Abstract
In 1919, following the ‘deluge’ of World War One, Europe was in ruins. To keep the peace, an international organization named the League of Nations was created. While lasting peace remained a pipedream, a fruitful ‘technical’ coordination developed under the League’s umbrella: A wide variety of networks of experts sought to coordinate economic, social, hu-manitarian, and ‘technical’ problems transnationally. From its conception to its organization, the League of Nations was influenced by two Presi-dents of the United States, the Republican Theodore Roosevelt and the Democrat Woodrow Wilson; however, the United States did not become a member of the League of Nations. Wilson, who was in poor health in 1919, could not convince the US Senate to join the League. Nevertheless, an intensive exchange between the League and Americans followed in the 1920s, including many private initiatives. Furthermore, a substantial number of Americans worked in the secretariat of the League. The financial field provided various examples of successful instances of ‘technical’ coordi-nation through the League’s platform. Many understood that economic recovery could be delayed by barriers to transnational economic exchange, such as when tax burdens that had increased sharply since the war were applied more than once. Double taxation between states, however, was an exotic topic at the time, even for most tax experts. In 1921, the League asked several economists to prepare a report on the economic impact of international double taxation and on general principles to remove the ‘evil consequences of double taxation’. A group of four economic experts on double taxation was formed, com-prising the following members: Josiah Stamp of the United Kingdom, Luigi Einaudi of the Kingdom of Italy, Gijsbert Weijer Jan Bruins of the Netherlands, and Edwin R. A. Seligman from New York City (the United States was not member state of the League of Nations). The collaboration of these four economic experts was successful, and they delivered an eco-nomic report to the League in April 1923. Tax scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have since agreed that this 1923 economists’ Report on Double Taxation created the architecture of today’s international tax regime. As will be revealed below, Seligman was the key figure in the establishment of the 1923 report. For many years before the League requested thereport, Seligman had been in a friendly exchange of views with Luigi Einaudi and Josiah Stamp. It was a dialogue among scientists who respected each other. What led to the successful collaboration of the four economic experts on double taxation in 1923? In the period after the Great War, the world was ready for international coordination. However, the collaboration of the economists was demanding. Their mandate had to be clarified, as did governance questions within the League. Was there any consultation with the US government? Uncataloged, barely tapped source material is involved, particularly from the Edwin R. A. Seligman Papers at Columbia University in New York City. Today, Seligman is forgotten as an economist, or at least ‘somewhat neglected’. This work-ing paper describes Seligman’s personal and scientific background, his studies in Europe in the 1880s, some of his manifold roles in New York, and his affiliation with Columbia Uni-versity, which spanned more than half a century. Is it possible to reveal some buried roots of the ideas that underlie the international tax regime – in Heidelberg, Paris, New York, or Geneva? In addition, this working paper provides a brief account of how various people in the League – as well as the four economists – were operating responsibly, always with the big picture in mind. The goal was ‘the wealth of nations’, not only the domestic wealth of a specific country. Some characteristics of Seligman’s biography support the collaboration of the four economic experts, namely the fact that he grew up in a cosmopolitan family, his broad knowledge of languages and cultures, his transcontinental economic education, his undogmatic goal orientation, his sociable character, his charm, his respect, and his ability to compromise. He was an effective transnational networker on many levels, with an inde-fatigable scientific curiosity. The working paper touches on many narratives from other areas of the social sciences. These include many US-specific themes, but also the changing tides of international scientific transfer in the social sciences between 1880 and 1930, the pioneer-ing role of Americans in the development of a ‘new histography’ between 1900 and 1920, or the emergence of ‘technical’ international coordinations immediately after 1919.
Muster, Adrian