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## **National Dimensions of Political Conflict and Economic and Cultural Forms of Euroscepticism: Implications for the Formation of a European Identity**

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# National Dimensions of Political Conflict and Economic and Cultural Forms of Euroscepticism

Implications for the Formation of a European Identity

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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Over the past years, scepticism regarding the European Union in European mass publics has become increasingly evident. The failure of the constitutional treaty to gain majority support in France and in the Netherlands has marked the definite end of the “permissive consensus” among European publics that had allowed European integration to proceed since the late 1950s. The precise nature of the recent surge of Euroscepticism, however, remains poorly understood to date. Little work in a genuinely comparative perspective has been undertaken to assess whether opposition against European integration primarily reflects national idiosyncrasies or if there are common patterns across countries.

In this paper, I suggest that opposition against European integration can have economic or cultural motives, which have diverging consequences for the future prospects of the integration project. A first form of Euroscepticism is related to the perception that *market building in the EU* has committed national governments to a liberalizing thrust in economic policy making and endangers the achievements of national welfare states. Consequently, as long as “positive integration” does not prevail over “negative integration”, in Scharpf’s (1996) terms, citizens with strongly state interventionist attitudes will oppose further integration efforts.

The second source of opposition against the EU is *culturally and politically based*, and reflects a more fundamental concern with the establishment of a supranational European polity. The integration process diminishes the autonomy of the nation state and establishes a new political community in which collectively binding decisions are taken. Both aspects clash with the orientations of citizens that hold what I call traditionalist or communitarian conceptions of community. These citizens believe that politics at the national level should remain autonomous and should prevail over decisions taken at the EU-level. Such a conception of community is incompatible with the sense of European identity that is a prerequisite to the functioning of the enlarged European Union, as suggested by Fuchs (2008).

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was written within the project “EU enlargement, cultural diversity and national identity”, directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, and supported by the EU-Consent Network. I would like to thank all the participants of Team 12, and especially Hans-Dieter Klingemann, for their most valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper also draws on research conducted in the project “National Political Change in Borderless Spaces. A Comparative Assessment of the Impact of Globalization on National Party Systems” (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).

A second key hypothesis advanced in this paper is that the potential for politicization of European integration – which has been termed a “sleeping giant” by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) – is exploited to a far greater degree by national parties than is often assumed. One of the key obstacles to understanding how national and European conflicts relate has been the misconception that political space at the national level is structured by a one-dimensional left-right dimension. If this assumption was ever warranted, this is certainly no longer the case since the rise of the New Left and the subsequent counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right has brought a new cultural conflict to the core of Western European party systems (Bornschieer 2005, 2010, Kriesi et al. 2006). As I will argue, the basic structure of conflict across the old members of the Union is such that the politicization of the integration process is likely. In fact, the two types of opposition against the European project derive from distinctive positions regarding the two central dimensions of conflict in national party systems across Western Europe.

Whether or not contrasting attitudes regarding European integration are actually mobilized, however, depends on the strategic choices of political parties. In this respect, I argue that the configuration of the respective national party system is crucial. Because the major parties tend to be internally divided regarding the integration issue, the full mobilization of the two forms of opposition against European integration depends on the existence of a split both within the left and within the right of the political spectrum. In particular, I expect the cultural potential of contestation of the EU to be mobilized only in those party systems where a party of the extreme populist right is present.

