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Framing in Athenian public discourse: a case study of Aeschines II

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FRAMES AND FRAMING IN ANTIQUITY I
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST FRAMES
AND FRAMING IN ANTIQUITY CONFERENCE,
16-18 OCTOBER 2020

edited by
Elisabeth and Sven Günther

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AD LECTORES!

The present volume comprises selected, double-blind peer-reviewed papers from the first conference on “Frames and Framing in Antiquity,” held online from 16 to 18 October 2020 and jointly organized by the two editors, Sven Günther from the Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations (IHAC), Northeast Normal University, Changchun, China and Elisabeth Günther, then Institute for Digital Humanities, University of Göttingen, Germany, now Classical Archaeology, University of Trier, Germany.

That the papers could appear within two years after the conference in these challenging times is due to many helpful and supporting hands and minds: first of all, the conference participants who submitted their papers and any necessary revisions and proof corrections on time; second, the anonymous reviewers who deeply engaged in the arguments and helped a lot to improve the final papers; and third, IHAC’s assistant editor of the *Journal of Ancient Civilizations* (and its Supplements), Dr Shi Xueliang who – as always – made the papers ready for publication with his careful copy and meticulous layout editing. Furthermore, we thank IHAC’s students for the help in the background, in particular Dr Zhang Hongxia and Zhang Duoduo, MA for helping in the conference preparation, and Luo Fuxing, MA for preparing the source index.

Moreover, we are extremely grateful to IHAC’s director Prof Zhang Qiang for accompanying the whole process from conference organization to publication with his generous and profound support.

As the traditional “thanks”-frame has now been filled as expected we hope to satisfy, maybe also to challenge, and eventually to stimulate other of your frames related to research into antiquity within the following pages: *tollite, legite, dissertate!*

Changchun & Trier, in mid-October 2022

The editors

INTRODUCTION: FRAMES AND FRAMING, IN AND FOR ANTIQUITY?

Elisabeth Günther / Sven Günther

Classical Archaeology, University of Trier / IHAC, NENU, Changchun

In the first book of his *Noctes Atticae*, the second-century AD author Aulus Gellius reports an academic discussion about a passage from the speech of the republican censor Metellus Numidicus¹ (1.6), who had admonished the people (*populus*) to marry women despite the annoyance (*molestia*) resulting from such wedlock with women (*uxores*).² His view of the state of marriage (*res uxoria*) as being inevitably linked to annoyance (*molestia*) and constant disadvantages (*incommoda perpetua*) is heavily criticized by certain erudites, since they consider such arguments harmful for the purpose, viz., to encourage the people to conduct marriages. Instead, they propose a different wording, that is, on the one hand, to deny any *molestia* occurring from marriages, and on the other to rationalize away any reported *molestia* as being small compared to the respective advantages, and being merely the result of specific misconduct by man or woman (*maritorum culpa et iniustitia*), rather than of a natural vice (*naturae vitium*).³

¹ On the discussion about which Metellus spoke as censor and the possible historical context, see McDonnell 1987.

² Gell. 1.6.2 (trans. Rolfe 1927, as for the other passages): *In ea oratione ita scriptum fuit: "Si sine uxore pati possemus, Quirites, omnes ea molestia careremus; set quoniam ita natura tradidit, ut nec cum illis satis commode, nec sine illis ullo modo vivi possit, saluti perpetuae potius quam brevi voluptati consulendum est."* / "In that speech these words were written: 'If we could get on without a wife, Romans, we would all avoid that annoyance; but since nature has ordained that we can neither live very comfortably with them nor at all without them, we must take thought for our lasting well-being rather than for the pleasure of the moment.'"

³ Gell. 1.6.3: *Videbatur quibusdam, Q. Metellum censorem, cui consilium esset ad uxores ducendas populum hortari, non oportuisse de molestia incommodisque perpetuis rei uxoriae confiteri, neque id hortari magis esse quam dissuadere absterreque; set contra in id potius orationem debuisse sumi dicebant, ut et nullas plerumque esse in matrimoniis molestias adseveraret et, si quae tamen accidere nonnumquam viderentur; parvas et leves facilesque esse toleratu diceret maioribusque eas emolumentis et voluptatibus obliterari easdemque ipsas neque omnibus neque naturae vitio, set quorundam maritorum culpa et iniustitia evenire.* / "It seemed to some of the company that Quintus Metellus, whose purpose as censor was to encourage the people to take wives, ought not to have admitted the annoyance and constant inconveniences of the married state; that to do this was not so much to encourage, as to dissuade and deter them. But they said that his speech ought rather to have taken just the opposite tone, insisting that as a rule there were no annoyances in matrimony, and if after all they seemed sometimes to arise, they were slight, insignificant and easily endured, and whether completely forgotten in its greater pleasures and advantages; furthermore, that even these

This view is countered by Gellius' rhetorical "multi-purpose weapon," his teacher Titus Castricius.⁴ He differentiates (Gell. 1.6.4) between what a rhetor and what a censor must say, and then lists the different tricks and manipulations permitted to an orator as long as "they have some semblance of truth and can by any artifice be made to insinuate themselves into the minds of the persons who are to be influenced" (*si veri modo similes sint et possint movendos hominum animos qualicumque astu inrepere*). However, for the censor Metellus Numidicus, he outlines his complex entanglement in the Roman society based on the aristocratic value-and-honor system (Gell. 1.6.5). Having great reputation, standing, and trust within the society, he would endanger his position by covering something that is actually perceived as a reality in both his and every man's view. Hence, by speaking what fits to the perceived reality, he increased the people's confidence in his sincerity and truthfulness, and consequently could convince them to follow his admonition by thinking of the well-being of the whole state.⁵

What reads like a normal struggle between two schools of rhetorical training – one in focusing on merely technical aspects, the other one in the application of rhetorical skills to real situations⁶ – has a deeper meaning at the level of argument design: While the anonymous critics of Metellus rather technically recommend a denial or diminishing of any negative side of marriages (which must result in a positive picture of the institution "marriage"), Castricius considers the common and daily knowledge, experiences, and expectations of the audience of which the censor is integral part of, namely, the *populus Romanus*, with all the complex relations and networks of the speaker to different groups (especially to the

annoyances did not fall to the lot of all or from any fault natural to matrimony, but as the result of the misconduct and injustice of some husbands and wives."

⁴ On Titus Castricius, see PIR² C 542 (A. Stein). On rhetors in Gellius, see Howley 2018, 226–231, esp. 227 on the episode discussed here.

⁵ Gell. 1.6.6: [Castricius:] "*De molestia igitur cunctis hominibus notissima confessus, fidem sedulitatis veritatisque commeritus, tum denique facile et procliviter, quod fuit rerum omnium validissimum atque verissimum, persuasit civitatem salvam esse sine matrimoniorum frequentia non posse.*" / "Accordingly, having admitted the existence of annoyances notorious with all men, and having thus established confidence in his sincerity and truthfulness, he then found it no difficult or uphill work of convince them of what was the soundest and truest of principles, that the State cannot survive without numerous marriages."

⁶ Cicero's *De Inventione* is the first (Latin) example of how to design a proper speech argument according to the actual circumstances of the case. For the critics of Metellus Numidicus, cf., e.g., Cic. *Inv.* 2.8.25 (trans. Yonge 1913): *... defensor autem ex contrario primum inpulsionem aut nullam fuisse dicet aut, si fuisse concedet, extenuabit et parvulam quandam fuisse demonstrabit aut non ex ea solere huiusmodi facta nasci docebit.* ... / "... But the advocate for the defence will say, on the other hand, either that there was no motive at all, or, if he admits that there was, he will make light of it, and show that it was a very slight one, or that such conduct does not often proceed from such a motive. ..." For teaching students of rhetoric by contextualizing a speech: Quint. *Inst.* 2.5.7–9; cf. Howley 2018, 227, n. 68.

elite noble families) that made any political statement from the *nobilitas* an issue.

Clearly, this could have its background and *Sitz im Leben* in a discourse about the proper role performance of imperial authorities, especially when addressing their target audience(s).⁷ Yet, it is noteworthy that this reads like a perfect example of any modern discussion about the design of a public relations campaign and its communication: it is not the actual topic that counts, but rather how you market, sell, and frame it to the audience in the right way so that they perceive it to be correct, true, and real.

We strongly believe, in turn, that not only this episode can be described by using concepts of frame and framing. Rooted in the 1970's, frame and framing are clearly modern theories, but, nonetheless, offer (as we argue in this volume) excellent potential to describe, analyze, and interpret ancient sources, since they are concerned with the basic structures of human knowledge and their embedding in different forms of communication. As is outlined in more detail in Elisabeth Günther's introductory paper, "frames" are defined as cognitive structures that serve to classify and categorize all kinds of experiences, perceptions, and acts of communication. Their relevance to social life has been emphasized by Erving Goffman in his seminal work *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience* in 1974,⁸ which still contains many stimulating ideas for social, cultural, and historical studies. Two other "fathers" of frame theory formulated groundbreaking theses on the inner structure of frames and their importance for communication: the linguist Charles J. Fillmore (1976),⁹ and the cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky (e.g., 1980).¹⁰ According to this tradition which still influences current approaches, for instance, in respect of linguistic frame theory,¹¹ frames are network-like structures that can be divided into smaller sub-frames or merged into frame-bundles on higher level, both applicable to individual situations and to patterns shared in groups or societies. Thus, frames are not only dynamic mental structures which can be re-affirmed, modified, altered, or broken, but also can only exist in relation with other frames, intertwined in a complex mental network with numerous crosslinks and interdependences.

⁷ On the different roles the emperor had, or was expected, to perform to stay within the subtly designed system of acceptability, see the classic works by Flaig 1992/²2019 and Winterling 2003 (English ed. 2011). On how this imperial order with the emperor as core to which everything gravitated was challenged and transformed in the first century AD by the rise of a class of "new rich," see Hartmann 2016. For the imitation of the emperor's roles on the senatorial level, see Page 2015 and Künzer 2016. On the patron-client-relations as inner core of the Roman world, see Ganter 2015.

⁸ Goffman 1974.

⁹ Fillmore 1976; 2006.

¹⁰ Minsky 1980.

¹¹ For an in-depth study of the applicability of frame theory to linguistics, see the compendium of D. Busse: Busse 2012.

To apply frame theories means to disentangle such communication processes in order to understand the relationship between smaller pieces of information – and specially to think about how such information is embedded into the pre-existing frame network, i.e., how communication is framed by the background knowledge of the author and (target) audience, and their respective knowledge, experiences, and expectations. Since frame theories deal with the very basic processes of communication, and since frames serve to identify and investigate culturally specific elements within these processes, they are a suitable tool for approaching different cultures within different periods of time. Furthermore, they stimulate us as modern researchers to reflect and define our own viewpoint of and perspective on the past, to sort out the manifold relationships between past and present, to look with a new perspective on the per- and reception of (classical) antiquity, and to transfer the phenomena we extract from ancient sources to the many frames we encounter in our own times. This, in turn, enables us to understand the frames and the framing processes, innate in both our sources and research.

The term “framing” (and related terms such as “priming”) have gained in significance and popularity during the last decades, especially in the fields of political and media studies,¹² as a means of describing the deliberate and systematic activation of unconscious connotations of words and/or images in order to influence or direct (public) opinion. Such a political (mis)use of framing seems, at first sight, not adequate for approaching ancient sources, since mass media in a modern sense did not exist in antiquity,¹³ and since a clear agenda, clearly limited to a systematic influence of a specific audience, is in most cases hard to prove – or may even lead to a circular argument and a rather uncritical application of equally modern concepts such as “nudging” or “propaganda.” Yet, Robert M. Entman, coming from the field of communication and media studies, proposed the currently most influential definition of framing in the 1990’s,¹⁴ aiming at a much broader concept: “Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described.”¹⁵ And in fact, this paves the way for an application of the framing concept to ancient studies, drawing attention to

¹² See, e.g., Wehling 2019.

¹³ Even Roman coins, which are often claimed to be an “ancient mass medium,” targeted different audiences, depending on, e.g., the circulation of the different denominations. Cf. E. Günther and S. Günther 2021.

¹⁴ Entman 1993.

¹⁵ Ibid., 52. Italics in original. He understands salience as “[...] making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (ibid., 53).

the selection and salience of specific words, aspects, symbols, figures, etc. in ancient sources, may they be literary or documentary texts, coins, inscriptions, archaeological objects, monuments, or images.¹⁶

The discussion of Metellus Numidicus' speech as shaped by Aulus Gellius clearly demonstrates the potential of the framing concept, shedding light on rhetorical strategies to select pieces of information and to make them salient with the intent to "frame" the respective audience in order to win them. Rhetorical theory and praxis are, thus, the most promising starting point to apply frames and framing theories to ancient sources, as the papers of Riccarda Schmid and Jan Lukas Horneff demonstrate. Focusing on political communication in ancient Athens, Schmid understands framing as a dynamic, multilevel process. In her paper, she discusses in-depth the scope of different frame theories and their potential as analytical tools, and provides a comprehensive introduction to the application of frame/framing theory to actual framing processes in ancient Greek speeches delivered by Aeschines and Demosthenes who refer not only to historical arguments, but also to earlier speeches, of both sides. From this perspective, oratory reflects the public discourse in the communication process between the communicators, the composition of the content, and the audience. By means of this dynamic model, she highlights that frames of reference in the social memory of ancient Athens were constantly negotiated, adjusted, and updated.

Horneff studies the invective nature of Roman forensic oratory by analyzing passages from Apuleius' *Apologia*, the only completely preserved court speech from the Roman imperial period. Besides framing, skilful re-framing plays an important role in this context in rejecting and replying to the opponent's invective, as Horneff demonstrates in his analysis. The (quite colourful and intriguing) motif of the *os impurum* in the passage on which Horneff focuses sheds light on the rustic, sometimes abusive nature of Roman humor, and reveals playful puns which invert and pervert the underlying gender roles and respective social norms. This analysis leads Horneff to assume that the passage is a response to a (now lost) invective against Apuleius, which tried to label him as an effeminate *vir mollis* who practices cunnilingus. With a clever reframing, however, of the not only metaphorical term *os impurum*, Apuleius replied by eroding the plausibility of the accusation by ridiculing and distorting it, and by re-framing effeminacy with urban lifestyle while demoting his opponents' apparent masculinity to provincial and primitive behavior.

It is only a small step from oratory to history, since the orations analyzed by Schmid and Horneff with the methodological aid of frame and framing

¹⁶ On visual framing, see Geise and Lobinger 2013. See also below with n. 17.

terminology had their *Sitz im Leben* in historically relevant discussions or discourses, respectively. Yet, the question arises to what degree historical sources other than speeches can be analyzed and interpreted with frame and framing methodology. Sven Günther addresses this question by re-assessing the fundamental work *Outline of the Principles of History* (*Grundriss der Historik*), deriving from a lecture series on historiology, i.e., the principles of History as a scientific subject at universities, by the (ancient) historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884). Droysen already realized that extant sources from the past offer (only) a specific perspective on historical events and/or developments, and that they must thus be analyzed and interpreted critically with regard to the pragmatic course of events, the conditions, the individual acts of wills, and the common ideas which all produced the sources and history. Hence, he formulated not only basic principles for History as an academic discipline of the modern Humanities, but also came close to modern frame and framing theories in seeking not to study “what actually happened” (“wie es eigentlich gewesen,” Leopold von Ranke, against whose school of thought Droysen argued), but rather the different viewpoints (“Sehepunkte”) on realities, and their relations to each other.

