Year: 2009

It's about more water. Natural resource conflicts in central Asia

Bichsel, C

3 It's about More Water. Natural Resource Conflicts in Central Asia

Christine Bichsel[8]

3.1 Introduction

A body of academic and policy-oriented literature began to focus on the danger of conflict in Central Asia as of the late 1990s. While differing in details, the authors concurred that the Ferghana Valley has a high potential for violent conflict. They base this potential on evidence of past violent episodes and/or present tensions that may yield in violence. In other words, these writings depict the Ferghana Valley as a 'host of crises' (Slim 2002) or a 'flashpoint of conflict' (Tabyshalieva 1999:vii). The literature argues in general lines that the potential for conflict is constituted by a broad array of interlinked conflictive factors, including social, political, economic, religious, demographic, military, and criminal ones. A core concern of this literature is inter-ethnic conflict over natural resources, aptly summarised by Slim (2002:511): 'In the short term, they [aid agencies] must focus on the localities where water-based conflicts have taken on an ethnic character and which, if not addressed, might provide the spark for region-wide interethnic violence'. This literature on conflict in the Ferghana Valley stressed the need for interventions by international aid to avert widespread violence resulting form this potential.

This concern was taken up by several donor organisations in early 2000, including the three aid agencies on which this article focuses. First, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is a governmental donor organisation which coordinates international development activities of Switzerland as a part of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Second, Mercy Corps International (Mercy Corps) is an international NGO which acts in this case as an implementing agency for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Third, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a multilateral aid agency and represents the UN's global development network in Central Asia. While these three agencies have implemented a multitude of projects in Central Asia, for this article I base my insights on three only. With regard to SDC, this is the 'Regional Dialogue and Development' (RDD) project active over the period 2002-2005 in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the case of Mercy Corps, I look into the 'Peaceful Communities Initiative' (PCI) implemented in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and later also Tajikistan during 2001–2006. For UNDP, I focus on the 'Preventive Development Component' (PDC) and later 'Preventive Development Programme' (PDP) conducted over the period 2000-2005 mainly in southern Kyrgyzstan, but at a later stage also in northern Tajikistan. My main argument is that the three projects rest on a misconceived interpretation of the conflicts upon which they were devised to act. Because they see conflict as an endemic element in village life and because their perspective is strongly influenced by a functional interpretation of the issue of scarcity, aid agencies in this context fail to take into account the political dimension of social change, and do not pay enough attention to the issue of power in natural resource conflict management.

3.2 Engaging with conflict at the village level

With these three projects, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps aimed to mitigate conflicts over water and land between rural communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The three aid agencies largely subscribed to a similar approach, although it varied in detail, implementation, and the weight given

to singular components. It centred on the combination of the following three components: (1) building or rehabilitating infrastructure; (2) establishing and training community-based organisations (CBOs); (3) fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. The first component entails the building and rehabilitation of drinking water and irrigation infrastructure, but also healthcare, educational and recreational facilities. It should help communities at loggerheads to resolve the structural causes of conflict, related to the scarcity of natural resources and to the dysfunctional state of infrastructure. The second component consists in establishing and training CBOs for each conflict party. By means of CBOs, communities should be enabled to mobilise and constructively address the conflict at stake, turning it into a more peaceful relationship. The third component involves fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. It entails the creation of social spaces for conflict parties or parts of them to interact, such as youth clubs, sports competition or festivals. Cultivating communication, trust and personal friendship is expected to improve inter-group relations.

SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps implemented this approach numerous times in the Ferghana Valley. In most cases, the social unit for implementation included two or several village sharing an irrigation system, within which conflictive claims over water and land had arisen. The three aid agencies thus conceptualised conflict as existing in a limited spatial extension expressed by the villages and their adjacent land, as well as in a confined scalar dimension in that its roots were seen as residing only in the relationships between the conflict parties. In my exploration, I follow this particular perspective adopted by the aid agencies and explore their approach based on three such cases in the Ferghana Valley. The first case focuses on the three villages of Pülgön, Khalmion and Alga in Kyrgyzstan. The three villages share a large irrigation system on the border of Uzbekistan. While in particular Khalmion is likely to have a very long history of irrigated agriculture, the main canal infrastructure now in place was built during the 1970s. With independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the overall share of water available for the irrigation system became dependent on inter-governmental agreements between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Disputes over irrigation water are a frequent occurrence in this irrigation system. They have occurred and do occur between upstream and downstream users, and also between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in this area. Yet, so far, governmental agencies as well as water users have managed to successfully resolve these disputes.

