Abstract
Should answers to fundamental questions of political philosophy be ‘convincing’ and ‘meaningful’ to real people with vested interests? Normative behaviourists argue that they should, and this can be achieved by avoiding the use of intuitions in our normative theorizing and instead relying on long-term empirical evidence of human behaviour. In this paper, I argue that to obtain the full benefits of behaviourism, it needs to be accompanied by some form of mentalism. Normative behaviourism sacrifices critical distance from the status quo to provide answers that are convincing and meaningful. However, there is no clear benefit obtained from this sacrifice. Furthermore, because of behaviourism’s institutional focus in its current form, it does not have much to say about how to achieve its goals. Behaviourists can solve both problems by incorporating a mentalist account of political agency, one that determines what values and ideals political agents should fight for and helps political agents develop strategies to achieve their goals.
Kim, Hwa Young