Such relative viewpoints of historical transitions in Athens and Rome are studied in the two papers of Sven-Philipp Brandt and Francesco Ginelli, respectively. Brandt focuses on the emergence of the *autarkeia*-framework in late classical Athens. By comparing the League-framework of the first, namely the Delian League of the fifth century BC (478–404 BC), and the second Athenian League system founded hundred years after the first (378–338 BC), he discusses the similarities in the overall framework of the two leagues, but also the differences in respect of some attributes (“slots” in frame and framing terminology) and values (concrete “fillers” of the “slots”). Furthermore, he demonstrates how the wording of the League-framework was modified after the devastating Social War (357–355 BC) in which Athens’ allies revolted against the once-more visible and tangible imperial behavior of the leading polis. This re-framing resulted in the emergence of the *autarkeia*-concept within political discourse (which was eventually fully formulated by Aristotle) in order, on the one hand, to reflect and to return to the many, especially economic, advantages of the polis Athens and its inhabitants, and, on the other, to claim the natural leadership in Greece, not by force, but rather by drawing everything into the new (and equally imperialistic) framework of economic success and prosperity.

Ginelli touches on the important question of how to communicate political viewpoints by life-writing. For this, he investigates the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (*RGDA*) which were composed by the first emperor Augustus, and published after his death not only as an inscription in Rome, but also elsewhere in the

Roman Empire, and thus must be seen as a political statement of both Augustus and his successor Tiberius, and, in turn, the Julio-Claudian imperial family. Examining two decisive episodes from Augustus' lifetime, namely the handling of the situation after his adoptive-father's murder on the Ides of March 44 BC, and the acceptance and refusal of political powers in the supply crisis of 22 BC immediately following the great political changes of 23 BC, he shows how Augustus framed the perspective on these events through selection and salience, and applies terminology from the communication model coined by Entman for his analysis. Moreover, he provides important hints about how this monumental inscription could have been perceived by viewers, not only in Rome, where we know about the setup from the heading of the *RGDA* and few literary sources, but also in the cities of the province of Galatia, where the three main fragmentary copies of the *RGDA* have been found and can – to some degree – be archaeologically contextualized.

The actual perception of not only spoken or written words, but also the physical monuments themselves and their related frames – being themselves a product of authorities with their intentions and frames – by the intended target audience but also others is an essential question which is up to now an often-understudied topic in ancient studies. Hence, Ginelli's contribution is vitally complemented by Elisabeth Günther's application of the methodological toolkit for studying ancient material culture offered by frame theories, outlining an approach suitable for object-related and archaeological research. In her paper, she chooses an Athenian mug with a depiction of an owl "in armor" (housed in the Louvre) as an example to disentangle the manifold frameworks of the reception process in the human-object interaction. Decoration (iconography), object (shape/purpose), and context of use and perception are the main avenues by which to shed light on the frames and levels of understanding that might have been salient for different users/perceivers of the mug in different periods of time, and that might have framed the reception process. That these different "readings" overlap, complement, and contradict each other causes, in her eyes, a comic effect contributing to the humorous character of this unique vessel.

Images and objects are, thus, not mere media transporting their producer's message directly to a receiver, but should rather be considered as a third entity in the reception process. According to both the producer's and receiver's frameworks, they may offer different levels of understanding, including ambiguities and transformations of meaning over time and in different places.¹⁷ The application of frame theories to material culture raises many important questions about the relationship between individual experiences and frame

¹⁷ On these ambiguities, see E. Günther 2021.

patterns (e.g., discourses) in groups and societies, about the dynamics of perception, reception and interpretation processes, and about the cross-links within the respective frameworks, namely, the complementation or incongruency of meanings ascribed to images and objects by the viewer.

Hence, a second edition of our conference on frames and framing, “Frames and framings in antiquity II. Sources in contexts – materiality, affordances, entanglements, and communicative dynamics” was held online from 15–17 October 2021, in order to explore especially the potential of frame theories for the study of ancient material culture, and how this is embedded into communication processes (selected papers of which will be published in a subsequent volume). Such processes are, however, flexible and dynamic, and frame theories imply that the meaning of an object (or image, or text) may be changed due to alterations within the receivers’ frameworks. Elisabeth Günther’s paper touches upon this aspect in discussing the connotations of owls “in armor” within and beyond the Athenian context. Thus, we should be aware of a development and transformation of frameworks, and this immediately influences research, since each and every person approaches antiquity through his or her own frame-set.

These modern viewpoints (“Sehepunkte”) add another layer to the analysis of frameworks through time, and arguably offer another field of applicability for frame and framing methodology. From a historiological perspective, the questioning of one’s own view- and standpoint was the limit in Droysen’s *Principles of History*, as Sven Günther argues. Droysen was aware of the close relation and interdependencies between the individual with the own acts of will and the moral potencies of the age an individual lives in, communicated through the groups in which an individual lives and acts such as family, neighborhood, state, etc. However, he failed to reflect critically on the common notion of continuous and constant progress and the trend toward a higher development present in his time, and therewith to review his own frames when he composed his notion of History as a university discipline.

That such reviews of the frames and framings of research into and reception of ancient history are fruitful tasks is particularly emphasized in the paper of Guendalina Taietti. She focuses on the end of the eighteenth century, when Greek diaspora thinkers felt that the time had come for Greece to be freed from Ottoman rule. These intellectuals became particularly active in educating the Greek masses in mainland Greece, in order to instill courage and to awaken national consciousness, preparing the ground for the Greek Revolution of 1821. Within this Hellenic revolutionary movement prompting European intellectuals both to help and to write about the Greek struggle for freedom, the ancient Greek spirit and Hellas as a cultural and politico-philosophical model was celebrated.

Philhellene scholars and initially also Greek scholars were very selective on what was counted as “truly ancient Hellenicity,” and consequently favored the ancient democratic polis model over any mention of the Macedonian rule or the Byzantine era, both of which were considered to have been periods of oppression. However, the constitution of the Hellenic State in 1831 brought about new ways of thinking about Greek national consciousness; this “Hellenic Romanticism” movement aimed at proving the uninterrupted continuity of Hellenism not by obliterating or criticizing, but rather by integrating the Macedonian and the Byzantine periods into the national cultural and political discourse, as she demonstrates by analyzing the works of Spyridon Zambelios (1815–1881) and Konstantinos Paparrhegopoulos (1815–1891).

That these two writers gave birth to Greek National History should render it evident to us that the main potential of frames and framing lies precisely within a heuristically as well as methodologically stimulating achievement: accuracy of discrimination. If we see sources not as merely static media of historical events or developments, but as integral part of the dynamic establishment and communication of viewpoints between – unfortunately only to some degree reconstructable – communicators (authors, authorities, etc.) and audiences which were not passive receivers but actively involved in the communication process and could (and did) have retroactive effects on the original “senders,” then we can more closely approach what Droysen considered the basis for any historical research:

The possibility of this understanding arises from the kinship of our nature with that of the utterances lying before us as historical material. A further condition of this possibility is the fact that man’s nature, at once sensuous and spiritual, speaks forth every one of its inner processes in some form apprehensible by the senses, mirrors these inner processes, indeed, in every utterance. On being perceived, the utterance, by projecting itself into the inner experience of the percipient, calls forth the same inner process. (Droysen 1897, 12–13 [§9])

Hence, we hope that this volume offers new chances to understand the past with the help of frames and framing, not as a strict theory, but rather as a tool by which to approach antiquity and the different layers of its per- and reception.

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FRAMING IN ATHENIAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE:
A CASE STUDY OF AESCHINES II

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Public communication significantly influences how we perceive the society we live in and how we make decisions within the political system. This awareness that language plays a crucial role in shaping our thinking and, therefore, our decision-making has been researched in various ways. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed in a series of experiments that humans do not make rational choices according to facts presented to them but, rather, how something is phrased and linked to emotions – in short, *framed* – is key to how people make decisions based on the information received.¹ The linguist George Lakoff further pointed out that “frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world”² and so concluded that “people think in frames.”³ Therefore, framing – or better: frame analysis – has become a major field of research within political and communication sciences to analyze how public communication works and consequently how it shapes societies.

The Athenian democracy in the 4th century BC was strongly based on face-to-face communication, making language crucial to the political process and making public speeches an important part of political communication. With framing theory gaining more attention within classical studies, the question arises whether framing, too, played a role in ancient public discourse. However, most framing models in political and communication sciences build heavily on experiments to measure the cognitive effects of language. This is of course not possible for the analysis of ancient societies. In this paper, I argue that frame analysis can nevertheless be fruitfully adapted for the study of Athenian public discourse, using a framing model that focuses on communication as a process and is based on analyzing the interaction between the communicators, the composition of mediated content, and the audience. This is Claes de Vreese’s framing model, which defines framing as a dynamic process within the political communication of a society.⁴ For de Vreese, frames “are parts of political arguments, journalistic

¹ See Kahneman and Tversky 1984, and Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1986; 1991; 1992.

² Lakoff 2004, XV.

³ Ibid., 17.

⁴ De Vreese 2003; 2005; 2012; 2017.

norms, and social movements' discourse. They are alternative ways of defining issues, endogenous to the political and social world."⁵

I. Framing as a multilevel process

Different framing models have previously been used to analyze Athenian oratory. Giulia Maltagliati used cognitive framing theory, building upon Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Chong and Druckman 2007, and Lakoff 2014, to analyze the presentation of historical examples within Attic court speeches.⁶ She conceptualized framing very literally as giving a rhetorical frame to an example, and hence analyzed how a *paradeigma* is introduced in a speech.⁷ She showed convincingly how orators use framing to make their *paradeigmata* appear more salient and recent and so enhance their persuasive power.⁸ Furthermore, she pointed out the importance of familiarity in the selection of an example.⁹ Previously, Brad Cook had already taken up framing as a strategy in Athenian oratory. Applying a cognitive-linguistic frame model, based on Lakoff 2002 and Kövecses 2006, he analyzed the socio-political dynamics of Athenian society in forensic speeches.¹⁰ Cook compared framing to swift-boating, which according to him is not mere character assassination, but "relies on a complex substrate of socio-political opinions and assumptions and, while appearing to focus on a specific detail, [...] it deploys all the moral weight and immense compass that the underlying knot of gut-felt beliefs invokes. This is framing."¹¹ By analyzing character frames and reframing in Aeschines' and Demosthenes' speech from the Crown Trial, Cook demonstrated how reframing of Aeschines' arguments was crucial to Demosthenes winning the case, showing how framing can be a rhetorical strategy built up over entire speeches.¹² Similarly, Sven Günther has shown, building on Goffman 1974, that framing as a method of composing content in ancient literary sources must be analyzed throughout a whole text,

⁵ De Vreese 2005, 53.

⁶ Maltagliati 2020.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 71–76 and 78–92 for a very careful examination of the orator's strategies in introducing historical examples.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁰ Cook 2012.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 219–220.

¹² *Ibid.*, 227–250 showed how Aeschines rhetorically constructs an opposition between the good citizen and the oligarch, thus framing Demosthenes as a cowardly deserter, a frame that is meticulously woven through the speech. But Demosthenes then succeeds in countering this by reframing and turning Aeschines' own argumentation against him: Demosthenes presents himself not as a military actor but as a statesman who had always held his position in the assembly. This implies that Aeschines is the deserter, since he did not guide the *dēmos* in the assembly.

because every part of it is phrased in such a way as to correspond to the chosen frame(s) and the strategic aims of the communicator.¹³ The applicability of frame analysis to classical studies has been further debated at the *Frames and Framing in Antiquity* conference, held online in October 2020.¹⁴ The discussions illustrated well how frame analysis can be fruitfully adapted to classical studies in various fields of research, but it must be borne in mind that there are many different approaches to framing and various definitions of what frames are and what they do. Consequently, the question of which framing model is most suitable to analyze an ancient society depends heavily on one's field of research, one's main interest, and the sources available.¹⁵

To analyze the use and effects of frames in public speeches and, thus, to understand framing in the context of political communication within Athens, I have chosen a framing approach based on communication sciences. According to this model, frames in public discourse must be considered on two different levels: as individual frames they are part of the cognitive reference system of every human being, whereas as media frames they are means of constructing and arranging content communicated through media.¹⁶ Since political communication is very dynamic, de Vreese emphasizes that framing, i.e., the use of media frames to influence individual frames, should also be understood as a dynamic communicative process.¹⁷ Hence, he defines framing as a “multilevel process”¹⁸ that includes various actors and different interdependent sub-processes of communication, such as the choice of media frames by political actors and news organizations, the interaction between media frames and the individual frames of recipients, and the effects of framed media content on individuals and societies.¹⁹ De Vreese's model aims to give equal consideration to each level of the framing

¹³ See Günther 2014, esp. 81–83 and 85–86.

¹⁴ Organized by Sven and Elisabeth Günther. For the program and a summary see: <https://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-8857> (04.02.2021).

¹⁵ To analyze texts, Goffman's frame analysis, Dietrich Busse's semantic framing model, and George Lakoff's linguistic framing approach have been used fruitfully. To study strategic framing with a focus on the author of a text and his aims, Matthes 2007 and Marcinkowski 2014 are interesting approaches. For the effects of framing on individuals, the most insightful studies have been those on cognitive framing effects and psychological framing approaches such as the various studies of Chong and Druckman or Kahneman and Tversky, but these are heavily based on experiments and are therefore sometimes difficult to apply to ancient sources. De Vreese's model I deem more suitable since it looks at framing effects within social groups, which can be studied well by linking frame analysis to memory theory (see below, 108). For frame analysis within archaeology, the very recent volume by E. Günther and Fabricius 2021 demonstrates in an interesting variety of studies how framing approaches can also be well integrated into the study of ancient images and artefacts.

¹⁶ Matthes 2014, 10.

¹⁷ See de Vreese 2005; 2012; 2017; Lecheler and de Vreese 2019.

¹⁸ De Vreese 2017, 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 2005, 51–52, and for an overview on framing-effect research: Lecheler and de Vreese 2019.

process as well as to moderators, i.e., factors that influence, limit, or cancel framing effects.²⁰

These different levels of framing are interdependent, making framing a continuous circle.²¹ A communicator proposes a specific interpretation of a piece of information in a media message by using a media frame and so suggests to his audience how the information should be evaluated and how they should react. If the recipients consider the media frame to be a suitable interpretation of the information, this media frame will have agreed at least in part with individual frames held by this social group. The intended effect of framing is not only to activate such individual frames but in the longer term a communicator wants to embed his interpretation of a given topic, i.e., the media frames he uses, into the frames of reference of his target audience and to strengthen them continually. As the individual frames of a target audience are decisive for the choice of a new media frame with which topics in public discourse are presented, previous framing effects continuously influence the media frames used.

By focusing on the social setting of communication, where the content analysis of the media message is just one level in a multilevel process, this model allows us to look at framing in a broader context than linguistic and cognitive framing approaches do, one that more strongly includes the persons involved in, and the context of, communication.²² The aim is to understand how in public communication contents are composed using media frames, how framing functions within a society, where media and individual frames come from, how they change, what effects media frames can have, and to what extent this framing process shapes the perception of reality within a society. The model builds on all available information about actors, institutions, media, and communication within a society at a certain time, in order to better understand the dynamics of and within public communication. Consequently, this approach does not serve well for the analysis of framing over a long time period.

²⁰ Ibid., 43–45. They aim to understand framing in an environment similar to “real life,” since moderators are often excluded in experimental settings.

²¹ See Scheufele 1999 for reciprocity in the framing of media content.

²² De Vreese and Lecheler understand their framing-process model as integrative, aiming to bring together previous subfields of framing research within communication sciences in order to demonstrate that the different levels of framing, such as actors, media, institutions, recipients, and effects, are inseparably intertwined and therefore must be considered together as an ongoing process. See Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 15: “In essence, you cannot fully understand framing effects without understanding the manifestations of frames and where they come from.” The cognitive and linguistic framing models can be very interesting for analyzing frames within a certain text (as shown by Maltagliati 2020 and Cook 2012), but regarding the dynamics of communication these models tend to leave out crucial factors such as different actor groups, institutional and social context, and previous framing effects.