The second case centres on the three villages of Khush'iar in Uzbekistan, and Sogment and Charbak in Kyrgyzstan. They came into public attention with a violent escalation of the conflict in spring 2005. The three villages share a complicated cross-border irrigation system whose main canal dates back to the period of the Second World War. The system was enlarged with additional pumps and canals during the 1970s in order to satisfy the growing need for water. Rather than for the considerable amounts of water transported by the main canal, disputes occur over water distribution from a small spring. These disputes have been framed by analyses in terms of animosities between Kyrgyz and Tajiks which inhabit the three villages. Mercy Corps has addressed these disputes during 2002-2003. The third case entails the two villages of Aksai in Kyrgyzstan and Tojikon in Tajikistan. It is, compared with the two cases described above, the most long-standing dispute over water and land. At the same time, the conflict resulted in the largest number of casualties over time. The infrastructure of the irrigation system in place was built between the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, disputes between Aksai and Tojikon date further back into the Soviet period and can be traced to the 1930s. The conflict is often explained in terms of long-standing inter-ethnic animosities between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. The dispute between Aksai and Tojikon has been addressed by two aid agencies in the focus of my research (see Bichsel 2009). In 2003-2004, SDC and UNDP attempted to resolve the conflict over irrigation water.

A conceptual analysis of the aid agencies' approach to conflicts over land and water shows that they are guided by three basic assumptions. First, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps assume that competition over limited water and land may divide communities along ethnic lines. They expect that economic deprivation and unsatisfied human needs lead people to resort to violence. The causal link between increasing resource scarcity and the occurrence of inter-group violence follows a hypothesis in

environmental conflict or environmental security research on mainly intrastate conflict. During the 1990s, several research projects established a causal relationship between the environment, scarcity and violence, however mediated by context factors (see for example Baechler 1998; Homer-Dixon 1996, 1999). Thus, in the aid agencies' approach, water and land scarcity becomes the explanatory factor linking irrigation and inter-group violence, resulting from mismanagement, socio-economic deterioration and demographic pressure. They attempted to remedy scarcity by means of improved infrastructure which should supply additional water.

Second, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps state that violent conflict is a dysfunctional social condition and should be transformed into a peaceful state by non-violent means. For this, they subscribe to the concept of conflict transformation (Lederach 1995; Miall 2004; Mitchell 2002). Within this concept, they suggest that behavioural, relational and structural changes should bring about peace. In terms of behavioural changes, the aid agencies expect that the conflict parties need to adopt moderation, tolerance and affect control. Relational changes should be achieved through increased contact between the groups at loggerheads, therefore reducing prejudices and improving social relations between them. The three aid agencies foresee that joint social activities should bring about such change. Structural change, finally, should alter the very constitution of society which gives rise to or supports the continuation of conflict (Miall 2004:70).This faulty constitution is located in the socio-political construction of the state. Civil society should therefore foster more democratic and peaceful governance. However, the aid agencies also attempt to tap on the local potential for peace in the form of traditional institutions (Lederach 1995).

Third, the three aid agencies expect social change to happen with the emergence of specific forms of power. This idea is expressed most distinctly when they speak of the need for empowerment that, in their view, bears the potential for change. Such power should result from specific forms of social interaction which brings to life associational power. Through participatory procedures, the conflict parties should be empowered to exert collective action for the public good. The aid agencies locate such power to a high degree in individual members of a community. They expect power to increase with the successful pursuit of individual and collective goals, not conditional upon prior changes in structures and systems (Mohan and Stokke 2000:249). At the same time they expect that with the emergence of 'civil society', this power may exert pressure on autocratic and unresponsive states and thereby support the desired change towards a more democratic governance which should foreclose violence. The establishment of CBOs is central for such change.

3.3 Scarcity as a social and political issue

My empirical data, stemming from the three cases presented, provides insights for a critical discussion of the there basic assumptions outlined above. I have outlined the conceptualisation of the link between population growth, the environment and conflict that the aid agencies bring forward. They posited, as it has been suggested, that 'grievances' arising from 'scarcity' divide groups along ethnic lines and drive them to adopt violence. The empirical analysis showed that there were moments in all three cases when people apprehend water as scarce. Yet, as the detailed explorations of social relations within irrigation systems show, at closer sight the phenomenon defies easy definition and generalisation. First, the experience of 'scarcity' is not simply an overall characteristics of an irrigation system, but appears in temporally and spatially discrete instances. Second, 'scarcity' is far from being a merely natural condition. It results from local institutional contexts but is equally embedded in shifts of larger political and socio-economic networks over time. Third, the experience of 'scarcity' is not an objective dimension. The meaning that people attribute to it cannot be understood outside specific economic, political and cultural contexts. 'Scarcity' is thus socially as well as naturally constituted, and a result of complex human interaction (see also Barnett 2000; Hartmann 2001; Timura 2001).

