when the pleasure, pain, and the like, presented by the poet as belonging to the character, “perfumes”, or permeates, “one’s feelings”, that is, the mind of the viewer/reader (*bhāvaka*) actualizing the emotion. (Pollock 2016, 159)⁸⁸

DR: The psychophysical “sensitivities” (*sāttvika*), since they are also reactions, are categorized as emotions distinct from the others. They are called sensitivities because they arise from one’s psychic sensitivity (*sattva*). They similarly permeate one’s feelings. AL: “Sensitivity” is when one’s heart is completely amenable (*atyantānukūla-*) to “actualizing” another’s sorrow and joy. (Pollock 2016, 160)⁸⁹

The issue of the attribution of *sattva* to the spectator ultimately rests only on the interpretation of the enigmatic *tad* in the *tadbhāvabhāvanam* of verse 4.5ab. The deictic pronoun is identified as the spectator by Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha (*tadbhāvasya sāmājikacetaso*

⁸⁷ This interpretation of Dhanika as holding the view that *sattva* belongs to the spectator is indeed probable, but not certain, even if it is clearly followed by a classical commentator such as Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha, an author who borrows freely from the *Avaloka* such as Śāradātānaya, and a modern translator such as Pollock.

⁸⁸ *Daśarūpaka* 4.4ab and *Avaloka* thereupon (p. 172): ***sukhaduḥkhādibhir bhāvair bhāvas tadbhāvabhāvanam* | *anukāryāśrayatvenopanibadhyamānāiḥ sukhaduḥkhādīrūpāir bhāvāis tadbhāvasya bhāvakacetaso bhāvanam vāsanam bhāvah* |** All bolds in both the original and the translation have been added by us in order to visually separate the root-text from the commentary.

⁸⁹ *Daśarūpaka* 4.4cd-4.5ab and *Avaloka* thereupon (p. 172-173): ***pṛthagbhāvā bhavanty anye ’nubhāvātve ’pi sāttvikāḥ* || 4 || *sattvād eva samutpattes tac ca tadbhāvabhāvanam* | *paragataduḥkharṣādibhāvanāyām atyantānukūlāntaḥkaraṇatvam sattvam* |**

bhāvanam vāsanam) on the basis of the previous *tadbhāvabhāvana* in verse 4.4ab, which is indeed noted by Dhanika to refer to the *bhāvaka*, the spectator. However, after giving the definition of *sattva* as *paragataduḥkhaḥarṣādibhāvanāyām atyantānukūlāntaḥkaraṇatvam* (the utmost mental attunement when actualizing/realizing another's feelings of pain and happiness), it is Dhanika himself who quotes a portion of Bharata's text on *sattva*, which cannot but refer to the actor when read in its entirety.⁹⁰

Apart from these implicit and explicit references to previous authors and texts, a theoretical point that seems to be added by Kumārasvāmin himself is the forthright equivalence between the *sattva* of the spectator as emotional attunement and his identification (*tanmayībhavana* or *tanmayatva*) with the emotional situation. This move seems to aim at ecumenically coordinating the theory of Dhanika with the theory of Abhinavagupta.

After his preferred interpretation, Kumārasvāmin moves on to four other understandings of the concept of *sattva*. This first alternative position recognizes *sattva* as nothing but *prāṇa*, the vital breath, and follows closely the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* of Hemacandra.⁹¹

Some state that this group of emotions that start with delight, which is active on the plane of the mind, experiences the quality *sāttvika*

⁹⁰ The short quote from NŚ prose after 7.93 (cf. Introduction above) reads: *yad āha sattvaṃ nāma manaḥprabhavam | tac ca samāhitamanastvād utpadyate* (As Bharata said: "what is called *sattva* originates from the mind, and it is produced because the mind is in a concentrated state"). In these few words the reference to concentration does seem to gesture toward the actor rather than the spectator. Moreover, if *sattva* belonged to the spectator alone, the *sāttvikabhāvas*, which are after all the cause for talking about *sattva* in this passage, would also be only the psychophysical reactions of the audience members, which seems reductive and odd, to say the least. All things considered, Dhanika's position on the primary *āśraya* of *sattva*, so to say, is less clear than it appears to be and possibly deserves further investigation.