To illustrate how I think this framing-process model can be used fruitfully to study Athenian oratory, in section IV I will use it to analyze framing within Aeschines' second speech as a case study and so will evaluate whether this tool allows new insight into the composition of public speeches and the dynamics within Athenian public discourse. Before this, in section II, I will discuss how frames are defined in this paper and how the concept can be adapted to the study of ancient societies. Further, in section III, I discuss de Vreese's model in more detail and show how it can be used for the study of Athenian oratory.

II. Media frames, individual frames, and collective frames

As framing in public discourse can have significant effects on how a social group evaluates topics or aspects of the world around them, frame analysis has become a thriving concept in various fields of research such as psychology, social and political sciences, linguistics, and art history. As a result, various definitions of what a frame is and how framing works are now in use. I shall here discuss how media frames and individual frames are defined in the framing-process model based on communication sciences, and shall evaluate how this model can be adapted to the study of Athenian public speeches by adding the concept of collective frames.

After Erving Goffman's 1974 *Frame Analysis*, it was Todd Gitlin who first applied the concept of frames to the media context, creating the basis for framing research in political and communication sciences.²³ Since then, in communication sciences, media frames have been understood as means to arrange mediated content that have a decisive influence on the attitudes and opinions of recipients. William Gamson and Andre Modigliani defined these media frames as "interpretative packages"²⁴ with a specific internal structure, making them a central organizing idea "for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue" within a media message.²⁵ The term media frame is thus short for an interpretative frame within mediated content that suggests a specific interpretation of the information that is communicated within the media message. Media frames hence represent a communicator's (rhetorical) strategy to present to his audience a specific view on a topic. This means that a media frame is not a simple stylistic device – such as a single example or stereotype – but rather it is a specific interpretation of the topic at hand, which is superimposed on the single media message and promoted with an internal argumentative structure. These

²³ Gitlin 1980, 6–7: Gitlin understood media frames as "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters."

²⁴ Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

internal structures of media frames have been influentially defined by Robert Entman as follows: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, [...] Frames, then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their effects.”²⁶ With this argumentative structure, a media frame gives any communicated information a context and shows the audience how the information can be interpreted and how one should react to it.

A media frame in a text, as I will analyze it in Athenian public speeches, can therefore be understood as “a structure of meaning – a central idea, organizing principle, master narrative, macroattribute, or theme – that can be implicit, or latent, in a mediated text but nonetheless imparts a clear, selective meaning to the words and visuals a communicator uses to contextualize a topic.”²⁷ Media frames can, for example, be thematic, e.g., economic gain, protection of the environment, or peace being better than war,²⁸ or focus on portraying a certain person in public life with a specific character image that is linked to at least partly shared moral values, attitudes, and emotions. Further, media frames often serve to arrange the content of a given message in such a way as to link the interpretation of the topic to emotions.²⁹

Media frames in the Athenian context are understood similarly: an organizing idea within mediated content of public discourse. I suggest that all content of public communication – and thus mediated content – that is still visible or readable today can be analyzed as a potential carrier of such media frames. The model of de Vreese is not based on a specific type of medium, since frame analysis focuses on the content of media messages and not on the medium itself. Media in communication science are understood as channels of communication established within a society, being the mediating instance between the producer of a media message and the recipients; and at the same time media significantly influence the composition of a media message and the choice of media frames.³⁰

²⁶ Entman 1993, 52.

²⁷ D’Angelo 2017, 5.

²⁸ With political parties it can be observed well how certain thematic frames determine their political program, meaning that every event, person, or new piece of information in public discourse is picked up and immediately evaluated according to the essential frames of their political agenda, and thus fitted into the picture of reality that a political party wants its target audience to perceive.

²⁹ On emotions, see Nabi 2003; Kühne 2015; Wirz 2018; Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, esp. 38–39 and 69–71.

³⁰ Communication sciences understand all communication as a mediated process, which involves (at least) a communicator, a message, a medium, and a recipient. Media are not understood as

As Pantelis Michelakis points out, adaptating the concept of media to pre-modern societies is indeed possible, despite completely different technological conditions: the question should not be what media are in a technological sense, but what function they have in a society; based on this, one can identify various media in past societies.³¹ In Athens direct communication dominated the political system, but this does not mean that mediation did not take place.³² A content could be conveyed to a wider audience through various channels: inscriptions, monuments, pictorial representations, coins, art, and also the theater, the actor or speaker on stage, and the ritual. For the court speech as mediatized content, the decisive communication channel was the speaker, who conveyed the previously produced message to the target audience via body, voice, and language. Christian Mann has analyzed this role of the speaker and calls the body and the entire habitus of a *rhētōr* the medium of politics.³³ Thus, the court speech is mediated by the performance of the speaker, which is a socially established communication channel in the polis.³⁴ Accordingly, the speech was mediatized content in public discourse; and, therefore, it could also contain media frames.

In an Athenian court speech, media frames represent rhetorical strategies the orator chose in order to present a specific understanding of the case, to guide his audience to take a corresponding view when making their judgements. This

simple technological devices, but as social instruments of communication that are integrated into institutionalized contexts of behavior within a society. See Burkart 2019, 21–61.

³¹ Michelakis 2020, 3–4: in the modern use of the concept of media, three aspects dominate: “media as conduits (i), media as languages (ii), and media as environments (iii).” For adaptations of the media concept used in communication sciences (i) is the most important: “As conduits, media are channels with real or imagined possibilities and limitations for conveying information to the senses, and for bridging the gap between production and reception. In this sense media include materials for aesthetic expression such as clay, stone, or wax. They also include tools and devices, both real and imagined, from the actors mask and the sculptor’s chisel to the plough of didactic poetry and the automata of Hephaestus’ divine workshop. They can also include sensory organs, from the painter’s hand and the actor’s body to the eyes of the mind and the ears of the divinely inspired poet.”

³² See Wilke 2012 for an important discussion of ties between modern communication science and classical studies.

³³ Mann 2009a, 148. He defines a medium as a carrier of information in a communicative process, not just serving as a mere transmitter of information, but rather participating in the production of mediated messages. See Mann 2009b, 11. Michelakis 2020, 5 states that at the same time, in the direct communication between speaker and audience, equality of language and an understanding of the linguistic variation is a prerequisite for the successful communication of a message and accordingly should also be recognized as a predisposition of the audience.

³⁴ On the orators’ performance, see Hall 1995; Serafim 2017; Papaioannou, Serafim and da Vela 2017. Considering the mediation of court speeches, Riess 2012, 22 argues that the trials, in addition to their role as legal procedures, had the character of a secular ritual. For that reason, it has to be borne in mind that the surviving speeches are written renderings of original performances and derived their original thrust through this performance (ibid., 10). Approaches to reconstructing the performative aspects of the speeches are Boegehold 1999 and O’Connell 2017.

analysis of media frames in forensic speeches can be linked to previous studies that have focused on narratives and storytelling by Athenian *rhētores*.³⁵ As media frames we can identify, for instance, thematic interpretations focused on the court case or other aspects of community life in the polis,³⁶ as well as character representations that depict the people involved in the case,³⁷ and narratives aimed at arousing emotions.³⁸ An important point is that a media frame is a cohesive rhetorical strategy woven into the whole speech and with an internal argumentative structure, focused on defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments, and suggesting remedies. Whether the use of media frames has effects on audience members depends on the interaction between the media frame and the individual frames of the recipients; the latter consist of their existing opinions on, knowledge of, emotions towards, and interpretations of the topic, which may coincide with the media frame (strong effect) or oppose it (no effect).³⁹

An individual frame is to be understood as an individual's frame of reference that is activated when a piece of information is received and processed; individual frames are thus cognitive conditions that determine how individuals

³⁵ See Gagarin 2003, and now Edwards and Spatharas 2020 for an excellent overview of narratives and storytelling.

³⁶ E.g., Piepenbrink 2016b on "security."

³⁷ There are various studies on character images within Athenian society. For an overview, see Mann, Haake and von den Hoff 2009, and Adamidis 2017 on traditions of character images. Further, the concept of *ethopoeia* can be closely linked to character framing, since both describe processes where the orator constructs characters for the persons involved in a case according to his main rhetorical strategies: see Webb 2009a and Piepenbrink 2016a. Also, the concept of *schema* as discussed by Goldhill 1999, 4–5 parallels a speaker staging his own person by means of a specific character frame.

³⁸ The importance of emotions within Athenian oratory has been well studied. See Sanders and Johncock 2016 and, for emotions in rhetoric, Spatharas 2019; on emotions within forensic oratory Rubinstein 2004; and Spatharas 2017 on using *enargeia* to influence emotional responses. Cairns 2008, 46 describes emotions as "socially performed and dynamic, linked to the norms which govern social interactions in a given society." Since frames used to promote a specific interpretation within a mediated message often build especially on social norms already established within a social group, they can also aim at evoking emotions within the recipients. To describe how emotions are linked to language and performance, Cairns uses the term "emotion script:" "A script is a mini-narrative that will usually encompass (at least) the conditions in which emotion X occurs, the perceptions and appraisals of those conditions, and the responses (whether symptomatic, expressive, or pragmatic) that result." Further, also Spatharas 2020, 6 stresses that emotion scripts have a narrative background, and that the storytelling within a speech elicits mental images and emotional responses in an audience.

³⁹ If, for example, a communicator uses a "save the environment" frame to promote his actions, he needs this media frame to be known to his audience in such a way that they think the environment needs saving and that wanting to save the environment is something good. The more strongly this opinion is already established in his audience, perhaps even linked to personal experiences, the more strongly the positive effect will be for him as political actor when he presents his own actions and appeals through this thematic media frame.

take up, evaluate, and interpret received media content. This process provides an individual with possibilities for interpreting and evaluating every piece of information received. The whole framing process is thus fundamentally determined by the dynamic interaction between media frames and individual frames.⁴⁰ Communication sciences, as well as psychology and cognitive studies, depend heavily on experimental studies to determine individual frames of reference and how they are affected by using frames to arrange media content. This cannot be adopted for the study of an ancient society, since our sources do not, or only very rarely, allow insight into individual frames. These are limitations to the adoption of this model for the study of ancient civilizations. Yet, I suggest that a workaround is to focus less on individuals and more on the collective of recipients of a court speech. Therefore, I propose the use of the concept of collective frames instead of individual frames. To understand such collective frames of reference without experiments, I further suggest linking framing theory to memory theories that have already been well adapted to study Athenian public discourse.⁴¹

Robert Entman names the communicator, the text, the recipient, and culture as crucial locations of framing, whereby he understands culture as a “stock of commonly invoked frames” and explains that “culture might be defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourses and thinking of most people in a social grouping.”⁴² I do not agree that we can define culture simply as common frames in a society. Moreover, what Entman describes I understand as collective frames of social groups, being the frames of reference shared by the group members. They represent shared ideas about values, morals, and concepts of right or wrong and are the results of negotiation processes within social groups. A communicator’s choice of media frames is determined by his assessment of these collective frames of reference of his audience.⁴³ Therefore, within Athenian public discourse, we can determine the media frames chosen by an orator as well as his knowledge of the collective frames of reference of his audience.

⁴⁰ De Vreese 2005, 53 with Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 47. Scheufele 1999, 105 calls individual frames the individual version of reality based on personal experiences, interactions with peers, and a certain selection of content conveyed in the mass media. Chong and Druckman 2011, 239 have called framing the process in which a “frame in communication” influences which “frame in thought” is activated in an individual to evaluate a topic.

⁴¹ See Thomas 1989; Clarke 2008; Grethlein 2010; Steinbock 2013a; Franchi 2017; Canevaro 2017 and 2019.

⁴² Entman 1993, 53.

⁴³ See also Spatharas 2020, 3, who states that telling a certain story within a forensic speech “enabled speakers to appeal to audiences’ social knowledge or cultural understandings.”

While communication sciences rarely use the concept of memory, the link between framing approaches and memory theories is evident. Frames of reference are structures within social memories that link memory contents to each other.⁴⁴ Shared memories of social groups are of great importance for public communication processes, since memories determine what can be said in which context and to what audience.⁴⁵ When a topic, event, or person is addressed in a speech, in the recipient's mind other memory contents that are already linked to it become activated: memories, experiences, knowledge, emotions, evaluations, opinions, and so on, often summarized as individual predispositions. These form a frame of reference for the information received, suggesting an interpretation and reaction to it. These links between memory contents have different origins: experiences, perceptions of the present, current needs, or as the result of former framing processes that had already linked certain topics and memory contents together. The same topic can be linked to very different contents in the different social memories of various social groups, a fact that results in differing interpretations and reactions. Thus, frames of reference are not just given in a society or social group but are very dynamic constructs that change constantly, especially through communication.⁴⁶ This process within Athenian public discourse can thus be studied by frame analysis, by inserting the concept of collective frames of references into this model.

III. Framing in Athenian political communication

De Vreese suggests that looking at framing as a process helps to understand the dynamics of public communication within a society and how communication shapes a society's perception of itself and the world around it. This is because both media frames and collective frames of reference are continually renegotiated

⁴⁴ Fentress and Wickham 1992, based on the essential works on memory by Maurice Halbwachs, elaborated the concept of social memory: this defines interaction as main constitutive of memory. When memories are articulated, they become a social fact and part of the memory of the social group with which it is shared. A society consists of various social groups, each sharing its own social memory; every individual is part of several groups of very different sizes – the family, the deme, the Assembly, or the whole Athenian *dēmos* – and, thus, partakes in various social memories. This model has been adapted to the study of Roman society especially by Späth 2016 and for Athenian society by Steinbock 2013a/b and 2017, and is further discussed in Franchi and Proietti 2017 and Franchi, Proietti and Giangiulio 2019.

⁴⁵ On the interaction of social memories and public discourse, see esp. Steinbock 2013a.

⁴⁶ Rosalind Thomas (1989; 1992) has shown the importance of orality for transmission of shared memories within Athenian society. Yet, through communication, not only are memory contents transmitted, but also connections between memory contents and current topics are constantly made, moral values are relocated into the present, and so new frames of reference are created. Framing is part of this process, because a media frame, too, needs to be linked to memory content in order to have an effect on recipients.

in the framing process and are passed on in societal groups and linked to current issues. The fact that a media frame is used shows that it already had significance for the target audience and therefore that it had previously been negotiated and established as a possible interpretation of topics relevant to this social group. The importance of public communication in the functioning of Athenian democracy as well as in shaping Athenian society has been stressed many times, especially since Josiah Ober's *Mass and Elite* in 1989.⁴⁷ The Athenians as frequent audience members were experienced listeners and knew the orators' usual strategies and tricks. And, while listening to public speeches, the *dēmos* knew that the final decision-making power lay with themselves, making the *rhētores*, however influential, ultimately dependent on their audience.⁴⁸ Accordingly, Athenian public discourse was never a one-sided communication: the audience expressed its opinion through heckling, expressions of support, applause, laughter, and protests, even by preventing a speech from taking place.⁴⁹ De Vreese's model not only allows us to analyze the content of a speech as a mediated message and to trace how frames were used, but also to consider all the different actors involved in this process and the context of communication. In what follows, I discuss how this framing-process model can be – and needs to be – adapted for the study of 4th-century BC Athenian society and especially public speeches.