For irrigation systems, socially constituted water scarcity is often attributed to human needs or greed. In this view, human greed leads to depriving others of their water, while through human

needs the phenomenon 'scarcity' comes into view. My research has shown that human agency in relation to water and meanings attributed to it are complex, and the practice of upgrading one's water supply at the expense of others is not easily understood as greed that results in needs. On the one hand, such a practice may characterise human voraciousness, instructively pointed out by the following Kyrgyz saying, which states that 'Even if one's stomach is full, one's eyes are still hungry'. On the other hand, the same practice may have its motivation in human foresight and precaution, when water is hoarded to provide for the 'black day', which is characterised by the inherent uncertainty about water provision in the system. The proximity of the two possible explanations - that may furthermore not be mutually exclusive - blurs the boundaries between needs and greed, and show furthermore the relativity of the two concepts.

Moreover, it is important to ask to whom 'needs' and 'greed' is attributed. My research has shown that water distribution does not necessarily constitute or divide groups along ethnic or kinship lines, but is often rather based on residential or territorial collectivities. Yet, this distinction is at times obscured by the fact that residential and ethnic groups coincide. Furthermore, in the case of water, solidarity is contextual and temporal, and may not automatically arise as often presumed. In relation to this, it is important to note that dimensions of irrigation systems often include formal, ideological discourses of how it should work, descriptive accounts of how it actually works, and, again differently, the actual social practices that take place (see also Hunt and Hunt 1976:392). Therefore, monolithic representations of groups should not be taken for granted, neither in relation to water nor with regard to the very nature of kinship and ethnicity. The diffuse nature of 'scarcity' also questions universal forms of causalities proposed to arise from them. Experiences of 'scarcity' lead to numerous social responses that do not imply violence (Barnett 2000:283). At the same time, competition for water is a distinct reality during the irrigation season. Yet again, daily skirmishes and fights that arise from such competition should not be mistaken for inter-group violence, since the latter follows a different logic. The complexities of the conflict escalation show that such processes are essentially cultural and political work and entail much more than just a response to a state of a natural resource (Schröder and Schmidt 2001). Furthermore, the close scrutiny of interpretational and representational politics in the course of escalations forms renders the very idea of linear, unidirectional causality chains problematic.

Yet causality should not easily be disbanded, as violence is often discussed as a symptom to find causes and cures (Feldman 1995:226). Explanations of violent events may not unearth actual causalities, but provide crucial insights into how people assert situations and how they attribute meanings to what happens. Moreover, they may express deeply held values at the core of the dispute. To illustrate this, I turn to the violent escalation that took place between Aksai and Tojikon in 1975. In an interview, an elder from Aksai remembered how residents of Tojikon began to extend the cultivation of land towards Aksai. As a consequence, a group of elders had repeatedly appealed to the authorities of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and equally to their Tajik neighbours to stop these activities. Yet, as my interlocutor suspected and other persons alleged, authorities of the Kyrgyz SSR had tacitly agreed to concede the respective piece of land with leaders from the Tajik SSR, and concluded a secret deal. Suspecting betrayal by their own authorities, as the elder explained, this was the moment when 'the Kyrgyz became very angry and prepared for war', perceived to be the only way to solve the problem by taking things into their own hands. Thus in this instance, it may not so much be the mere restriction of freedom and civil rights which gives rise to violence, but also the ultimate feeling of not being recognised and abandoned by the state.

