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Reconsidering the Epistemology of Deductive-Inferential Validity


Demont, Florian (2008). Reconsidering the Epistemology of Deductive-Inferential Validity. Abstracta : Linguagem, Mente e Ação, 4(1):44-56.

Abstract

Until quite recently, the epistemology of logical laws has not been much discussed and neither has how one can be justified in claiming that a particular inference is valid. The transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion(s) in modus ponens will be examined in the paper through assessing Paul Boghossian's inferentialist proposal of assuming 'blind reasoning'. It will be argued that merely being justified in inferring according to a logical law a priori is worthless un-less one can also be justified in claiming that the inference is valid. An alternative to Boghossian's solution will be presented which addresses this need as well as the needs Boghossian had iden-tified previously.

Abstract

Until quite recently, the epistemology of logical laws has not been much discussed and neither has how one can be justified in claiming that a particular inference is valid. The transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion(s) in modus ponens will be examined in the paper through assessing Paul Boghossian's inferentialist proposal of assuming 'blind reasoning'. It will be argued that merely being justified in inferring according to a logical law a priori is worthless un-less one can also be justified in claiming that the inference is valid. An alternative to Boghossian's solution will be presented which addresses this need as well as the needs Boghossian had iden-tified previously.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, not_refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:English
Date:2008
Deposited On:12 Mar 2011 07:59
Last Modified:23 Mar 2022 13:05
ISSN:1807-9792
OA Status:Green