Choice of frames

Every topic of public political discourse is open to various interpretations, making different framing strategies possible for every piece of information and every event or person. Media frames are chosen in competition with other communicators, each of whom wants to find the right, i.e., persuasive interpretation to suggest for the specific topic, medium, moment of communication, and audience.⁵⁰ De Vreese calls this frame building, which is a multi-stage process “that includes the flow of frames from the political actors to the journalists and from the journalists to the voters.”⁵¹ The actors involved are: first, political actors, meaning the political elite, state institutions, interest groups, social movements, NGOs, lobby groups, and so on; second, journalists,

⁴⁷ For a discussion of the use of the sociological concepts of *the public* and *public opinion* in classical studies, see Imhof 2012 and Kuhn 2012, esp. 3–21. Framing-process models do have overlaps with these sociological concepts, even if the framing approaches in communication science do not explicitly make these connections.

⁴⁸ Roisman 2004, 264. Ober discusses the balanced power relationship between *rhētores* and the *dēmos*. See Ober 1989, 293–339 and 1994, 88–89.

⁴⁹ Ober 1989, 104 and Roisman 2004, 264. See further Thomas 2016 and *Dem. Or.* 19.15, 45, and 113, where the orator mentions that he was silenced in the assembly.

⁵⁰ Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 12.

⁵¹ Hänggli 2012, 1.

meaning the entire group of producers of any kind of media content; and third, the recipients, often understood as members of a society or social group who consume media messages. Political actors and journalists both use framing and pursue their own communication goals; therefore, the struggle for attention is also a struggle over media content.⁵² But the most important aspect is to precisely consider the targeted audience: communicators do not necessarily choose media frames that they themselves consider to be the best, most concise, or morally most valuable interpretation and evaluation of the topic. Rather, after considering the rules and conditions of their intended medium, they choose those media frames that they hope will have the greatest effect on opinions and political decision making within their audience. Since the most effective media frame is one that is already known and linked to opinions and emotions, the communicator needs to carefully evaluate the collective frames of reference and other predispositions of his audience, who – in a longer-term view of public communication – are also heavily influenced by the previous framing of similar topics.

Public speeches were held in various locations in Athens, such as the assembly of the *dēmos*, its smaller political units such as the demes and tribes, as well as in the courts and at festive occasions.⁵³ At the same time, there were numerous other media of public communication. The public speeches I focus on here must therefore be understood as just one part of public discourse; the framing of content in speeches is continuously interacting with frames promoted through other media in this society.⁵⁴ For a public speech, an orator decided on the media frames to be applied.⁵⁵ Consequently, in Athenian society there was no negotiation process comparable to the one between political actors and journalists observed today, which made communication – and framing – a more

⁵² Ibid., 2–3. There is interdependence: political actors need media to reach the public, while the media need the inputs of political actors for their news production. Matthes 2014, 37 and Scheufele 1999, 105 discuss how the production of media content is influenced by the individual, social, institutional, and structural factors that surround journalists. And as Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 20–21, de Vreese 2005, and Scheufele 1999 show, also editorial policy, political orientation, desired news values, economic goals, and the structures and communication platforms of the medium influence the choice of media frames.

⁵³ For the sites of public discourse, see Ober 1989; Steinbock 2013a; 2017; Matuszewski 2019.

⁵⁴ Kostopoulos 2019 analyzes *Erinnerungsräume* and the Athenian orators and demonstrates that in public discourse there are links between communication through different media, such as monuments, graves, inscriptions, and speeches. The orators frequently point to certain sights or recall them, cite an inscription, or use quotations from literary works. Yet such interaction between media frames used in different media within Athenian public discourse can only be analyzed to a limited extent, since the majority of public communication has not been preserved.

⁵⁵ I here discuss speeches written and delivered by the same *rhetōr*. In a more detailed further study, I will discuss how the role of the logographers can and must be fitted into the communication process.

direct process from communicator to target audience. The *rhētores*, as influential statesmen in 4th-century BC democracy, hence played an important role in the framing process within public discourse.⁵⁶ Their position as leading statesmen was based on the favor of the people, so successful communication was of the utmost importance, especially in order to promote oneself as a good advisor to the *dēmos*.⁵⁷

Choosing media frames was part of the rhetorical skillset of the orator. Crucial for his success was the assessment of his audience's predispositions as well as of the circumstances of communication. Further, every institution of political communication in Athens had given rules for speeches (e.g., on time limits, or the sequence of speakers). In addition, every venue had its own unwritten rules, meaning that there were specific expectations of a given audience in each institution of public communication.⁵⁸ For my approach, with its focus on public speeches, the *rhētōr* was the main communicator. Yet at the same time he was part of the wider social group (the *dēmos*) that he wanted to address, giving him a good knowledge of the collective frames of reference that he would be able to activate in his audience by using specific media frames.⁵⁹ In order to do justice to his role in the political system and his social group, an orator had to meet the specific conditions of the speech and the requirements of the context of communication, follow the rules of *rhētōr*-audience interaction and consider the predispositions of his audience, and also stage himself as a good statesman and good citizen. Choosing the right media frames for a public speech was therefore a communicative tightrope walk.

Framing as an orators' main rhetorical strategy also represents what Peter O'Connell summarizes so aptly: "speakers do not directly tell the jurors what they want them to believe but instead create a situation where the jurors seem to

⁵⁶ There was no word corresponding to our term politician (Hansen 1983 and 1995, 278–287), as the Athenians used the terms *rhētores* and *stratēgoi* for their leading statesmen. Thus, the leader in the non-military aspects is simply named by his main duty: speaking to the *dēmos* (Ober 1989, 105–108). This group possessed a certain recognition in the polis and their wealth allowed them to dedicate much time to political life. However, they were not a fixed elite; social rise and fall happened quickly within this political system also due to changing personal friendships and contests for power. The *rhētores* are discussed in several papers in Eder 1995a, esp. id. 1995b, 23–24 and Mossé 1995. See further Burckhardt 1997, 168–170, Piepenbrink 2015, and Harris 2017.

⁵⁷ Harris 2017, 54 cited moral integrity as the most important qualification for being deemed good for the collective.

⁵⁸ On unwritten rules of communication within different sites of public communication, see Martin 2012 and Bers 2013 for how the orators adjusted their performances. See further Harris 2016, Kremmydas 2016, and Barbato 2017 for the assembly speeches, and Rubinstein 2005 and 2016 and Kremmydas 2013 for court speeches.

⁵⁹ Ober 1989 and Thomas 1989 discuss how orators and audiences shared the memories used in public speeches.

reach on their own the conclusion the speakers wish.”⁶⁰ By using media frames the whole speech becomes a cohesive story about the case and the persons involved, one that conveys a compelling image to the audience in which the interpretation suggested by the orator seems to be the only right way to judge this case.⁶¹

As regards communication in political competition, Regula Hänggli and Hanspeter Kriesi have shown how strategic framing is approached: communicators choose one or a few main frames for their media content, promoting their interpretation and evaluation of the topic at stake consistently throughout all their communicated content.⁶² Further, they must consider the media frames of their opponents and decide if reframing or attacking is necessary.⁶³ Third, political actors decide whether to focus on framing the topic discussed or framing the opponent, depending on whether they think political mudslinging would win interest among the audience. In the competition between political actors, both sides use media framing to construct a view of reality in which only their own proposed ideals and judgments seem reasonable. The voters – or in Athens: the *dēmos* – then have the power to decide which proposed view of the topic at hand, and the reality constructed around it, is the more appealing. This evaluation of strategic framing in competitive public communication can be adopted for the situation in an Athenian court.⁶⁴ First, an orator chose one or a few main media frames that are his interpretation and evaluation of the case. They form a coherent rhetorical strategy promoted throughout the speech and which, if successfully conveyed to his audience, the orator considered would be sufficient to win the case. Second, he had to consider the media frames used to present the case by

⁶⁰ O’Connell 2020, 94.

⁶¹ See also *id.* 2017, esp. 127–140 on how orators manipulate the jurors’ imagination to promote a picture of reality in Athens that makes only their proposed verdict seem reasonable.

⁶² See Hänggli and Kriesi 2010 and 2012 on how political actors in Swiss public votes choose strategic frames.

⁶³ Lakoff 2004, 3: “Reframing is changing the way the public sees the world. It is changing what counts as common sense. Because language activates frames, new language is required for new frames. Thinking differently requires speaking differently.” Using different language to present a topic is part of the framing strategies of political actors. When attacking the media frames of an opponent, one should be careful not to repeat the picture drawn by the opponent, but instead should pick up the topic and frame it according to one’s own strategy, fitting it into the picture of reality one wants to promote. See Hänggli and Kriesi 2012 on the reframing strategies of political actors.

⁶⁴ See also Westwood 2020, 25 on competitive rhetoric within the courts: “The balance orators had to strike between appealing to a general audience knowledge base while seeking to make a distinctive impression on that audience with their treatment of what was often (in various forms) familiar material—a task which might involve risks—indicates a dynamic not unlike tragic poets’ reshaping of mythical plots: the aim in both cases is victory in a competition, and in both cases that competition might be with previous efforts by fellow practitioners as much as with the efforts of current rivals (a part of the dynamic that comedy shares too).”

his opponent and decide whether reframing was necessary.⁶⁵ Third, depending on the context, an orator would decide to focus more on the case or on attacking his opponent. In sum, an orator's strategy in a public speech was determined by what he thought to be the most compelling media frames to present this case, what he expected his opponent to say, and what he thought would gather the most attention from his audience.

Frames in media content

Dimos Spatharas states that in the Athenian courts "storytelling plays a predominant role" and the orators offer the jurors "a conceptual framework in which they invite them to decide the case."⁶⁶ O'Connell, in analyzing how orators tell stories about the jury, concludes about Isaeus' *On the Estate of Ciron* that this inheritance case was framed as a "dispute between ownership and theft,"⁶⁷ and so identifies how an orator presents a whole case through a thematic media frame that determines the rhetorical strategy.⁶⁸ While studies of narratives and storytelling within forensic oratory often focus on the various stories told within a speech,⁶⁹ or on one specific narrative that is analyzed across several speeches,⁷⁰ frame analysis suggests another approach: the media frames chosen by the orator are communicative strategies superimposed on the content of a speech and promoted in various ways to continually communicate a cohesive narrative throughout the speech. All small stories, as well as any other stylistic devices, are chosen, phrased, and arranged so as to promote this one main rhetorical strategy. Only when an orator's main media frames have been identified can we evaluate which stylistic device was chosen and why, how it was phrased, and how it corresponds to other parts of the speech. With this framing approach, then, in an Athenian speech a media frame is not constituted by a single stylistic

⁶⁵ There were opportunities before the actual trial to start communicating one's main media frames and to get to know the media frames of the opponents: the *anakrisis* (see Kremmydas 2018) and talk in the city (see Din. *Dem.* 12 or Aeschin. 1.94).

⁶⁶ Spatharas 2020, 1.

⁶⁷ O'Connell 2020, 87.

⁶⁸ Ibid. O'Connell discusses how orators tell stories about the jury in order to characterize them in such a way as to help the orator gain their trust and favor. Although O'Connell does not use framing as his methodological approach, this is a very good parallel to the concept of character framing in mediated content. For the speech of Isaeus *On the Estate of Ciron* he shows how the orator framed the jury in such a way as to correspond with his main thematic media frame of ownership and theft, illustrating how character media frames and thematic media frames chosen by the orator serve the same rhetorical strategy.

⁶⁹ Spatharas 2020, 4: "Even a cursory reading of the orators indicates that stories of varying length are commonly dispersed over different parts of the speeches or that the 'proofs' are conveniently interwoven with storytelling."

⁷⁰ E.g., O'Connell 2020 and Piepenbrink 2016b.

device, *topos*, or example; rather, all discernible stylistic elements are understood as framing devices that have been deliberately selected and coordinated by the communicator to promote his chosen media frames to his audience in the best possible way throughout the entire speech. Framing devices in a forensic speech can be metaphors, examples, *topoi*, stereotypes, catchphrases, comparisons, depictions, or visual images.⁷¹ They make a media frame communicable and are often condensed versions of the proposed interpretation that are easily accessible to the audience.⁷² While framing affects every part of a speech, framing devices promote the media frames more strongly by simplification, dramatization, and alluding to emotions, moral judgments, shared memories, experiences, and traditions.⁷³ This makes them vehicles of signification within a speech.⁷⁴ And by means of framing devices, a topic is placed in a context well-known to the audience in order to make the angle on the topic that the media frame promotes plausible and convincing.

For an orator – especially in the competitive setting of the law-court trials – the most important and desirable framing effect is to successfully appeal to his audience and, ideally, to convince them of the truth of what was said. Aristotle, too, stated that persuasion is most important in rhetoric, and is achieved by using means of persuasion to make what is said plausible to the audience.⁷⁵ A rhetorical proof does not need to be factual, it simply needs to convince the audience; truth or falsehood is in the eye of the recipient. For forensic oratory, Aristotle and Anaximenes in their respective treatises on rhetoric distinguish

⁷¹ See Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3. Entman 1993, 52 stated similarly that frames in media messages can be identified by “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.”

⁷² Pan and Kosicki 1993, 59: Framing devices “are structurally located lexical choices of codes constructed by following certain shared rules and conventions. They have varying functions in signification. They function as framing devices because they are recognizable and thus can be experienced, can be conceptualized into concrete elements of a discourse, can be arranged or manipulated by newsmakers, and can be communicated in the ‘transportation’ sense of communications. In essence, they are tools for newsmakers to use in composing or constructing news discourse as well as psychological stimuli for audiences to process.” See further D’Angelo 2017, 5–8 and de Vreese 2005, 53–54 on identifying media frames in text.

⁷³ A media frame can be made prominent by eye-catching and attention-grabbing framing devices. But a frame can also be “implicit, or latent, in a mediated text but nonetheless imparts a clear, selective meaning to the words and visuals a communicator uses to contextualize a topic” (D’Angelo 2017, 5).

⁷⁴ I borrow this term from Dimos Spatharas, who calls stories within a speech vehicles of signification (Spatharas 2020, 7). I suggest that not only stories but all framing devices are such vehicles of signification which highlight those aspects of a case and of the persons involved that the orator wants to promote while neglecting others.

⁷⁵ See Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.1–12 1354a–1355a.

between proofs given by the case (*pisteis atechnoi*) and artificial proofs, which depend on the abilities of the orator (*pisteis entechnoi*).⁷⁶ The former include witness statements, laws, documents, objects, and confessions under torture, while the artificial proofs must be composed by the orator himself, and their effectiveness relies on his skills.⁷⁷ Aristotle further distinguishes three ways in which *pisteis entechnoi* make a speech convincing:⁷⁸ first, by constructing the *ēthos* of the speaker and the opponent; second, by stimulating specific emotions within the audience; and third, by making the speech itself persuasive by establishing what is true or apparently true to the audience. The crucial aspect is to create plausibility within the audience, in which it is irrelevant whether something is an actual or apparent proof. I suggest that *pisteis entechnoi* can be compared to *framing devices*: both are used to persuade the audience by giving examples, illustrations, and explanations, and so in a text they both serve to promote a certain interpretation of a topic, event, or person – often by alluding to emotions, moral judgments, or collective memories and experiences. The same stylistic elements are thus cited as means to influence the opinions, emotions, and decision-making of a given audience by both ancient rhetorical theory and modern communication sciences alike.

I here focus on *paradeigmata* as framing devices.⁷⁹ Studies of the use of examples in media content have shown that examples are a very effective means of proposing a certain evaluation of a piece of information. Examples are more vivid to the recipient, which attracts attention and stimulates the imagination, and their episodic structure makes examples easier to understand and, since they highlight individual aspects, also more accessible and so more convincing.⁸⁰ In

⁷⁶ Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.2.2 1355b and [Aristot.] *Rhet. Alex.* 7.2.

