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Meylan, Anne (2024). In defence of the normative account of ignorance. Erkenntnis, 89(1):207-221.
The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 100 Philosophy |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Physical Sciences > Logic |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Logic, Philosophy |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 1 January 2024 |
| Deposited On: | 16 Feb 2023 08:21 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Dec 2024 02:36 |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0165-0106 |
| OA Status: | Hybrid |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7 |
| Project Information: |
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Meylan, Anne