Abstract
Background: Security regressions are vulnerabilities introduced in a previously unaffected software system. They often happen as a result of code changes (e.g., a bug fix) and can have severe effects.
Aims: We aim to increase the understanding of security regressions.
Method: To this aim, we perform an exploratory, mixed-method case study of Mozilla. First, we analyze 78 regression vulnerabilities and 72 bug reports where a bug fix introduced a regression vulnerability at Mozilla. We investigate how developers interact in these bug reports, how they perform the changes, and under what conditions they introduce these regressions. Second, we conduct five semi-structured interviews with as many Mozilla developers involved in the vulnerability-inducing fixes.
Results: Security is not discussed during bug fixes. Developers’ main concerns are the complexity of the bug at hand and the community pressure to fix it. Developers do not to worry about regression vulnerabilities and assume tools will detect them. Indeed, dynamic analysis tools helped finding around 30% of these regressions.
Conclusions: Although tool support helps identify regression vulnerabilities, it may not be enough to ensure security during bug fixes. Furthermore, our results call for further work on the security tooling support and their integration during bug fixes.
Braz, Larissa