⁷⁷ As *pisteis entechnoi* Aristotle defines *enthymēmata* and *paradeigmata* (Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.2.8–9 1356b) whereas Anaximenes also includes plausibilities, *tekmēria*, maxims, signs, and *elenchoi* into this group ([Aristot.] *Rhet. Alex.* 7.2).

⁷⁸ Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.2.3–6 1356a.

⁷⁹ On the use of historical *paradeigmata* in Attic oratory, see Jost 1935; Pearson 1941; Perlman 1961; Nouhaud 1982; Uccello 2011; 2014; 2021; Piepenbrink 2012; Westwood 2020. *Paradeigmata* are a crucial stylistic device in court speeches and are composed by the orators very precisely according to their communicative goals. Historical *paradeigmata* are contents of social memories adapted to the rhetorical strategy of a certain speech, allowing us to analyze how dynamic the memory contents were within the Athenian *dēmos*, since they demonstrate how much an orator could reframe past events to fit his argumentation. See on this also Steinbock 2013a. Claudia Uccello emphasizes that *paradeigmata* do not have to be historical; in my further research on *paradeigmata* as framing devices I will discuss this in more detail, but for the present paper, as a case study, I will in section IV focus on the analysis of the historical *paradeigmata* that Aeschines specifically composed for his second speech.

⁸⁰ Brosius and Bathelt 1994, 49–52. Since then, several studies have shown that examples in media messages have significantly more influence on the perception of a piece of information than do general facts, statistics, or exact numbers. Even one example can determine the evaluation of the

Athenian oratory, too, examples represent a versatile stylistic device, drawn from social memory content by the speaker and specifically shaped for each speech.

Framing effects

By using media frames, an orator aims to activate certain frames of reference held by his audience, in order to put them in a state of mind such that they find his speech appealing, plausible, and more convincing than the argumentation of the opposing side. This presupposes that framing has effects. Dietram Scheufele points out that research on framing effects builds on studies of mass media effects since the beginning of the twentieth century, starting from the simple premise that media messages have effects on recipients by constructing social reality, that is, by framing images of reality in a predictable and patterned way.⁸¹ Thomas Nelson, Zoe Oxley, and Rosalee Clawson have shown how using different thematic media frames to present a topic in a media message had a significant influence on the recipient's attitudes after media consumption.⁸² Lecheler and de Vreese define media effects simply as the ability to influence people's attitudes and behaviors by subtle changes to how an issue is presented.⁸³

The most important moderators of framing effects are the predispositions of the target audience, such as cultural values, political affiliations, religion, opinions, attitudes, emotional states, moral concepts, values, and their respective intensity. If a media frame contradicts predispositions, there is a high probability that it will have no effect. To be effective, a media frame must succeed in attracting attention to such an extent that the media message is received and the interpretation suggested by the media frame is perceived. If successful, frames of reference already held by the recipients will be activated and a framing effect will occur. But this will not necessarily be the effect that a communicator was aiming at, since a media frame may be judged to be false, disturbing, or insulting. Choosing the right media frame is thus crucial. Especially, a similarity between media frames and the recipients' frames of reference significantly increases the probability that the suggested interpretation will be accepted, considered to be correct, and perceived as matching the recipient's own opinions and attitudes.⁸⁴ This raises the issues of applicability and accessibility.⁸⁵ The applicability effect

whole piece of mediated content by the recipients. See Hinnant, Len-Ríos and Young 2013 for an overview of research on the effects of examples in media content.

⁸¹ Scheufele 1999, 104–105.

⁸² See Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997 and their experiment on using different thematic frames to present an event and how this affects the audience's attitudes towards it.

⁸³ Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 1–2.

⁸⁴ See Ostfeld and Mutz 2014. Further Hinnant, Len-Ríos and Young 2013, 9–10 discuss the importance of similarities between the audience members and the examples used in media messages.

⁸⁵ See Price and Tewksbury 1997, and Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 61–71.

refers to the fact that the media frame has an effect on the selection of cognitive contents that we apply when we process a piece of received information. The accessibility effect refers to the fact that, once a cognitive structure has been activated to evaluate information, it retains an activation potential, increasing the probability that it will be used again. This happens in two ways: accessibility can determine which content will be activated first when assessing a certain topic, or it can cause an activated content to be applied also when processing the next media message that immediately follows.⁸⁶ Applicability and accessibility both increase with the frequency with which an audience is subjected to a certain media framing.

Further moderators of framing effects are the specific medium and the location of media consumption, as well as the presence of peer groups, since the collective frames of reference shared with this group are more likely to be activated when consuming media content.⁸⁷ Recipients are constantly confronted with a large number of different media frames evaluating the same topics: these frames suggest the reasons, consequences, and moral assessment of current topics, but, since all the various actors in public discourse use different media frames to achieve their goals, there is a constant competition over sovereignty of interpretation.⁸⁸ In Athenian public discourse, we can state – at least to a certain extent – that all orators used framing, but only one side won the day in the assembly or the law court. Hence there, too, we can identify a contest over framing: within the assembly, this was primarily a contest over framing the topics at hand, while in the law courts there were at least two different views proposed of the case, as well as strong character framing of the people involved.

Whether a media frame is effective depends on how often it is used, on the context of communication, on whether the communication source is considered

⁸⁶ For instance, if a frame in a media message triggers the emotion fear, this activated cognitive content is then applied to evaluate the topic, e.g., climate change. This is the applicability effect. Accessibility may now have the result that the next time the person is confronted with a media message concerning climate change, fear will be the first cognitive content to be activated, since it is more accessible than other cognitive structures linked with this topic, due to its recent activation. But the accessibility effect also has the result that the emotion remains activated for a certain amount of time. If in this period a different media message is received, the probability is increased that fear will also be used to evaluate the new topic.

⁸⁷ Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 51–55 discuss the following as *contextual moderators*: (1) interaction in social groups; (2) the news environment in which a frame is encountered; (3) the presence of competitive frames and repetition of framing; (4) a mediated public sphere through which political information flows, influencing the attribution of importance to a topic; (5) the level of controversial discourse attached to a topic. See also Chong and Druckman 2007, 107: “effectiveness depends on the context in which frames are encountered.”

⁸⁸ See Gamson and Modigliani 1989, and Cappella and Jamieson 1997.

credible, and on whether the frame is in line with the audience's predispositions.⁸⁹ If achieved, framing effects can be short- or long-term. Short-term framing effects are cognitive negotiations between media frames and the frames of reference of an individual or a group. In the short term, existing links between contents in a person's own frame of reference cannot simply be dissolved, yet through the accessibility effect it is possible to control which frames are first and most easily activated to assess a certain topic. Which media frame is most appealing in the short run depends heavily on the perception of reality by the audience at the very moment of media consumption. Thus, through their speeches, the orators propose a specific view on the reality in Athenian society in which their arguments seem to be the only reasonable way of judging the case. Further, a crucial element for framing effects is emotion: emotions are moderators of the framing process as well as being decisive short-term framing effects, influencing the perception of a message as well as its evaluation. In the long term, political actors aim to change attitudes and opinions in their favor and to influence which topics are deemed important in a society.⁹⁰ Today, this is most recognizable in the programs of political parties and the competition between political actors.⁹¹ In Athens – at least regarding Demosthenes' assembly speeches – we can determine that a statesman tried to promote similar thematic and character frames across more than one speech over a period of time. Thus, we can assume that he aimed to establish his main media frames in the minds of his audience in order to influence their political decision-making over a longer time period.

IV. Aeschines' *On the False Embassy*

To illustrate how de Vreese's framing model can be used to analyze Athenian public speeches I have selected Aeschines' speech from the Embassy Trial. In this trial, Aeschines defends himself against Demosthenes' accusation of misconduct as envoy (*parapresbeia*). After the First Embassy to Philip II, on which both Demosthenes and Aeschines served, the Athenian Assembly met in 346 BC and discussed whether to conclude a peace treaty with Philip.⁹² After

⁸⁹ Chong and Druckman 2007, 104.

⁹⁰ Change in the attribution of importance to particular issues in public discourse is an important framing effect. See Lecheler and de Vreese 2019, 67–69; and on framing and issue importance, see Slothuus 2008, and Lecheler, de Vreese and Slothuus 2009.

⁹¹ Most political parties promote a specific conception of the world and will interpret every topic, event, and person with those main frames of their program, trying to establish their media frames as frames of reference within their audience. Previous successful framing is decisive in choosing a media frame for one's next communication, since frames that were received positively before have a higher chance of appealing to an audience.

⁹² For a discussion of the embassies, the peace negotiations, and the Embassy Trial, see Harris 1995 and Worthington 2013. For commentary and analysis of Aeschines' speech, see Greaney 1992 and

long debates the Athenians voted for a proposal made by Philocrates and sent the Second Embassy, again including Demosthenes and Aeschines, to receive oaths from Philip to seal the treaty. This embassy suffered several delays and, in the meantime, Philip expanded his power in Thrace and into Greek territories, which was not well received in Athens. When the envoys had to submit their *euthynai* Demosthenes and the *rhētōr* Timarchus brought forward their charges against Aeschines. Aeschines reacted quickly and brought a charge against Timarchus, winning his first public and obviously political trial⁹³ and successfully resisting Demosthenes' attacks. In the following years, the *dēmos*' support for the peace treaty decreased steadily. In 343 BC the *rhētōr* Hyperides successfully indicted Philocrates, who was sentenced to death, though he had already left Athens before the trial.⁹⁴ This is a good example of how political trials could evoke the mood of the *dēmos* and be used by orators to identify a guilty party responsible for unpopular situations.⁹⁵ Soon afterwards, Demosthenes again took up the charge against Aeschines, and this time it reached court. Demosthenes' main accusation was that Aeschines as envoy had taken bribes from Philip and betrayed the Athenians by making false promises and delaying the Second Embassy. Hence, according to Demosthenes, Aeschines should be blamed for the undesirable peace terms with Philip. For Aeschines the situation was dangerous: Demosthenes was a well-established *rhētōr*, an excellent orator, and the *dēmos* had shown its willingness to find scapegoats for the unpopular treaty.⁹⁶ But Aeschines, too, was a proven *rhētōr*, knew Demosthenes and his strategy well,

2005; for detailed commentary on both speeches: Paulsen 1999; and for Demosthenes' prosecution speech: MacDowell 2000.

⁹³ See Burckhardt 1997: While the majority of trials in the different courts of Athens were private and public lawsuits, there is a certain group of politically motivated trials that were used for the power struggle and self-staging of the *rhētores*. They were part of the game of politics, and it can be assumed that the jury and the audience were well aware of when a trial was a political *agōn*. These trials offered the *dēmos* power over *rhētores*, since it got to decide which *rhētōr* would remain in an influential position. For the *rhētores*, these trials could be used to grasp the public mood about political decisions and about themselves and their opponents. In the extant public court speeches, the political trials are most frequent, but I do not think this correctly represents the use of the courts in Athens, since there must have been a large majority of cases that were strictly based on an actual legal violation. The selection of surviving speeches has, thus, been heavily influenced already in the ancient world by an interest in famous speakers.

⁹⁴ See Carey 2000, 81: since fleeing the city was judged as a proof that he was guilty, Aeschines, while retaining his commitment to the peace, had to carefully dissociate himself from Philocrates.

⁹⁵ In Athenian thought, the *dēmos* does not make wrong decisions when it is correctly informed. Wrong decisions (or those later considered bad decisions) were made when the *dēmos* was deceived, lied to, and seduced. On the rhetoric of deception, see Kremmydas 2013. In this case, Philocrates, who proposed this treaty, was accused of having deceived the *dēmos* and thus inflicting an unfortunate treaty upon the Athenians.

⁹⁶ It can be assumed that due to Hyperides' previous success against Philocrates, Demosthenes hoped that he, too, could exploit the shifted mood concerning the peace treaty to convict his opponent.

and had shown earlier against Timarchus that he was a capable player of the game of politics within the courts. Moreover, he had influential friends and could count on the well-established *rhētōr* Eubulus, the *stratēgos* Phocion, and his fellow envoy Nausicles as his *synēgoroi*. The vote was close but Aeschines won the case.

To analyze framing within Aeschines' speech I focus on a historical *paradeigma*, in paragraphs 74–78, that has already drawn some attention, since it seems to be an unusual reference to the Athenian ancestors. After a short overview of the passage, I will discuss previous proposals to explain and interpret the *paradeigma* and then I will re-evaluate the passage in more detail using the framing model discussed above to analyze the *paradeigma* as a framing device.

The relevant passage begins already in paragraph 69 with Aeschines stating that Demosthenes had misrepresented his statements in the debates in 346 BC and affirming that he himself still stands by what he argued for then. Next, in paragraphs 70–73, Aeschines reminds his audience of the precarious military situation in which Athens found itself before the Peace of Philocrates. He refers to the loss of territory and identifies the incompetence of the *stratēgoi*, and especially Chares' misconduct, as the main cause. As proof, he has a decree read out, which confirms the dissatisfaction of the *dēmos* with Chares' behavior in 346 BC. Then, in paragraph 74, the historical *paradeigma* follows: Aeschines recalls that in the debate in 346 BC he criticized the *rhētores* who ignored the security of the polis and blindly called on the *dēmos* to look to the Propylaea and remember the Battle of Salamis and to the tombs and monuments of their ancestors. He, Aeschines, too, urged the *dēmos* to imitate the glorious deeds and wisdom of their ancestors, reminding his audience of the victories at Plataea, Salamis, Marathon, and Artemisium, and the time when Tolmides was *stratēgos*. But, on the other hand, he also warned the Athenians not to imitate the ancestors' errors and ill-timed ambition, such as during the Peloponnesian War, when Athens had followed Leontini's call for help with an expedition to Sicily even though Deceleia had already been occupied. The even greater folly, as Aeschines puts it, had been to refuse an offer of peace because the *dēmos* was deceived by Cleophon, which meant that in the end Athens lost everything and had to cede the democracy to the Thirty.⁹⁷ In paragraph 78, Aeschines then states how he learned

⁹⁷ That historical *paradeigmata* do not necessarily represent historical truth has been discussed many times, see Worthington 1994; Clarke 2008; Steinbock 2013a; Westwood 2020, as well as Jost 1935; Pearson 1941; Perlman 1961; Nouhaud 1982. I do not believe that distortion is the reason for this but simply persuasion, for which allusions to history are an important means. The contents of *paradeigmata* show us how dynamic Athenian social memories were, as we see how events or persons were remembered and how memory was reproduced within the ever-changing present of Athenian society.

about Athens' past deeds first-hand from his father and his mother's brother, who had both stood up for the polis in times of crisis. Aeschines closes in paragraph 79 with strong accusations against all those *rhētores* supporting a futile war out of a personal desire for profit. He emphasizes once again that he readily admits to having spoken in favor of the peace treaty, since he was convinced that this was the lesser evil for Athens at that time.

Bernd Steinbock discusses historical *paradeigmata* in the context of the interplay of social memories and different memory traditions perceptible in Athenian public speeches.⁹⁸ In his 2013 paper he points out that the passage summarized above shows the dynamics between the rhetorical use of *paradeigmata* and what he calls the Athenians' master-narrative of memory of their past.⁹⁹ Steinbock argues that the part about the military defeats was used by Aeschines in 346 BC to stage himself as an honest and trustworthy advisor, which he reinforced by mentioning unpleasant truths and – in contrast to other *rhētores* – not trying to propagate an ideal state of affairs. His opponent is characterized as a warmonger who does not care for the safety of the city. Aeschines then depicts Tolmides as a great *stratēgos* to show the *dēmos* what would have been possible for Athens in 346 BC if only they had had a good *stratēgos*, unlike Chares at that time.¹⁰⁰ According to Steinbock the historical *paradeigma* was used by Aeschines to illustrate what could happen to the Athenians if they did not agree to a peace treaty and listened to warmongers such as Cleophon. Steinbock assumes that Aeschines is mirroring what he had said in the assembly and that the wording of this whole passage has to be understood in the context of the speech from 346 BC, not that of 343 BC.¹⁰¹ He suggests that with this *paradeigma* Aeschines in 346 BC broke with, or at least countered, the then current Athenian master-narrative of collective memory, which could be dangerous for his reputation, as can be seen by the fact that Demosthenes was still attacking Aeschines over this. Therefore, Aeschines in the Embassy Trial tried to justify his argument by presenting himself as an honest advisor who did not need to sugarcoat his arguments, even if this meant that he had to evaluate the behavior of the ancestors critically to employ it as an example for the present.¹⁰² Steinbock argues that Aeschines further justifies his *paradeigma* by the fact that he referred to memories of his own family, which

⁹⁸ Steinbock 2013b, 69–75, as well as 2013a and 2017.

