Abstract
The paper continues a book chapter devoted to the Belarusian and Russian crisis management during the first months of the pandemic (Weiss 2022). The present chapter examines the second half of 2021 when vaccines were already available in both countries. It is based on data from speeches broadcast on TV, reports by so-called “foreign agents”, i.e. Russian independent investigative agencies, and online news including the official Kremlin site. The main research question focuses on the impact of vaccination on both Lukašenko’s and Putin’s policies: how did their communication strategies change, what was their own stance towards vaccination, and how did they cope with peoples’ reluctance to get vaccinated? The tools to achieve this goal are mainly provided by argumentation theory and impoliteness theory. The comparison is somewhat impeded by Lukašenko being a tacit COVID denier who rejected any compulsive protective measures but nevertheless had to support vaccination. He mercilessly insulted his ministers who tried to impose protective measures on citizens and he tended to conflate online bloggers criticizing his crisis management with his political opponents. Putin backed the vaccination campaign but did not succeed in overcoming the masses’ passive resistance despite a “split-voice” strategy: whereas he officially maintained his image of an unbiased father of the nation, state media such as the TV station “Russia today”, which attacked anti-vaxxers very aggressively, portrayed him as the main decision-maker and ruthless punisher. His publicly pronounced arguments against compulsory vaccination proved very weak.
Weiss, Daniel