While prior research on party positions at the aggregate level has found that positions along an economic and a cultural dimension at the national level are related to party stances on European integration (Hooghe et al. 2002, Marks et al. 2006), this paper makes at least four additional contributions. First, it offers a more elaborate theoretical explanation as to why the new cultural line of conflict prevalent in Western Europe is related to European integration. Secondly, it draws attention to the differing implications of the two logics of rejection for the formation of a European identity, and, consequently, the future of the integration process. Thirdly, I take a closer look at national context conditions that determine whether opposition against the EU is mobilized or not. As it turns out, the pattern detected by Marks et al. (2006) does not apply in Scandinavia, Portugal, and Greece, and thus cannot claim general

status. Fourth, my analysis does not focus on the positions of political parties, but on the potential for contestation of European integration at the voter level, which parties may or may not mobilize. Where citizen orientations regarding the EU prove to be structured by partisanship, this indicates that parties have effectively mobilized opposition against European integration.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I depict how the major dimensions of conflict in Western European party systems have been transformed in recent decades and how this leads to something of a “natural association” between national and European political preferences. Furthermore, I discuss how the configuration of national party systems impinges on the mobilization of opposition against the EU. In the second section, I use Eurobarometer data from the mid-1990s to empirically determine the dimensions underlying citizen orientations regarding the EU. As it turns out, three forms of Euroscepticism are discernible across the 15 old member countries of the EU, two of which correspond closely to the economic and cultural logics of rejection depicted above. In a second step, I investigate to which degree parties have mobilized opposition against the European project. The results show that the cultural opposition has been more strongly mobilized, and primarily in those countries where the extreme populist right has achieved an electoral breakthrough. The final section presents a re-analysis of the dimensions underlying European citizens after the 2004 eastward enlargement. Here, I test the claim that scepticism regarding the enlargement of the Union is likely to become integrated into the economic dimension of opposition against the EU.

## National Political Conflict and European Integration

Until recently, models of conflict in the European Union have used the left-right dimension of conflict to derive hypotheses on the relationship between ideological oppositions at the national level and positions regarding the EU (see the overview in Steenbergen and Marks 2004). Together with the finding that opposition against European integration comes both from the extreme left and the extreme right, they have concluded that the issue fits uneasily in the structure of national conflicts (e.g., van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). A different picture emerges, however, if political

space is conceived as structured by an economic and a cultural dimension of conflict (Kitschelt 1994, Bornschieer 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006).

Similarly to the national political space, attitudes regarding the European Union are also likely to be structured by at least two dimensions. On the one hand, market integration is a highly political process in that the desired degree of re-regulation at the European level depends on preferences regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism. On the other hand, the integration process has important cultural and political implications. It establishes a new political community that competes with the established national community for democratic decision making competences. It entails a loss of national autonomy that at least some citizens are likely to resist. While a first generation of research has focused on narrow economic cost-benefit factors, more recent studies have underlined the important role of identity in determining support for the EU (McLaren 2006, Hooghe, Marks 2004).

As I will argue, potential conflicts over European integration grounded in economic preferences and in citizens' identities correspond to disputes that also play an important role in national politics. While this is relatively straightforward in the case of economic conflicts, it also applies to the cultural domain. In fact, the cultural conflicts prevalent in party oppositions in Western Europe are closely related to cultural issues and anxieties raised by European integration. The next step is therefore to present a brief picture of the nature of cultural conflicts in the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe.

*The rise of the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values*

In the aftermath of 1968, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and life-styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The mobilization of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s brought these new issues onto the political agenda, resulting in a two-dimensional structure in Western European party systems, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. Cutting across the "old" distributional axis, a cultural line of conflict opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to

structure the attitudes of voters.<sup>2</sup> On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism has given rise to the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation of Social Democratic parties early on in the 1980s. Whereas a counter-potential to the libertarian movements was evident early on in Western publics (Sacchi 1998), its political manifestation was delayed as compared to that of the New Left. Being essentially conservative, its underlying values and goals were more diffuse, and their political manifestation therefore depended more heavily on political leadership.