⁹⁹ Id. 2013b, 76–81. The idea of an Athenian master-narrative in collective memory builds strongly on Loraux 1986 and is further discussed by Thomas 1989 and Clarke 2008. See also Barbato 2017, 218–222.

¹⁰⁰ Steinbock 2013b, 85–87.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 82–83.

¹⁰² Ibid., 83–85.

were built on their own experiences, showing that memory traditions within families could differ from the social memory of the whole citizen body.¹⁰³

Matteo Barbato takes a different approach, using New Institutionalism Theory. He states that “the orators’ function largely depended on the institutional contexts in which they operated.”¹⁰⁴ Thus, unwritten rules – Barbato calls them discursive parameters – significantly shaped the rhetoric an orator used in the different institutions of Athenian democracy. He further shows convincingly that institutions condition not only the style of rhetoric and the expectations of the audience but also the way references to the past are made; this explains why orators could use different historical *paradeigmata* in a forensic or deliberative speech than those in epitaphs, without contradicting their audiences’ expectations.¹⁰⁵ Barbato, too, understands the passage as a report of what was said in the assembly in 346 BC and states that Aeschines is “eager to clarify the nature of his statements about the ancestors,”¹⁰⁶ since his statements contain “the risk of being perceived as holding views irreconcilable with the image of the city created in funeral speeches.”¹⁰⁷ As the decisive discursive parameter of assembly speeches, Barbato identifies the need to show the advantages of a proposed decision.¹⁰⁸ He argues that Aeschines’ historical example served precisely this purpose: Aeschines invited his audience to look at past mistakes to illustrate the advantage of a peace treaty at the right moment, compared to trusting warmongers at the wrong time.¹⁰⁹ Since the example is not from an *epitaphios*, it was shaped according to the discursive parameters of deliberative speeches;¹¹⁰ the context of the assembly allowed this critical approach to past events. Barbato concludes that this *paradeigma* was not a breach with memory traditions, since every institution allowed its own way of referring to the past.

Guy Westwood, too, discusses this *paradeigma* in his 2020 monograph on the use of the past in the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines. Concerning the interpretation of this *paradeigma* as a verbatim quotation of what Aeschines had said in 346 BC, he states that this view “takes insufficient account of the present trial context – Aeschines is giving a persuasive rather than an accurate account of what he said in the peace debate – and of the dynamic of

¹⁰³ Ibid., 91–98.

¹⁰⁴ Barbato 2017, 216 with references to the New Institutionalism approach in n. 9. He further elaborates on this in his highly interesting book on public discourse and institutions: id. 2020.

¹⁰⁵ See Barbato 2017, 218–228 for his discussion of how the institutions of the Athenian democracy conditioned the narratives about the ancestors in Athenian oratory.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 231.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 225–227.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 234–235.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 233–243.

contestation.”¹¹¹ Westwood reads the passage as Aeschines’ direct response to Demosthenes’ accusations in the prosecution speech in 343 BC.¹¹² He discusses how Demosthenes and Aeschines “stage an explicit contest over the right way to use the Athenian past, and over who is best placed to do that”¹¹³ in which Aeschines, especially in 2.74–78, constructs an image of himself as the wise and credible advisor of the *dēmos* who has such detailed knowledge of the past that he can assess which view of it should serve as a suitable example for the present. At the same time, Aeschines skillfully compares Demosthenes to Cleophon and associates him with the group of warmongers who did not advise Athens well.¹¹⁴ According to Westwood, the historical *paradeigma* thus, on the one hand, is a direct recourse to accusations and, on the other, is constructed within the speech in such a way as to reinforce the characterizations of the orator and his opponent.

To sum up, the question these three approaches answer differently is: why do we find this *paradeigma* phrased and accentuated in this striking way within this specific speech?¹¹⁵ Frame analysis, too, aims to answer the questions why, how, and to what purpose something is phrased in a particular way. Therefore, I consider it interesting to reassess this text passage in the light of frame analysis. I focus on the three main processes – choice of frames, framing the speech, and effects of framing – to assess whether the model allows a different reading of this *paradeigma*.

Choosing frames for the Embassy Trial

To understand why which media frames were chosen for a speech, the site of communication, the specific characteristics of this public speech, and the actors involved must be considered. This trial was a political trial based on competition between Demosthenes and Aeschines, as was well known to all parties involved. Further, these two *rhētores* knew each other well, having spoken against each other on several occasions, and, since this case had been three years in the making, one can assume that both were well prepared and knew the main arguments of their opponent.¹¹⁶ As political trials focus on the role of the *rhētōr* and the question of who was a good advisor to the *dēmos*, strong character frames are needed to depict one’s own action as beneficial and the opponents’ as harmful

¹¹¹ Westwood 2020, 255.

¹¹² Dem. Or. 19.15–16 and 307–313.

¹¹³ Westwood 2020, 249.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 255–260.

¹¹⁵ Correspondingly, the question is not what Aeschines said in 346 BC, because, unless the speeches from the assembly debates in 346 BC resurface, we cannot answer this.

¹¹⁶ Demosthenes knew that Aeschines would attack Chares (Dem. Or. 19.332–333), and that Aeschines would argue that peace is better than war (Dem. Or. 19.88–97).

to the whole polis. Aeschines chose to present himself as a modest servant and calm and honest advisor to the *dēmos*, while Demosthenes is portrayed as a sycophant, a liar, a trickster who ruthlessly pursues his own interests, and as a blustering politician who only lies to the Athenian citizens.¹¹⁷ Aeschines had to select a main thematic media frame by evaluating which possible interpretation and evaluation of the case was known to the audience, was established for this context of communication, and seemed to him the most successful strategy for this speech. He then had to decide the kind of framing devices that would best illustrate and promote this interpretation to his audience. By detecting this main thematic media frame, one can identify what the orator thought his audience would find the most pressing or interesting issue on which to decide the matter. Thematic media frames in political cases therefore do not always concern the case, but rather what the orator thinks the audience will find most interesting. Since the mood in Athens towards the Peace of Philocrates had shifted, this case was dangerous for Aeschines, who had prominently advocated this treaty, a fact he could not deny and knew Demosthenes would use against him. By accusing Aeschines of accepting bribes and deceiving the *dēmos*, Demosthenes wanted the jury to hold Aeschines responsible for the unfavorable terms of the treaty with Philip. Therefore, Aeschines' main thematic media frame refers to the treaty too, choosing reframing as strategy: he does not defend the content of the peace treaty but highlights the result of it – peace – and hence frames it as Athens' best possible option in 346 BC, promoting the advantage of peace at the right time over war at the wrong time. In doing so, he legitimizes the fact that he, as an advisor to the *dēmos*, spoke in favor of this peace.

As the passage discussed here is introduced by references to the speeches in 346 BC, an important question is what the audience remembered from that time. We cannot know how many (if any) of the citizens serving as jurors in 343 BC were also present at the long debates in 346 BC. Further, it is questionable whether the exact wording of a single *paradeigma* would have been remembered three years later: it is more likely that not the detailed phrasing but the general topic and one's own reaction would have been remembered.¹¹⁸ Demosthenes builds his prosecution speech heavily on recalling the events in 346 BC. Although he has no proof of Aeschines' alleged misconduct, Demosthenes recalls the events in an order that makes Aeschines seem to have had a sudden change of mind concerning Philip and the Peace of Philocrates.¹¹⁹ This is then used

¹¹⁷ This frame is probably best captured by Aeschines calling Demosthenes "Sisyphus" in paragraph 43.

¹¹⁸ See Matthes 2007, 158–162: one's own response to a media message is more easily remembered than the message itself. This is why framing aims at emotional responses, since they can create a more durable effect.

¹¹⁹ Demosthenes on recalling the events for his audience: *Dem. Or.* 19.3 and 25–28.

as the main proof that Aeschines had been bribed.¹²⁰ Thus, it is Demosthenes' main strategy to influence how his audience remembers the events of 346 BC by recalling them framed in such a way as to highlight the alleged change in Aeschines' behavior.¹²¹ The recollection of Aeschines not respecting the Athenian ancestors is part of this strategy and serves to underline how sharply Aeschines had changed and stopped acting in Athenian interest.¹²² As a general point, a *rhētōr* can hardly serve as an exact source for what his opponent had said. Moreover, he will adapt everything within his speech to his own communication goals.¹²³ Since the prosecutor spoke first, he had the opportunity to influence what the audience thought it remembered;¹²⁴ this needs a very good knowledge of the audience's predispositions and high rhetorical skills, both of which Demosthenes certainly possessed.¹²⁵ And for the defendant this makes reframing a crucial counter-strategy, one that Aeschines applies well.

Frames in court speeches: Examples as framing devices

Aeschines in paragraph 69 tells his audience: "ask yourselves whether Demosthenes has incriminated me or, on the contrary, himself."¹²⁶ This question about the *ēthos* of the *rhētores* involved marks the starting point of the argument that runs to paragraph 79. He states firmly that, contrary

¹²⁰ Dem. *Or.* 19.9–16 and 302–314 on Aeschines' changing his mind as proof of having been bribed.

¹²¹ A tactic often seen in political communication: apparently quoting the opponents' arguments to make them seem inappropriate and unacceptable to the audience. This "quotation" is selective, arguments are taken out of context, and the opponent's statements are reframed to fit one's own strategies. The aim is to destroy the credibility of the opponent. See Westwood 2020, 253, calling Demosthenes' recollection the *trial version* of the debates on the peace treaty.

¹²² See esp. Dem. *Or.* 19.13–16 and, similar, 114–116.

¹²³ Yunis 2005, 119 on Dem. *Or.* 19: "The narrative is not presented in a continuous, chronologically ordered manner. Rather, it is broken up into segments, interrupted at unpredictable intervals by indignation at Aeschines' corruption and by explicit or ironic disparagement of Aeschines' character and background, then resumed with little warning or recapitulation. ... The original audience was aware of the basic plot, of many of the details, and of Demosthenes' agenda, and so they could pick up Demosthenes' thread at any moment with the briefest reference. Yet by compelling the audience to attend to his allusive, morally compelling narration, Demosthenes was forcing them to accept his view of events."

¹²⁴ O'Connell 2020, 90 describes this in relation to how Lysias promotes memories to his audience: "They heard what Lysias said, and their memories of what they saw and suffered have been coloured by Lysias' descriptions of how the Thirty treated him and his family."

¹²⁵ See Canevaro 2017, who suggests that although orators and their audience share memories there is a gap between the knowledge of the orator and that of the audience, giving the orator the opportunity to fill this gap by recalling detailed memories for his audience about events they would only remember superficially. On how Demosthenes attempted to shape the memories of his audience in this speech, see Franchi 2017.

¹²⁶ Aeschin. 2.69. All translations are from Carey 2000.

to Demosthenes' accusations, he had neither done nor said anything wrong in 346 BC and that he is even proud of the fact that he spoke for the peace treaty in the assembly. In 343 BC (and after Demosthenes' speech), this was a rather controversial statement, generating immediate attention.¹²⁷ Then the reframing starts: he does not appeal to Demosthenes' accusations by defending the content of the treaty but sheds a different light on the treaty by highlighting some specific points of the context at that time and considering parallels in Athenian history. The ten paragraphs are, thus, recognizable as a framing device. By answering his own rhetorical question, Aeschines reaffirms his position on the treaty in 346 BC and has made his point. Yet now he still needs to illustrate his account in such a way as to win the audience's approval and with this influence their attitudes towards the peace treaty and the behavior of the two *rhētores*.

Aeschines begins by discussing Athens' precarious situation in 346 BC. However, immediately in paragraph 70 he makes a short excursus and turns to characterize himself. He stages himself as an honest *rhētōr* who does not shy away from addressing negative points when advising the *dēmos*. He constructs his persona as one who always sticks to the truth and never hides, distorts, or sugarcoats anything for his own benefit, implying that, unlike his enemy, he will not lie or trick the jurors with rhetoric.¹²⁸ In then telling the uncomfortable truth of Athens' situation in 346 BC in paragraphs 71–73 he immediately proves his self-characterization and relentlessly points out bitter military defeats and loss of territory, which is painful for the Athenians' sense of honor. He recalls the anxiety and confusion in Athens before the treaty in order to stir up emotions against the *stratēgoi*. The purpose of this is also to influence how his audience will perceive the written proof that is subsequently read out, drawing on the accessibility effect.¹²⁹ Aeschines uses this decree to support his own account of the situation in 346 BC concerning Chares, blaming him for Athens' futile position in the war, and so taking any responsibility for it away from the assembly.

Then in paragraph 74, he continues by reporting how, in this dangerous situation for the city in 346 BC, in unison the *rhētores* stood up and made no attempt to rescue the city but continued to call for war by telling the *dēmos* to

¹²⁷ As in modern-day politics, provocation generates attention. Holding the attention of an audience that had already heard several speeches was challenging for the defendant.

¹²⁸ The rhetoric of anti-rhetoric is common in political trials, even if everybody knew that the *rhētores* were professional speakers. See Hesk 1999. In this speech Aeschines uses it to underline the contrast that he emphasizes between himself and Demosthenes, by highlighting how Demosthenes is a liar and tricks everyone for his own gain. See, e.g., paragraphs 40–43 and 156.

¹²⁹ Demosthenes speaks of discontent towards the *stratēgoi*, too, without agreeing that they are to be blamed. This confirms that there was already a certain tendency in the audience to hold the *stratēgoi* responsible for Athens' circumstances, which Aeschines builds on here. See *Dem. Or.* 19.96–97 and 147.

remember the great deeds of the Athenian ancestors. He does not criticize the ancestors, but accuses the other orators of being blind warmongers, who were not acting according to what was best for the polis, because they did not – as he and the *dēmos* do – recognize the dangerous situation Athens was in. As Westwood points out, Aeschines puts Demosthenes, too, into this group who spoke against peace, although as one of the envoys in 346 BC he had originally opted for peace.¹³⁰ Since Demosthenes now in this trial positioned himself as strongly opposed to the treaty, Aeschines uses the opportunity to rhetorically form two groups: the warmongers, who lie to and trick the *dēmos* for their own gain, and those who understood that peace was the reasonable and necessary option; he himself represents the second group, and Demosthenes the first.¹³¹ Consequently, Aeschines describes how he behaved in contrast to the warmongers: he alone reacted in this dangerous situation as a trustworthy advisor and told the *dēmos* the truth. It seems like a play: everyone was on the path to destruction but then – thankfully – the one good *rhētōr* stood up and saved the day, the *dēmos*, and the city.¹³² This is strong character framing: the good *ēthos* of the speaker and the malicious nature of the opponent, as judged by their role as advisors of the *dēmos*.¹³³

In paragraph 75, Aeschines repeats what he urged the *dēmos* to do: to imitate the ancestors' wisdom but avoid their errors and ill-timed ambition. By recalling Plataea, Salamis, Marathon, Artemisium, and the campaign of Tolmides he shows the kind of success that should be emulated as well as the kind of *stratēgos* needed to achieve it.¹³⁴ Aeschines then recalls the events from the end of the Peloponnesian War to illustrate what could have happened to Athens if in 346 BC the *dēmos* had listened to the warmongers and imitated past errors by allowing themselves to be carried away by false ambition in an already dangerous situation. By launching an attack even though Athens' own territory was already occupied, and rejecting a peace treaty that would have preserved territories such as Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros,¹³⁵ as well as the democracy, Athens would have suffered greatly only for the sake of waging a hopeless war. Aeschines here again

¹³⁰ Westwood 2020, 253.