This observation touches upon the norms and values that construe the concept of conflict transformation. This prescriptive approach is underpinned by a number of normative choices. While it defines the dysfunctionality of a social condition, it equally projects a remedied situation through social change. Dysfunctionality is identified by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps mainly in forms of individual attitudes, inter-group relationships and faulty institutions. In view of this, the aid agencies promote societal and political change, defined in categories such as 'modern', 'traditional', 'civil', 'participatory' and 'democratic'. My research shows that these categories are neither obvious nor

uncontested. Not only do they refer to vague, reified and idealised constructions, but the concept of conflict transformation is defined teleologically by reference to the supposed state of those who promote it. Thus, I argue that the frame of reference for the promoted social change becomes the supposed state of the societies that the donors are embedded in. Such an idea is explicitly expressed by Senghaas (2004) who suggests that 'the West', having undergone modernisation, can provide solution to those who are still in the process of it. Empirically, it also becomes manifest in the example of the CBOs whose social imaginary appears to pursue an idealised version of Western political organisation - not to be taken for an actual social practice. In this sense, conflict transformation entails a distinct ethnocentric bias. Such a bias becomes all the more problematic when coupled with ideas about moral progress towards a more peaceful, more civil and more harmonious society which underlie the aid agencies' approach and on which I will elaborate later.

In addition, the concept of conflict transformation also entails distinctly evolutionary narratives of how societies are expected to develop. Again, this is most clearly expressed by Senghaas (2004), who suggests that there is a road to modernity. CBOs stand in this sense for a future model, while past ones such as the elders merely serve instrumental or process-oriented purposes. The validity of this evolutionary idea has been contested by two insights. First, the inquiry into institutional histories of customary institutions in Central Asian societies discloses multiple 'modernities' and multiple 'traditions' that result from several layers of pre-Tsarist and Tsarist social engineering as well as Soviet modernisation schemes. Second, it demonstrates that institutions do not simply progressively evolve on a presumably pre-defined road to the future. Rather, they are consciously altered in their normative repertoire, their scope of validity and their social significance, at times appropriated by the state. Benda-Beckmann et al. (2003:297) note for traditionalism that, 'It usually results from present- and future-oriented strategies for (re)asserting collective identities and for dealing with competing political and economic claims'. 'Re-traditionalising', as it is being done by Central Asian states to create a national ideology, or 'modernising' institutions, as the aid agencies attempt with the substantive societal change through CBOs, are thus quintessentially political projects.

The promotion of civil society in the form of CBOs by the aid agencies entails a distinct vision of how the state and the individual should engage with each other. The model of the 'active citizen' which underlies CBOs, I suggest, is to confront the presumably determined subjects of formerly state socialist regimes with new forms of agency, making reference to a 'valorized "Western" Self' (Junghans 2001, p. 383) that is understood as self-authoring. The state, on the other hand, appears usually 'out there', and is thus referred to as being outside and 'above' local communities. This is exemplified by Lederach's (1997) idealised representation of the state's constitution, hierarchically structured. My empirical findings, however, strongly contests such a view. They show not only that the diffuse yet omnipresent nature of the state cannot be relegated to a level or a centre, but they similarly demonstrate that the contestation of what a state should be and how it should function takes place precisely at the level of the community. Equally, the boundary between those who personify the state and those who do not, appears blurred and cannot sharply be distinguished as suggested by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps.

These reflections lead to the issue of power. I have suggested that the aid agencies intended to evoke a form of 'power to' in the form of associational power. At the same time, the aid agencies and their projects themselves constitute a form of power that they exert. The analysis of the CBOs established by the aid agencies has shown, not surprisingly, that local societal arrangements and power relations (e.g., gender relationships) inscribe themselves into the organisation. In this sense, existing social relationships are not left 'at the boundary' of the new space that CBOs create, but continue to exert influence on how such organisations constitute themselves. Yet, the aid agencies also create new forms of power relations with CBOs. They shape specific public spaces where elections are held and decisions are supposed to be made. Such spaces may provide a forum for some, while excluding others. Furthermore, they give importance to particular types of knowledge and expertise held by segments of society. Finally, they shape specific forms of 'subjectivities' that

they construe for the inclusion into CBOs such as the elderly, the women and ethnic groups. In this sense, to some extent CBOs do rewrite the subjectivities of those who participate in the exercise of popular agency.

SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps locate power to a high degree in human agency. Such agency is expected to develop without prior changes in structures and systems, even notwithstanding the stark forms of control and by no means conducive conditions. In this view, power thus resides with individual members of a community, and can increase with specific forms of sociability and the successful pursuit of individual and collective goals. Through this conceptualisation, responsibility for non-violent behaviour and relationships is being conceptually relegated to the conflict parties. Moreover, within the civilising and modernising ideas that underlie the approach, failure of the conflict parties to foreclose further violence is accordingly relegated to lacking moral progress towards peace. At least theoretically, such evaluation perpetuates the need for 'engaging those who are not as yet fully committed to peaceful change' (Mercy Corps 2003:17) into further peace-building, along the lines of Ferguson's (1990) influential statement of international aid as an 'anti-politics machine' which grinds on in a self-perpetuating manner.