In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries have succeeded in putting new issues on the political agenda that have proven highly conducive to collective identity formation, and consequently, to political mobilization. Despite their diverse origins, these parties have converged on a programmatic profile that involves two elements: First of all, the populist right challenges the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and questions the legitimacy of political decisions that enact universalistic values. More importantly, the populist right has promoted new issues and developed new discourses, such as their anti-immigration stance. This does not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2004) has called “differentialist nativism” or “cultural racism”, and represents a counter-vision to multicultural models of society. Both groups of issues are theoretically as well as empirically situated at one pole of a new line of conflict that may be labelled libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian. As a consequence, right-wing populist parties seem to have converged on a programmatic profile that makes this party family represent the counter-pole to the libertarian left (Bornschieer 2010).

The opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is, at heart, a conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of an ongoing philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and communitarian conceptions of the person. Communitarians such as Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) argue that universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions within an established community and therefore engender the danger of being oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and

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<sup>2</sup> Following Kitschelt’s (1994) as well as Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) usage, I will use the term “libertarian” to denote a culturally liberal position compatible with an interventionist state, and not as an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as is the case in Nozick’s (1974) conception.

widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge the fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception of the self is misconceived. Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a (more or less modest) communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles advocated by Rawls (1971). Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for the discourse of right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 2000). Immigration is directly linked to this conflict since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right as well as exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present in communitarian thinking, as well as in the discourse of the populist right, is a defence of the primacy of politics over abstract normative principles.

Right-wing populist parties from the 1990s on can be distinguished from other parties by virtue of three commonalities: (i) a location at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (ii) a populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established parties, and (iii) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties (Bornschieer 2010). Empirically, the defence of cultural tradition and the rejection of multicultural society propagated by the populist right form one pole of the new division structuring the political space in a number of Western European countries. Cultural liberalism and the individualistic and universalistic conceptions of community advocated by the New Left form the opposing pole (Bornschieer 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006).



*The relationship between economic and cultural conflicts at the national level and the question of European integration*

The rising importance of the supranational EU polity in political life in Europe establishes a new political community within which collectively binding decisions are taken. Citizens holding libertarian-universalistic values will probably not find this threatening. First of all, they are characterized by a cosmopolitan outlook, and secondly, they will support the “exportation” of the democratic principle to the European level, where a substantial part of political decision making now takes place. For those adhering to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, on the other hand, the situation is different. For them, European integration further threatens the autonomy of the national political community that these citizens already see endangered, for example by the application of universalistic principles by autonomous state agencies such as constitutional courts. Consequently, the populist right has been quick to seize the political potential arisen for political actors that insist on the *primacy of autonomous national politics* as against the obligations stemming from European integration.

This cultural or identity-based logic of opposition against the EU is tightly related to what may be called the *political logic* of right-wing populist mobilization. As a consequence of commitments in the European Union to liberalize capital flows and trade, the policy repertoire available to national governments is constrained, leading to problems of legitimacy (see Scharpf 2000, Mény and Surel 2000, Offe 1996). As Huber and Stephens show, partisan effects on a whole array of welfare state indicators have vanished in the 1980s, when “(...) governments found themselves with dramatically fewer options” (Huber, Stephens 2001: 221). Furthermore, many governments have explicitly justified unpopular measures in economic and social policy making with the structural imperatives of EU-integration and globalization, an example being the obligation to fulfil the Maastricht requirements in order to participate in the European Monetary Union. Thus, it has been easy for actors of the populist right to denounce the “cartelization” of the established parties of the left and right, which share a pro-European consensus and allegedly no longer differ in their policies. Although European integration has originally only been an important issue for certain right-wing populist parties, such as the Swiss People’s Party, its close

association with the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension of conflict has led other members of this party family to oppose the integration process as well. In the 1990s, European integration has increasingly gained prominence in the discourse of other members of the right-wing populist party family, for example the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party (Bornschiefer 2005, 2010).