¹³¹ This black-and-white strategy is common in framing: every person will be presented as belonging to one of these groups, and there is no in-between.

¹³² This is a typical self-presentation of the good *rhētōr* in political trials: as the one *rhētōr* who saves the city because the *dēmos* knows it can trust him. See, e.g., Dem. Or. 18.169–173.

¹³³ On the use of the accusation of deceiving the *dēmos*, see Kremmydas 2013.

¹³⁴ Again, a blow at the *stratēgoi*. See Steinbock 2013b, 85–87, and for a different view, see Westwood 2020, 256–257.

¹³⁵ See Carey 2000, 117: the islands Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros are often mentioned together, as they were the important maritime stepping-stones between Athens and the Black Sea and thus crucial for Athens' grain supply.

uses strikingly blunt language, calling the refusal of peace an act of folly; this again underlines his persona as an honest advisor not afraid to tell the truth. And for Athens' rash actions only Cleophon was to blame. He deceived the *dēmos* when the polis was in an already precarious situation and maneuvered Athens into disaster, and he threatened anyone who spoke against him. In paragraph 77, Aeschines further emphasizes the shameful conditions of the peace Athens had to settle for after the defeat at Aegospotami and the horrors and sufferings under the Thirty. This serves to stir up emotions by evoking the memory of a situation the Athenians never want to find themselves in again.

With this historical example Aeschines makes a brilliant rhetorical move: He makes Chares the actual cause for Athens being forced to accept the peace treaty. Because of the precarious situation, the *dēmos* had to realize that Athens could not continue the war. In this depiction, it appears that in 346 BC the *dēmos* had to step in and save the polis because of the failures of an individual. Thus in Aeschines' portrayal, the *dēmos* decided correctly in favor of the peace treaty, as it had wisely recognized the necessity of it in that peculiar situation, ignoring the warmongers who spoke only for their personal gain, and not being seduced into false ambitions. While the peace treaty was not perfect, it simply had to be voted for, as it was the reasonable choice. Hence, Aeschines reframes not only his role in 346 BC but also the decision of the *dēmos*, characterizing the Athenian citizens as a rational actor that decided calmly in favor of what was necessary for the polis and was not impressed or tricked by harmful *rhētores*.

By discussing Cleophon, Aeschines continues to show his audience how Athens had previously lost everything when an individual succeeded in deceiving the *dēmos*. He recalls the situation during the Peloponnesian War in such a way that it perfectly mirrors the situation in 346 BC. During the Peloponnesian War, the warmonger Cleophon, who according to Aeschines was not rightfully an Athenian citizen, led Athens into ruin because he wanted war at all costs. He therefore tried to get rid of anyone who spoke out against war. Thanks to him, important Athenian territories such as Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were lost, and a reasonable peace was rejected, followed by great misfortune. Matching this, in 346 BC Demosthenes had likewise been a liar and warmonger, who, too, is alleged to be not rightfully an Athenian citizen and who argued for war without consideration or caution for the polis. As a result, Athens had again been tossed into a critical situation and was threatened with the loss of important territories such as – note the parallel – Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The key difference is that in the earlier events no one had stood up against Cleophon, nobody had stopped him, and so disaster came. But in 346 BC, in contrast, Aeschines did stand up (implying: against Demosthenes) and prevented the *dēmos* from

being deceived and allowing it to make the right decision. The whole passage is constructed to show how important it was that in 346 BC a good *rhētōr* had been there to advise the *dēmos* truthfully, so it got the chance to decide to save the polis and avoid impending doom. And just as Cleophon had pursued everyone who tried to oppose him, so now Demosthenes is pursuing Aeschines, who therefore asks the *dēmos* to protect him. By putting these two situations next to each other, Demosthenes becomes the Cleophon of 346 and 343 BC. This parallel fits well into Aeschines' black-and-white character framing: Demosthenes and Cleophon are the same sort of men, *rhētores* who lie and trick and do not act as they should, who follow their own personal goals, deceive the *dēmos* to their own gain, and risk ruining the polis. Furthermore, both are not legitimate citizens, as Aeschines stresses by calling Demosthenes a Scythian. In contrast, in paragraph 78 Aeschines emphasizes the good deeds done for Athens by members of his own family during times of crisis. Steinbock convincingly points out that this serves to stage Aeschines' family tradition as patriotic and to give his argument a reliable source.¹³⁶ This again is a means of character framing: on the one hand, the good and worthy citizens – Aeschines and his family – and on the other the harmful, non-Athenian individuals like Demosthenes and Cleophon.¹³⁷ The whole passage is, again, Aeschines' answer to the question of whether he or Demosthenes is the criminal in this trial. Finally, in paragraph 79, Aeschines does not reject the claim that he had originally opted to find allies against Philip, but argues that, once the situation had become futile and it had become necessary to choose peace, he alone advised peace while the other *rhētores* were looking to war for personal gain.

I conclude that the *paradeigma* is a precisely constructed parallel between the difficult situation towards the end of the Peloponnesian War and the situation in 346 BC, as presented now in 343 BC, and that it serves to amplify the speech's most important communication strategies: presenting Aeschines as the protector and trustworthy advisor of the *dēmos* and Demosthenes as a liar, ruthless warmonger, and the actual criminal in this case, while also demonstrating that a non-ideal peace treaty at the right moment is better than war at the wrong time. Thus, by selecting and highlighting specific aspects, everything within paragraphs 69–79 is phrased to fit and promote Aeschines' main media frames for his court speech in 343 BC. What Aeschines wanted to say has already been stated in paragraph 69, but then it is explained, justified, illustrated, and

¹³⁶ Steinbock 2013b, 91–98.

¹³⁷ Aeschines here avoids citing by name the *rhētores* who spoke in support of war and explicitly putting them in the group of villains and on a level with Cleophon. He names only his opponent Demosthenes in this way, which again underlines how this passage is phrased in response to the competition in the court in 343 BC.

evaluated in order to get the audience to perceive the statement as adequate, appropriate, and correct, influencing them to make their decision accordingly. Concerning the argumentative structure of a media frame, Entman points, as discussed above, to four main aspects: “problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”¹³⁸ This mirrors the argumentative structure of Aeschines’ main thematic media frame. The problem at hand is that the Athenians have a peace treaty with Philip with which they are no longer content. The cause according to Aeschines was Chares and the dangerous situation he had maneuvered Athens into, in which the wise *dēmos* had to decide in favor of the peace treaty. The evaluation is that the treaty was not perfect but was the only reasonable decision at the time, which justifies Aeschines’ support of it. Then Aeschines skillfully avoids the question of what Athens should do about the treaty now in 343 BC, but instead turns the case against his opponent and evaluates him as a criminal and his accusations as unjustified attacks. The only solution proposed to the judges is to acquit Aeschines. The whole passage from paragraphs 69 to 79 belongs together and contains one interlocked argument. Analyzing Aeschines’ framing strategy thus shows well why the historical *paradeigma* was phrased in this specific way: it has been constructed very precisely as a framing device to promote the interpretation proposed by the media frames Aeschines had chosen for this speech and the context of this trial. Therefore, I conclude that this historical example is not a quotation from Aeschines’ assembly speech in 346 BC.

To further understand how framing devices are composed and how they promote the main media frames that determine the overall rhetorical strategy, the context must be considered. Firstly, there is the immediate context of this *paradeigma* within the speech: paragraphs 56–96 form a section in which Aeschines refutes accusations by Demosthenes. He begins by addressing the claims that he had allegedly changed his position in the debates of 346 BC, had seduced the *dēmos*, and had said that the ancestors should not be remembered and the rest of Hellas should not be helped. He continues by stating “His allegation is not merely false, it is impossible. Demosthenes himself will give one piece of testimony against himself; a second will come from the recollections of all Athenians, including yourselves; a third comes from the implausibility of the charge, and the fourth from a man of good character, an active politician, Amyntor.”¹³⁹ This outlines this part of the speech. Aeschines starts with using a previous decree from Demosthenes himself and a deposition from Amyntor to prove that Demosthenes’ accusation is false. Then the passage 69–79 functions

¹³⁸ Entman 1993, 52.

¹³⁹ Aeschin. 2.64.

as the mentioned testimony, which consists of information already known to the audience, since Aeschines recalls known events. In paragraph 80 Aeschines concludes that envoys should be evaluated according to the situation in which they serve, while the *stratēgoi* are the ones responsible for the state of the war. This is a second conclusion drawn from paragraphs 69–79 but it is not one of the four announced proofs; rather, it serves to refuse to be blamed for a situation into which the *stratēgoi* had maneuvered Athens. It highlights to the audience that what had just been discussed is important for the whole context of the trial. And this, in turn, reinforces my conclusion, that the *paradeigma* discussed above promotes content that Aeschines considers to be one of the main rhetorical pillars of his defense strategy. After this excursus in paragraph 80, Aeschines, as a fourth proof, uses several documents to illustrate how he had wanted to help the Athenian allies. Therewith, the four charges of Demosthenes that were picked up in paragraph 63 have, in Aeschines' view, been successfully proven false. Considering the whole passage 63–93, it is evident that the *paradeigma* serves as an artificial proof within this package of four testimonies and at the same time is a crucial framing device to promote Aeschines' main rhetorical defense strategy.

In the context of the whole speech, frame analysis suggests that only a few main media frames are chosen and amplified by all the framing devices. Aeschines' speech is based on long narratives and written proofs, and appears strikingly neutral in its formulation compared to his other surviving speeches.¹⁴⁰ Aeschines mostly refutes Demosthenes' various charges calmly, step by step, as lies or absurdities. Hence, the orator is adapting his rhetorical style not only to the court and the political trial in general, but to the specific case. By presenting himself as an honest and unagitated *rhētōr* who advises the *dēmos* well, he is using the well-established frame¹⁴¹ that whoever tells the truth needs no exaggerations or fulminating rhetoric, but can simply say in few words how things stand, with the implication that as soon as the *dēmos* knows the truth it will decide correctly. Aeschines' self-framing shows that it could be a framing strategy *not* to use a lot of framing devices, but to make a speech seem objective, unagitated, and fitting for an orator telling the truth.¹⁴² The second

¹⁴⁰ In contrast, Aeschines' speech against Timarchus is thunderous, filled with various stylistic elements, and aims to provoke moral evaluations and stir up emotions.

¹⁴¹ For another example of this frame used in oratory, see Dem. Or. 18.10.

¹⁴² The speech therefore contains strikingly few framing devices: Aeschines does not use metaphors otherwise common in political speeches and in the characterization of *rhētores*, for example, the ship of state (Dem. Or. 18.194 and Aeschin. 3.158), disease (Dem. Or. 19.258–262), the doctor (Dem. Or. 18.243), and the paterfamilias (Aeschin. 3.78). Also absent are long comparisons, which are otherwise important for Aeschines (see, for example, Aeschin. 1.25–27 and 3.168–176). Further, Aeschines also does not use long examples alluding to daily life in Athens, as he does in his other speeches (see, e.g., Aeschin. 1.74–88). Aside from the three long historical *paradeigmata*, the probably most

important media frame concerns Demosthenes: the warmonger and criminal, liar and trickster, who acts without concern for the well-being of the polis and who is trying to harm Aeschines, one of his fellow envoys.¹⁴³ The third is the most important thematic media frame: a non-ideal peace is better than war in the wrong situation, therefore peace in 346 BC was the right decision, necessitated by the precarious situation the *stratēgoi* had maneuvered Athens into. The thematic frame illustrates what Aeschines deemed the most dangerous accusation in this trial: that he could be held accountable for the disliked treaty.

The three main media frames can be recognized throughout the speech from deliberately placed and well-coordinated framing devices. This becomes visible if we view the passage discussed above in the context of the two other longer historical *paradeigmata* used.¹⁴⁴ In paragraphs 164–166, picking up a statement already made in paragraph 79, Aeschines addresses Demosthenes' accusation that Aeschines' change of mind, when he first wanted to unify the Greeks against Philip but then spoke in favor of the Peace of Philocrates, is proof that he was bribed. To illustrate how a change of strategy can be reasonable, Aeschines recalls to his audience previous situations in which Athens had changed its political course.¹⁴⁵ Again, we see reframing: Aeschines does not deny that a change of strategy occurred, but highlights how changing direction had previously been a part of wise political decisions, setting his own change of action in a new context.¹⁴⁶ And he further, based on the accusations of betraying other citizens and ruining the youth, calls Demosthenes a traitor. Again, the same main media frames are promoted: first, thematically, he stresses the idea that every political situation demands a fitting decision according to the given circumstances, implying that his promotion of the peace treaty was right at that time. Second, he highlights

agitated stylistic device Aeschines uses are series of rhetorical questions in 136–139 and 158–163. Thus, picking up n. 58 above, this speech allows us to see how reframing an issue also involves using different language to present it.

¹⁴³ Aeschines emphasizes that Demosthenes is accusing him as a fellow envoy, considering it particularly shameful that he is betrayed by someone with whom he has shared food and libations. See Aeschin. 2.55, 163, and 183. Demosthenes expected this and brought in advance a justification based on examples: Dem. Or. 19.188–191.

¹⁴⁴ The passages Aeschin. 2.69–79, 164–166, and 171–178 are the only three longer historical *paradeigmata* in this speech, fitting the strategy of apparently simple, neutral rhetoric.

¹⁴⁵ Aeschines recalls how, in earlier times, Athens had waged war on Sparta but after the battle of Leuctra it had helped Sparta; it had also restored exiles to Thebes but then again went to war against Thebes at Mantinea; and went to war against Eretria and Themison but later rescued them. See Aeschin. 2.164.

¹⁴⁶ In 2.165 Aeschines argues that “both states and individuals must adjust to the prevailing situation to secure their best advantage. What should a loyal advisor do? Won’t he give the city the best advice in the prevailing circumstances? And what should a dishonest accuser do? Won’t he suppress the circumstances and criticize the action?”

that when he had supported the peace in 346 BC, he was being a loyal and true advisor, as he is now. And, third, Demosthenes is a dishonest accuser who does not advise the polis according to the situation but only according to his own maliciousness, and therefore must be judged a criminal.