⁹¹ Although Hemacandra has been quoted in support of the previous view as well, it is this interpretation that conveys the ideas expressed by the Jain polymath, as proved by the several *verbatim* parallels (See also above, § 2).

as it enters the plane of vital breath, which is what the term *sattva* refers to on account of three reasons: 1) because of the etymological explanation that *sattva* is where the plane of the mind resides (*sīdati*), insofar as it does become identical with the plane of the mind as the one who urges into motion the plane of the physical body made of the five elements;⁹² 2) because of the predominance of the quality of *sattva* [in the vital breath]; and 3) because of its goodness. And therefore, one obtains paralysis when the vital breath affects the earth part; tears when it affects the water part; sweating when it affects fire in its intense form, whereas one obtains a change of colour when the opposite happens, [i.e. the mild form of fire is affected]; fainting when ether is affected; and when wind is affected [by itself]⁹³ at a low, moderate, or violent intensity, one obtains horripilation, tremor, and stammering, respectively.⁹⁴

The next interpretation proposed by Kumārasvāmin is intriguing on aesthetic grounds insofar as it directly connects *sattva* with the manifestation of *rasa*, but the passage is very short and cannot be attributed to any particular author at the current state of research.

⁹² The conception of the organism that is implicit in this view is the time-honoured idea of a varying number of sheaths (*kośa*) that envelop the self, of which here we encounter the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya* and the *manomaya*. A very early reference is in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.8, but the conception is developed in countless Vedāntic treatises.

⁹³ This corresponds to the *svatantra* position; cf. note 44, above.

⁹⁴ *Ratnāṣaṇa*, p. 158-159: *kecid ayaṃ “manomayavartī ratyādigaṇaḥ pañca-bhūtātmakānnamayaḥsobhakatayā manomayatādātmyāpannam sīdaty asmin manomaya iti vyutpattiyā sattvaguṇotkarṣāt sādhutvāc ca sattvaśabdābhidheyam prāṇamayaṃ praviṣṭaḥ sāttvikatvam anubhavati | tac ca prāṇasya bhūbhāgānugrahe stambhaḥ | jalabhāgānugrahe bāṣpaḥ | tīvratejonugrahe svedaḥ | vaiparītye vaivarṇyam | ākāśānugrahe pralayaḥ | anilānugrahasya mandamādhyamotrṣṭatayā traividhye krameṇa romāñcavepathuvaisvaryāni” iti vadanti |* Although the *Saṅgītaratnākara* has a similar theory about the displacement of *prāṇa* through the elements and the production of the *sāttikabhāvas* thereby, Kumārasvāmin's direct reference must be Hemacandra, as revealed by the use of the term *anugraha*, on which see § 2.

Others state that *sattva* is a special force capable of rendering *rasa* perceptible without reliance on other emotional states and that the *sāttvikas* are produced by it.⁹⁵

The third alternative position states that there is no real difference between consequents and *sāttvikas*.⁹⁶

Still others say that although they share a common ground with [other consequents], such as sidelong glances and the like, because they are conditioned by their origin in *sattva*, whose characteristic is to be manifested, on account of the predominance the physical body [in all consequents], paralysis and the other seven states are called *sāttvikas* by way of conventional linguistic usage, like “the mud-born” in the specific sense of lotus.⁹⁷

As in the preceding view, the fourth and last alternative position resorts to a mere linguistic convention to account for the term *sāttvika*. However, it is on the grounds of similar linguistic practices in the jargon of other systems of knowledge that this usage is understood and justified as just a scholarly shibboleth.

Others illustrate that the designation *sāttvika* only with regard to paralysis and the other seven states is justified on account of its renown in the field of poetics, just like the term *artha* “object” or “cat-

⁹⁵ *Ratnāṇa*, p. 159: *kecid “bhāvāntaranairapekṣyeṇa rasāparokṣī-karaṇalakṣano balaviśeṣa satvmaṅ, tajjanya sāttvikā” ity āhuḥ* |.

⁹⁶ We cannot pinpoint the exact upholder of this view, but Mammaṭa, for instance, does not have a separate treatment for the *sāttvikas* and he implicitly includes them among the *anubhāvas* (*Kāvya prakāśa*, *vṛtti* ad 28, p. 52: [...]) *asrūpātādayo ’nubhāvāḥ* [...]). The closest approximation to this position, though chronological-ly later, might be that of Bhānudatta, according to whom *sattva* is the material, living body, which shapes the *sāttvikas* and the *anubhāvas* alike. See note 101, below.