The association between positions along the *state-market cleavage and opposition against the EU* is even more straightforward than in the case of the cultural dimension. Conceptions of social justice and of the relative emphasis put on the state or the market in economic regulation can be expected to be highly relevant here. After all, the policies pursued at the European level are heavily oriented towards the economic domain. Thus, attitudes towards deregulation at the national level, re-regulation at the European level, as well as the degree of harmonization desired in social and fiscal policy are presumably related to positions regarding the traditional state-market cleavage. Support for European economic policies then is a function of economic preferences at the national level and structured by established political alignments. More specifically, the extreme left's opposition against the EU is the mirror image of its opposition to economic liberalization and the potential threat it poses to national welfare states (Kriesi et al. 2006). It has been argued, however, that the European project is no longer neo-liberal in essence, and instead follows a model of "regulated capitalism" (Marks et al. 2006: 164). While this position also carries some truth, the crucial point is how voters with strongly state interventionist preferences evaluate EU-policies, and I will make this an empirical question.

That said, the limited degree of knowledge most citizens have of the policies pursued at the European level may still impede a close relationship between attitudes at the two levels. However, given rising levels of information and citizen involvement at the European level, diverging conceptions of the aims of European integration and of the policies pursued at the European level could be disputed in a representative democratic system at the European level. In other words, a rejection of the EU that stems from dissatisfaction with its economic policies does not represent a principled opposition to the integration process.

## *The mobilization of opposition against European integration*

Contrary to the argument presented by Taggart (1998) and partially endorsed by Marks et al. (2006), then, the resistance of the extreme left and of the extreme populist right has clear ideological foundations and does not stem from their outsider status within national political competition. Rather, it is the extreme position of these parties within their party systems that makes it easier for them to take a clear position on the question of European integration than for the large mainstream parties, which are internally divided on the issue (Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1996, Bartolini 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). This is also due to the fact that most mainstream parties mobilize along both of the two dimensions of conflict that structure national party competition,<sup>3</sup> which may result in contradictory positions regarding European integration. As Marks, Wilson and Ray's (2002: 587) point out, conservative parties can be expected to strongly support economic integration, while opposing further efforts at political integration due to their emphasis on national sovereignty. The Social Democrats represent the mirror image of the Conservatives, since they are much more sceptical regarding economic integration than with respect to the drawing up of a supranational polity that could, potentially, engage in European-wide market regulation. Right-wing populist parties do not face this dilemma because they mobilize only along one of the two national lines of competition, namely, the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension. Furthermore, they can define their policy stances without prolonged internal debate due to their hierarchical internal structure, which has allowed them to quickly take a clear and negative position regarding European integration (Bornschieer 2010).

In the following section, the dimensions underlying citizens' orientations regarding the EU are analyzed, testing the hypothesis that these dimensions are related to the conflicts that prior research has shown to prevail in national politics. I then proceed to verify the hypothesis that the structure of national party systems conditions the mobilization of the political potentials created by European integration.

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<sup>3</sup> Bornschieer (2010) presents empirical evidence for this fact in France, Germany, and Switzerland.

## The Dimensionality of Orientations Regarding the European Union

A study of the relationship between national conflicts and orientations regarding the European Union has to come to terms with a paucity of appropriate data. Ideally, our data source would include orientations regarding (i) the state-market and the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimensions of competition at the national level, (ii) the economic and cultural implications of European integration, and (iii) respondents' national party preference. Most cross-national surveys, however, do not allow a measurement of respondents' positions regarding both national conflicts I have referred to. Since it has been shown elsewhere that the state-market and the new cultural dimension structure political competition in Western Europe (Bornschieer 2005, 2010, Kriesi et al. 2006), I focus exclusively on citizens' orientations regarding the EU in the further analysis. In a second step, these orientations will be related to national party preferences.