The third long historical example follows a few paragraphs later in 171–178.¹⁴⁷ After he has pointed out his military services to Athens in paragraphs 167–170, Aeschines emphasizes that he is neither an enemy of the democracy “nor do I prevent you from imitating Demosthenes’ ancestors (he hasn’t any) but call on you to emulate those policies that are honorable and protect the city.”¹⁴⁸ Hence, he again stresses that Demosthenes is no Athenian and then emphasizes what he wants the Athenians to imitate, namely the historical *paradeigma*.¹⁴⁹ He begins by recalling Athens’ prestige after the Persian Wars, “[b]ut when trouble was stirred up by certain individuals, we went to war with Sparta, and both inflicted and suffered a great deal of harm.”¹⁵⁰ But then Cimon negotiated a treaty that brought thirteen years of peace and good fortune and wealth “and we kept our democracy stable.”¹⁵¹ He goes on through Athens’ history in the 5th-century BC, highlighting how war, brought upon Athens by malicious individuals and external causes, harmed the democracy and the polis, and how, at the same time, good individuals like Andocides, Nicias, Archinus, and Thrasybulus brought back peace, prosperity, and stability. But since then, “people who had themselves fraudulently enrolled as citizens constantly attracted to themselves the corrupt element in the city and pursued a policy of war and more war. [...] They support the name of democracy not with their conduct but with flattering words; they are trying to destroy the peace that keeps democracy safe, while they champion the wars that destroy democracy. These people have now formed ranks and come against me, [...]. They put me on trial not as envoy but as guarantor for Philip and the peace.”¹⁵² Like in paragraphs 69–79, Aeschines uses a skillfully accented picture of the past as a framing device to promote his main media frames. First, thematically, he shows once again how war was brought upon Athens by malicious individuals and harmed the polis, while peace meant prosperous times

¹⁴⁷ The suggestion that Aeschines copied this passage from Andocides (Paulsen 1999, 409–413) has been countered convincingly by Harris 2000 and Westwood 2020, 266. The fact that this *paradeigma* again promotes the main frames of Aeschines’ rhetorical strategy for this speech underlines that he must have phrased it himself.

¹⁴⁸ Aeschin. 2.171.

¹⁴⁹ Westwood 2020, 265–271 points out similarities between this *paradeigma* and the one in paragraphs 74–78. He analyzes them as part of the competition over who is the better advisor concerning the Athenian past.

¹⁵⁰ Aeschin. 2.172.

¹⁵¹ Aeschin. 2.173.

¹⁵² Aeschin. 2.177–178.

for the democracy. Second, Aeschines parallels himself with Cimon, Andocides, and Nicias, the good *rhētores* of the past, because in 346 BC it was he who negotiated peace and saved the city from a harmful war.¹⁵³ Third, he points out how warmongers not belonging to the citizen body harmed Athens again and again by promoting war for their own gain and jeopardizing the democracy. He underlines how the evil forces always came from outside, implying that no rightful Athenian citizen would harm the polis in this way.

In sum, the media frames identified in paragraphs 69–79 are also promoted within other framing devices in this speech. Therefore, we can determine them to be the three main media frames that are Aeschines' rhetorical strategy to appeal to his audience and persuade the jurors to vote for him. I fully agree with Steinbock that in Athens social memories of different social groups contained different and very dynamic images of the past. Framing, too, illustrates the dynamics of using memory-contents as an argument or proof, as we see how adaptable the social memories of a certain social group are to a specific situation, context, and communication strategy.¹⁵⁴ But within the *paradeigma* in 69–79, I do not see a breach with memory tradition. How the example was used in the non-extant speech in 346 BC, in what context, and to what aim, is in my opinion not recoverable. The historical *paradeigma* found in this speech of 343 BC fits perfectly into the circumstances of the trial: it is composed according to Aeschines' main rhetorical strategies in this speech and, on a closer look, is not a critique of the ancestors but a condemnation of outsiders coming into the citizen body and trying to destroy democracy, as well as being praise of wise decisions by the *dēmos*. Aeschines as an established *rhētōr* would have known well what was possible to use as historical allusion both in 346 BC and 343 BC. I regard it as possible that the charge of a breach with traditional memory was primarily constructed by Demosthenes for his own framing strategy within the prosecution speech. Hence, the composition of the passage as a whole makes clear that the *paradeigma* is not a direct quotation from the assembly speech. Further, I fully agree with Barbato that in every institution of public discourse there were specific unwritten rules of communication and specific ways to deal with the past. But in this passage 69–79 I see the discursive parameters not of the assembly, but of a speech in a political trial. The main topics of this *paradeigma* are not the ancient battles but the role of (malicious) individuals within Athenian

¹⁵³ Of course, the Athenians knew that Aeschines did not negotiate the peace alone. Here Aeschines benefits from the prosecution speech, where Demosthenes frames Aeschines as being responsible for the harmful peace treaty.

¹⁵⁴ Once the main media frames within a speech are identified, analyzing framing devices such as *paradeigmata* allows us new insight into how an orator composed, highlighted, or reframed memory contents to fit his frames.

democracy, wise decisions of the *dēmos*, and the importance of peace at the right moment. For an assembly speech, especially the prominent discussion of the *rhētores* and their actions would not have been fitting. While Westwood has made the important point that the trial context is decisive for understanding a speech, his analysis focuses on a competition over the use of the past.¹⁵⁵ I would argue that it is not, or not ostensibly, the past that interests the *rhētores*. Rather, Aeschines is using the past to construct framing devices that he deems effective in the context of 343 BC.¹⁵⁶ He constructs an image of reality for his audience in which Athens has repeatedly been harmed by criminals unlawfully gaining citizenship and deceiving the *dēmos*. They can be opposed by honest *rhētores*, who know the value of peace. Within this picture he characterizes himself as the good advisor, under attack by a criminal, and illustrates what happens when the *dēmos* is deceived. The *paradeigma* discussed thus anchors Aeschines' picture of reality in a past drawn to also perfectly match his depiction of Athens in 346 BC. This serves to give his framing strategy more weight in the present.

Framing effect

In a short-term perspective, a *rhētōr* uses framing to make his speech as persuasive as possible. Aeschines chose three main media frames to present an interpretation and evaluation of the case and the persons involved. Accordingly, although the speech is long and offers various arguments, there are only a few main messages that the orator promotes to his audience. If these three interpretations are received and deemed right and credible, they will be sufficient to win the case. Framing aims to persuade not with a large range of different arguments but with short, clear messages, promoted by several framing devices throughout a speech. This suggests that an audience does not need to understand every single argument or remember all parts of a speech. If the orator succeeds in passing on his main media frames, this is enough to be persuasive. Since Aeschines won this case we can assume that his framing was at least not rejected by his audience, though since the speeches of his *synēgoroi* are not extant we cannot know what exactly persuaded a (small) majority of the jury members to acquit him.

Long-term framing effects through public communication can be changes in attitudes, opinions, or perceptions of certain topics, events, or persons, as well as moral evaluations, emotional responses, and assignments of relative importance. Analyzing them in Athenian public discourse remains difficult due to the lack of

¹⁵⁵ Westwood 2020, 255.

¹⁵⁶ See Webb 2009b, 2–6 on how orators created an ongoing interaction between past and present, and so shaped new memories of the past through *enargeia* in the present. On *enargeia*, see further Webb 2009a, esp. 87–106.

sources. But the public speeches allow us to make at least some observations. As Demosthenes and Aeschines were competing *rhētores* over a long time, their mutual character framing could have had long-term effects on how the two men were perceived. This is one of the main goals of political actors: to determine or change how their opponent is judged and so to influence the collective frames of reference linked to a person in a society. Aeschines' accusation that Demosthenes was not rightfully an Athenian citizen is not unique to the passage discussed above but is emphasized also in paragraphs 22, 87, 93, 127, 171, 180, and 183. In the Crown Trial, Aeschines uses two paragraphs to show that Demosthenes is of Scythian descent and so is illegally claiming to be an Athenian citizen.¹⁵⁷ If there had been any proof of this, some opponent of Demosthenes would certainly have brought a case against him. It must be assumed therefore that there was no evidence – but for framing, there's no need for any. After all, frames propose not facts but a specific view of a topic: Demosthenes is framed as a *rhētōr* who is not rightfully an Athenian citizen, which is why he lies, seeks only his own gain, and harms the democracy. This argument is made even stronger by the parallel to Cleophon, and it has the effect that Aeschines is able to present himself as not accusing a fellow citizen but a criminal outsider. Aeschines thus links his argumentation to the established collective frame held by his audience, that a *rhētōr* who is not rightfully an Athenian citizen is a danger to all. By frequently linking Demosthenes to this collective frame, he aims to influence the perception of his opponent within the *dēmos*.¹⁵⁸ This seems to have worked at least to a certain degree, because also in the Harpalus Trial in 323 BC Demosthenes is referred to as Scythian in Dinarchus' prosecution speech, without further explanation,¹⁵⁹ which reveals that the *dēmos* knew what was meant. There is another similar example: in the trial against Timarchus, Aeschines, in paragraphs 170–173, tells the jury how Demosthenes corrupted the Athenian youth. He recalls a story about how Demosthenes deliberately searched the city for young orphans and found the youth Aristarchus, involved him in an inappropriate intimate relationship, gave him false hopes of a political career, and abused him for his personal purposes. Aeschines takes this up too in the Embassy Trial (at paragraphs 148 and 166) to accuse Demosthenes again of corrupting the youth. And, again, Dinarchus brings it up in 323 BC against Demosthenes twice (at paragraphs 30 and 47) without much explanation.

These two examples allow us to assume that character framing in public

¹⁵⁷ Aeschin. 3.171–172.

¹⁵⁸ See also Aeschin. 3.169: "... a democrat should possess the following qualities: first of all, he should be a man of free birth on both his father's and his mother's side, so that the misfortune of his birth will not make him hostile to the laws that keep the democracy safe;"

¹⁵⁹ Din. *Dem.* 15.

speeches had long-term effects. With long-term character framing the orators use the applicability and accessibility effects, trying to influence the memory contents first activated when a certain person is seen or mentioned. Once a communicator deems that applicability has worked in his intended sense, he will use that character frame frequently, to achieve an accessibility effect. As a result, this character evaluation is easily accessible in the audience's perception and judgment of the opponent. The speech of Dinarchus in 323 BC confirms a certain longer-term accessibility effect, showing that *rhētores* could use framing to influence collective frames of reference linked to a person. Thus, the choice of character frames may often not have been an *ad hoc* decision but should be seen within the bigger picture of long-term competition between *rhētores*. In general, the character frames chosen must be already established within the social group addressed and will best be linked to emotions and moral evaluations. Aeschines, when presenting himself through the frame that he always tells the truth, is building on the predisposition that telling the truth to the *dēmos* is the most important quality of a *rhētōr*. He wants to link himself to this well-established collective frame, in order to positively influence his perception by the audience. Analyzing character frames allows us to identify character concepts that were established within Athenian society. At the same time, it illustrates how character frames are very dynamic concepts, constantly negotiated and linked to new features of the present by framing in public discourse.

Concerning thematic media frames, we can discern that Aeschines' frame of preferring peace over pointless war was well established in Athenian society; otherwise, he would not have been able to promote it so strongly without risking immediate rejection. Whether we can detect a political program in the form of frequent use of similar thematic frames for certain topics remains difficult to say from the only three surviving speeches of Aeschines. In numerous speeches, Demosthenes promotes war against Philip, but constantly adapts the frames used, to argue why the war is (or in the Crown Trial was) essential. I do not want to assume that Attic *rhētores* had a fixed political program, but certainly, for a limited period of time, they proposed a specific view of political developments, of which they tried to convince the *dēmos* by influencing which aspects of reality in the polis were deemed important. Thus, analyzing the thematic frames used in public speeches reveals to us the established concepts for evaluating important topics within Athenian society. Understanding framing as a process within communication allows to see such concepts not as static but as dynamic links between any topic and collective frames of reference in the social memories of a society, which are constantly re-evaluated, negotiated, and adjusted to the present moment through public discourse.

V. Framing – A useful tool to analyze Athenian political communication?

De Vreese and Lecheler understand framing as a thriving concept, with various possibilities of application in different fields of research. They do not see as negative the fact that framing is, as Entman famously called it, a *fractured paradigm*, because frames and framing are defined and have to be analyzed differently in different fields of research. Consequently, using framing theory in classical studies does not mean that we must find *the* framing approach suitable, but rather that we should consider which model can be adapted and used fruitfully to analyze the respective sources. I found de Vreese's framing model to be an intriguing tool to study the dynamics of Athenian public discourse and the composition of speeches. By analyzing framing in court speeches one can gain insight into the negotiations within a society over how it wants to evaluate and comprehend its present moment. As Elisabeth Günther has aptly summarized it: frames are dynamic and flexible structures that are adapted to changing conditions and are culture-, society-, and group-specific.¹⁶⁰ Thus, *rhētores* chose for their speeches media frames that represented ways of interpreting and evaluating events, persons, and topics that were already established within the Athenian *dēmos*.

In a court speech, a media frame serves as an interpretative package, i.e., a specific narrative on the topic at hand and persons involved and a proposed evaluation of them. By recognizing which media frames an orator built his rhetorical strategy on, we can gain new insights into how stylistic devices were chosen, phrased, and arranged. I have demonstrated how this allows new insight into the oft-discussed passage at Aeschin. 74–78 by reading it in terms of the three main media frames Aeschines chose for this speech, as well as in the context of other *paradeigmata* used. Further research will have to examine the interdependences of different framing devices, to gain insight into how *paradeigmata*, along with metaphors, enthymemes, comparisons, and so on, promote the same media frames within a speech. Conceptualizing rhetorical stylistic devices as framing devices encourages their joint consideration. In doing so, observations on the media frames that determine the rhetorical strategy of a speech can explain which stylistic element is used, and when, and how, or, as shown for Aeschines II, why a speech contains only a few such framing devices. The limitations to adapting this communication science framing approach certainly lie in the research on framing effects. It will never be possible to measure immediate effects on the targeted ancient audience. Here, historical research must limit itself to considering the speech and its stylistic elements, to

¹⁶⁰ E. Günther 2021, 19.

assess when and by what means the orator may have wanted to provoke which reaction and what, if successful, this may have triggered in the audience.

A further positive aspect of this framing-process model is that it forces us always to consider context: the actors, media, and spaces involved must be considered, in order to better understand how a speech is composed. Previous framing effects must be considered as contexts of communication within a society, and can serve as evidence for how collective frames of reference are negotiated in public discourse. This model, therefore, aims to bring existing fields of research closer together to gain more knowledge of context, because context is key to understanding (Athenian) communication. Stephen Reese calls it a “proactive model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other,”¹⁶¹ combining the findings of various sub-areas of communication science for an even better understanding of the behavior of actors, the levels of interaction, the media and institutions of communication, and the effects of framing in a society. This, I suggest, is also true for study of ancient political communication: framing as a process within public communication works as a bridging model that encourages us to look not just at one part of communication, such as the orator, the speech, institutions, single stylistic devices, or memory effects of public speeches, but to bring these fields of interest together and so, most importantly, to help us better understand the context and dynamics of political communication and, with that, Athenian society and ancient democracy.

¹⁶¹ Reese 2007, 148.

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(with the help of Luo Fuxing, MA)

The abbreviations of ancient sources follow the conventions of the standard lexicons such as *OCD* (Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.). 2012. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. With Assistant Editor E. Eidinow. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press), *Brill's New Pauly* (Schneider, H., Landfester, M. and Cancik, H. (eds.). 2002ff. *Brill's New Pauly. English ed. of Der Neue Pauly*. Leiden / Boston: Brill), and *LSJ* (Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (eds.). 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Revised and Augmented throughout by H. S. Jones with the Assistance of R. McKenzie and with the Cooperation of Many Scholars. With a Revised Supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press). Besides, the following abbreviations are used:

ATL II = Meritt, B. D., Wade-Gery, H. T. and McGregor, M. F. 1949. *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. vol. II. Princeton, NJ: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

AVI = Attic Vase Inscriptions, accessible under: <https://avi.unibas.ch> (10.10.2022).

Furtwängler 1900/1982 = Furtwängler, A. 1900/1982. *Die antiken Gemmen. Geschichte der Steinschneidekunst im klassischen Altertum*. Reprint Osnabrück: Otto Zeller Verlag.

HGC = Hoover, O. 2009ff. *The Handbook of Greek Coinage (Series)*. Lancaster, PA: Classical Numismatic Group.

Wachter 2019 = Wachter, R. 2019. *Pompejanische Wandinschriften*. Sammlung Tusculum. Berlin: De Gruyter.

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