⁹⁷ *Ratnāṇa*, p. 159: *anye punaḥ “annamayaprādhānyenābhivyaktatvalakṣaṇasattvajanyatvopadheḥ kaṭākṣādisādhārānye ’pi pañkajādivad yogarūḍhatvena stambhādāya eva sāttvikāḥ” ity āhuḥ* |.

egory” designating the triad substance (*dravya*) etc. is renowned in Kaṇāda’s field of Vaiśeṣika.⁹⁸

Kumārasvāmin concludes the passage in an ecumenical fashion, by bestowing a partial legitimacy to any view whatsoever provided that some sort of clear distinction between *anubhāvas* and *sāttvikas* be preserved.

Thus swings the manifold oscillation in interpretation of the ancient authors of poetics. Be that as it may, we do not have any obstinate bias in that respect. But there must remain some way to distinguish paralysis and the other seven states from the consequents, even if they are included among them. This is what we require. Other details must be looked up in the *Rasanirūpaṇa* (“*Exposition on Rasa*”)⁹⁹ composed by Naraharisūri. Fearing prolixity, we stop here.¹⁰⁰

With its cautious and non-committal attitude and its aspiration to exhaustiveness, Kumārasvāmin’s impressive gallery of interpretations of *sattva* is a masterly display of the finest second-millennium *pāṇḍitya* and could even be interpreted as a harbinger of our own philological enterprise of making sense of all that *sattva* can be and has been. As a final corollary to this multi-perspectival discussion on *sattva* in Kumārasvāmin’s *Ratnāpaṇa*, this might be the place to record a relatively deviant opinion on the subject, which leads us far from the theatrically informed speculations that go back to Bharata and Abhinavagupta. In the fourth “wave” of his *Rasataranginī*,

⁹⁸ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 159: *kecit tu “kaṇādaśāstraprasiddhyā dravyāditrayavācakārthaśabdavad alaṅkāraśāstraprasiddhyā stambhādiṣv eva sāttvikavyavahārah” ity varṇyante |*

⁹⁹ Cahill (2001, 82) acknowledges the existence of a *Rasanirūpaṇa* by Narasimha Sūri (a.k.a. Sarasvatīrtha), possibly only extant in manuscripts.

¹⁰⁰ *Ratnāpaṇa*, p. 159: *evaṃ prācām ālaṅkārikāṇām anekadhā pāriplavam vartate | tad yathā tathā vāstu | na tatrāsmākam āgrahaḥ | kiṃtu stambhādīnām anubhāvāntarbhāve ’pi kenacid viśeṣeṇa pāṛthakyam ity etad evāsmabhir apekṣyata iti | viśeṣāntarāṇi naraharisūriviracite rasanirūpaṇe draṣṭavyāni | vistarabhūtrubhir asmābhir uparamyate |*

Bhānudatta (late 15th century) rejects the common view that *sattva* is “a feeling of deep sympathy for the experience of sorrow on the part of others” (*paragataduḥkhabhāvanāyām atyantānukūlatvam*), a version of the interpretation held by Dhanika, and instead puts forth the view that *sattva* simply means the “living body”, the *Leib* endowed as it is with its qualities and reactions. Bhānudatta’s text reads as follows: “What seems to be at issue here is this: The word *sattva* refers to a living being, *sattva* in this context being the enlivened body. The properties of a *sattva*, or being, are called *sāttvika*, and accordingly bodily reactions are called *sāttvika* reactions. Because the stable emotions and the transitory feelings are internal, they are not properties of the body” (translation Pollock 2009, 189).¹⁰¹ Though expressed in different words, this might actually voice an older opinion, also reflected in Kumārasvāmin’s third view on *sattva* and its products as manifestations of the physical body.

To sum up, we learn from the *Ratnāpaṇa* that, in the long history of *sattva*-driven speculation, dramatic theorists have thought about this highly elusive concept as corresponding to one of these three levels: the mind, the vital breath, or the body. These – according to Abhinavagupta, as reflected in Hemacandra and Śārṅgadeva-Kallinātha – do not form watertight compartments, but rather allow for a continuum between mental states and their outer symptoms, in the uncontrolled show of the emotional tribulation of the ordinary man as well as in the voluntarily induced emotional display of the actor.