However, it would be much too simple to conceive of the aid agencies' approach as the only nexus of power and knowledge that shapes the context. I have suggested (Bichsel 2009) that both the aid agencies and Central Asian states rewrite subjectivities of 'beneficiaries' and 'citizens' through projects of modernisation and re-traditionalisation. Furthermore, establishing knowledge about a conflict is a field of contestation for which the aid agencies may provide a site for expression; however, the processes that shape this contestation are far beyond the reach of the latter. In this sense, rather than constituting a regime of domination, I suggest that SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps provide new space for political action and competition. The types of authority that become manifest in such competition and the forms of power that they constitute themselves from is often beyond the 'local'. Accordingly, enabling or constraining conditions and relations that crucially shape the room for manoeuvre for CBOs are not located in their constituencies. This observation questions the territorially defined and 'locally' understood nature of CBOs, and may also suggest that the idea of 'community' upon which aid agencies base their approach is of an essentialist and romanticised nature (see Delanty 2003). Finally, these reflections also question the idea of peace as a potential to be tapped locally, as the attempt of tapping 'positive local traditions and customs' (Mercy Corps 2003:19) suggests.

3.4 Conclusion

Harmony, the ultimate goal of SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps, surfaces in many forms. It appears in the continuation of a 'success story' that describes '[…] the sincere well-wishes and goodwill that residents of Ravot brought to the opening [of the new drinking water system] to offer to their neighbors in Vorukh' (USAID 2003, no pagination). In this quotation, harmony is presumed in the absence of violence and the presence of friendly behaviour shown by the groups. This quotation locates harmony mainly in the behavioural realm and does not foreclose unequal relationships and a perception of an imposed compromise. Furthermore, a particular form of harmony also appeared in Khush'iar, when the Uzbekistani government violently quelled any form of possible unrest related to the conflict escalation by control and arms. The superimposed normalcy established resurfaces then as a representational fiction of harmony in the Kyrgyzstani and internationally oriented press which presented the conflict as resolved. Finally, harmony appears in the speech of the CBO representative that I met in the course of the escalation and who argued for moderation and tolerance after the outbreak of violence. In the face of other social forces and increased militarisation of the context, his elaborations on harmony appear not only forlorn, but become a source of suspicion. I thus conclude that the very idea of harmony does not embody the abstract 'good', but is itself intertwined with forms of power.

swiss**peace**

I suggest that SDC, Mercy Corps and UNDP failed to provide a solution to the conflicts at stake in the Ferghana Valley. In my view, this is a consequence of the three aid agencies' conceptualisation of these conflicts as emerging from adversarial relationships over scarce resources between ethnic communities and thus resolvable in the very same context. I propose four major points of critique to such an approach.

1. The perspective that conflict is endemic to the local context.

The first point of critique concerns the perspective that the sources of conflicts addressed are lodged in the relationship between communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The approach apprehends irrigation conflict as disrupted relations between two or several communities, and thus solvable in the very same context. My research demonstrates that such conflicts are not 'local' but embedded in wider political interests and power constellations. Issues at stake are thus often impervious to a 'local' solution.

2. The functional understanding of conflict.

The second point of critique addresses the functional understanding of conflict sources and parties that the approach exposes. Conflict is seen to emerge from 'grievances' over scarce resources. Such 'grievances' are expected to lead to violent conflict. Moreover, conflict parties are conceptualised as homogenous and uniform, shaped by essentialist solidarity that accounts for collective goals in a conflict. This research has pointed out the relativity of scarcity, has questioned that primarily unsatisfied needs lead to the adoption of violence and has finally deconstructed the monolithic representations of ethnic groups.

3. The assumption of homology between the conflict parties.

The third point of critique concerns the assumption of homology between conflict parties. The donors presume such homology not only between the conflict parties, but also between the CBOs and, more abstractly, for the enabling and constraining conditions which conflict mitigation meets in the respective countries. My work has pointed out that upstream-downstream configurations in irrigation systems are power relations. Furthermore, it has shown that conflict and its mitigation do not take place outside power constellations.

4. The normative nature of proposed social change.

The fourth point of critique addresses the normative nature of the social change brought forward by donors. It maintains that both by portraying irrigation conflicts and by proposing their 'transformation', the approach studied exposes normative accounts of evolution and moral progress. The study has brought to light some of these assumptions and suggests that apart from their ethnocentric bias, such prescriptions also lead to forms of depoliticisation and disempowerment.

Expressed in admittedly simplified terms, more water does not equal 'better' people, as is presumed. Promotion of the aid agencies' approach is based on the assumption that conditions of equal power exist between the two parties. It further assumes that negotiation and mediation take place in a vacuum, thus isolated from the local political and economic context, let alone the wider political contingencies, power constellations, and elite interests. This may be a consequence of underlying assumptions that causes of conflict are to be found in the relationship between communities, and that negotiation and mediation take place between equal partners and outside power relations. Nader notes that 'the rhetoric of harmony law models is attractive. But the idea that in a conciliatory model people do not fight but rather harmoniously agree about a common solution is fiction. So also is the belief that such a harmony model exists in "primitive" and "idyllic" societies. Once again we need to understand the real dynamic of power that is at play'. (Nader 2001: 25).

References

Baechler, Günther. 1998. Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis. *Environmental Change and Security Project Report* 4, pp. 24-44.

Barnett, Jon. 2000. Destabilizing the enviroment-conflict thesis. *Review of International Studies* 26(2), pp. 271-288.

Benda-Beckmann, Franz von, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Julia Eckert, Fernanda Pirie, and Bertram Turner. 2003. Vitality and Revitalisation of Tradition in Law: going back into the past or future-oriented development? In *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Report 2002-2003*, edited by Günther Schlee and Bettina Mann, pp. 296-306. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology.

Bichsel, Christine. 2009. *Conflict Transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation Disputes in the Ferghana Valley*. London: Routledge.

Delanty, Gerard. 2003. *Community*. London: Routledge.

Feldman, Allen. 1995. Ethnographic States of Emergency. In *Fieldwork Under Fire. Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, edited by Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C. G. M. Robben, pp. 224-252. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Ferguson, James. 1990. *The anti-politics machine: 'Development', depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hartmann, Betsy. 2001. "Will the Circle Be Unbroken? A Critique of the Project on Environment, Population, and Security." In *Violent Environments*, edited by Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, pp. 39-62. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1996. Project on Environment, Population and Security: Key Findings. *Environmental Change and Security Project Report* 2, pp. 45-48.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hunt, Robert C., and Eva Hunt. 1976. Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization. *Current Anthropology* 17(3), pp. 389-411.

Junghans, Trenholme. 2001. Marketing Selves: Constructing Civil Society and Selfhood in Post-socialist Hungary. *Critique of Anthropology* 21(4), pp. 383-400.

Lederach, John Paul. 1995. *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Accross Cultures*. New York, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, John Paul. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Mercy Corps. 2003. *Ferghana Valley Field Study. Reducing the Potential for Conflict through Community Mobilization*. Portland, OR: Mercy Corps.

Miall, Hugh. 2004. Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task. In *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook*, edited by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, pp. 67-89. Berlin: VS Verlag.

Mitchell, Christopher. 2002. Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform? *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9(1), pp. 1-23.

swiss**peace**

Mohan, Giles, and Kristian Stokke. 2000. Participatory development and empowerment: the dangers of localism. *Third World Quarterly* 21(2), pp. 247-268.

Nader, Laura. 2001. The Underside of Conflict Management - in Africa and Elsewhere. *IDS Bulletin* 32(1), pp. 19-27.

Schröder, Ingo W., and Bettina E. Schmidt. 2001. Introduction: violent imaginaries and violent practices. In *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, edited by Bettina E. Schmidt and Ingo W. Schröder, pp. 1-25. London: Routledge.

Senghaas, Dieter. 2004. The Civilisation of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation. In *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook*, edited by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, pp. 25-39. Berlin: VS Verlag.

Slim, Randa. 2002. The Ferghana Valley: In the Midst of a Host of Crises. In *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, edited by Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, pp. 489-515. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Tabyshalieva, Anara. 1999. *The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia. Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley*. Peaceworks No. 28. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Timura, Christopher T. 2001. 'Environmental Conflict' and the Social Life of Environmental Security Discourse. *Anthropological Quarterly* 74(3), pp. 104-113.

USAID. 2003. *Ferghana Valley Neighbours Celebrate Improved Access to Water & Better Relations*, *Success Stories from the Field*. June 2003. (http://www.usaid.gov/locations/ europe_eurasia /car/successarchive/0306carsuccess.html, accessed: November 2004).