¹⁰¹ *Rasatarāṅgī* IV (Pollock 2009, 188): *atredaṃ pratibhāti sattvaśabdasya prāṇivacakatvāt | atra sattvaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ tasya dharmāḥ sāttvikāḥ | tathā ca śārīrā bhāvāḥ stambhādayaḥ sāttvikā bhāvā ity abhidhīyante | sthāyino vya-bhicāriṇaḥ ca bhāvā antaratayā na śārīradharmā iti* | For details on the life and work of Bhānudatta, see the introduction in Pollock 2009.

Conclusion: The mystery of the thespian experience

Actors across latitudes and cultures amaze their audiences by displaying at will the physical “symptoms” of emotions such as blushing, shivering, and weeping. We have explored some avenues of reflection and speculation in rarely tapped Sanskrit sources about the thespian’s emotional life, the veritable hidden engine that is their trained capacity to emote by exhibiting outer signs of emotions that they might not even be feeling. Some authors, though, seem to accept the possibility of a phenomenological apperception of emotions on the part of actors on stage, but maybe never in a form that is identical with emotions in real life. The most likely reason is that workaday emotions would hinder the actors’ control over their incredibly complex set of acting techniques and would distract them from the continuity of the narrative plot. If, then, *rasa*, the aesthetic appreciation of the enacted play, is sometimes envisaged as being savoured in the heart of the acting performer, the kernel of his emotional life is the multifaceted and multidimensional concept of *sattva*. Without rehashing all we have tried to dissect and attempting to look beyond many crucial particularities of different theories, in the widest sense, *sattva* is nothing but the mind, consciousness itself, and therefore the common emotional organ of human beings. Given its extremely wide semantics, in every occurrence of the term, *sattva* might pertain to 1) the fictional characters of the story-world, i.e. real people living their life, sometimes under the sway of their emotions and sometimes sophisticated and restrained enough to be fully in control of themselves; to 2) the actors, who deploy their own mind as a chiselling tool to mould their physical expressions without ever losing control; or to 3) the members of the audience, who are engrossed in the spectacle and attune their heart (possibly *sattva*, again) to the characters and events portrayed, to the point of temporarily transcending the limits of their individual personalities and thus touching the beatitude of *rasa* gustation.

Historically, the retrieval of a lost cog in the extremely complex machinery that is Abhinavagupta's theory of theatre is an important contribution to an aesthetic system that is very well known in its general workings, but still open to investigation in innumerable aspects and details. For the sceptics, the dual dynamics of *prāṇa* we proposed and described above might just be a figment of scholarly imagination in an attempt to find a coherent and encompassing theory of actoriality across disparate sources. In any case, what remains is the analysis of a different understanding of the mechanics of the production of the *sāttvikabhāvas*, whose origin would thus still remain uncertain, but whose reception history, just sketched in the previous pages, sheds new light on the discourse and representations of the art of acting across South Asia in the second millennium.

The main topic of our investigation is the nature of the thespian experience, whose outline mutates unrecognizably according to a plurality of authors whose views are sometimes diametrically opposed, sometimes seemingly harmonious, sometimes both reconcilable and contradictory at once. We hope that the *sattva* of this open-ended discussion will be read, perused, enhanced, or even rewritten by researchers to come, who will further disentangle this protean subject.

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*Thespian Musings beyond Abhinavagupta.
The Emotional and Aesthetic Experience of the Actor 2*

Abstract

Actors across latitudes and cultures amaze their audiences by displaying at will the physical ‘symptoms’ of emotions such as blushing, shivering, and weeping. In this contribution, we explore some avenues of speculation in rarely tapped Sanskrit sources about the thespian’s emotional life. After a catalogue of views on the possibility or impossibility of actors experiencing *rasa*, the ‘aesthetic emotion’, we delve into two parallel passages from Hemacandra’s *Kāvyaṅuśāsana* (12th c.) and Śārṅgadeva’s *San̄gītaratnākara* (13th c.) – along with Kallinātha’s *Kalānidhi* (15th c.) – on the relation between *sattva* (‘mindfulness’), *prāṇa* (‘vital breath’), and the physical body. The lost seventh chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* is hypothesized as the common source behind these two complex texts on thespian emotionality. We conclude by addressing a passage from Kumārasvāmin’s commentary on the *Pratāparudrīya*, which represents a small encyclopaedia of views on *sattva* in Sanskrit aesthetics.

Keywords: theatre, actor, emotion, *sattva*, *rasa*, *prāṇa*, Abhinavagupta, Hemacandra, Śārṅgadeva, Kallinātha, Kumārasvāmin

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