The data source used is the Eurobarometer 44.2bis "Megasurvey" from 1996. While this data has the disadvantage of being rather dated and of covering only 15 EU-member states, it offers a battery of detailed questions pertaining to respondents' fears associated with European integration. Furthermore, the large sample size of around 65000 respondents is an advantage. Levels of non-response to single items are quite high in these surveys and the large sample boosts the number of respondents who declare they would vote for the relatively small parties of the extreme populist right and of the extreme left. Furthermore, because the theoretical background of the patterns of conflict I have set out is specific to Western Europe, it makes sense to disregard the new EU member states in East-Central Europe. This hypothesis is corroborated by the analysis of Marks et al. (2006), who find that the relationship between party positions along the European and national dimensions differs significantly between Eastern and Western Europe.

Table 1 shows the results of a rotated principal component factor analysis using a battery of 16 items that tap respondents' fears associated with the European Union. These questions offer the most detailed information regarding citizens' orientations vis-à-vis the EU, and I have used most of the available items. Among those excluded, a few questions pertain to the fear that small states will lose power and that decisions in the EU are imposed by the big countries. These questions do not appear

comparable across countries, since they are likely to be assessed differently in large and in small member states.

Table 1: Rotated factor analysis of citizens' perceptions of fear associated with the European Union, 1996

	Cultural dimension	Enlargement dimension	Economic dimension
Loss of identity	0.75	0.10	0.18
Nation no longer exists	0.72	0.11	0.19
Loss of language	0.67	0.19	0.01
Too rapid changes	0.52	0.15	0.34
People too different	0.44	0.31	0.25
Too much central control	0.41	0.13	0.32
Costs eastward enlargement	0.03	0.70	0.24
Rich countries pay	0.07	0.67	0.15
Foreign workers from EU	0.21	0.60	0.15
Countries joining EU	0.29	0.61	0.04
Massive imports	0.33	0.49	0.22
Border controls removed	0.42	0.47	-0.01
More taxes	0.13	0.17	0.71
Social security	0.24	0.08	0.67
Economic crisis	0.14	0.26	0.53
Transfer of jobs	0.15	0.39	0.46
Eigenvalues			
- before rotation	5.0	1.2	1.005
- after rotation	2.7	2.6	2.0
R-square (after rotation)	16.8%	16.2%	12.2%
N		37947	

Source: Eurobarometer 44.2bis

Note: The loss of cases as compared to the original sample size is due to very large number of respondents choosing the "don't know" response category. Given that the answer categories are "rather afraid", "rather not afraid" and "don't know", the latter category could also be assigned a neutral value. This alternative recoding of missing values does not affect the results markedly, however.

The analysis reveals three clearly separated factors. The *first factor* taps cultural or identity-based fears associated with European integration. Loss of identity and culture and of the perception that the EU endangers the existence of their nation are important features of this syndrome. The factor is also related to fears regarding too rapid

changes, that people in the EU are too different to get along well with each other and that the EU imposes too much central control. Leaving aside for a moment the second factor, the fears underlying the *third factor* are economic in nature. They pertain to the future of national welfare states, to taxes, and to the transfer of jobs to other member countries of the EU. Conforming to expectations, the first and the third factors bear some resemblance with the central lines of opposition at the national level. The first, cultural dimension appears closely associated with the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian conflict discussed in the preceding section. The third factor is related to the state vs. market dimension, or, put differently, the antagonism between support for the welfare state and economic liberalism.

The *second factor* is not clearly associated with national conflicts, and taps fears concerning the consequences of the eastward enlargement of the Union, above all in terms of increased economic competition. While the removal of borders loads both on the cultural, as well as on the enlargement factor, it is interesting to note that the immigration of workers from other EU countries does not seem to represent a cultural threat, but is clearly associated with (economic) fears regarding the enlargement process. With the eastward enlargement no longer on the agenda in the European Union of 27 member states, what used to be scepticism against enlargement may now feed into the economic and cultural dimensions, and may contribute to the latter's salience. This hypothesis is tested using more recent survey data in the final section of this chapter.

Because the factor analysis is based on all 15 EU member countries, it may hide large differences in the average positions and in the degree of polarization of national publics along the three dimensions just discussed. Consequently, the potentials constituted by fears regarding the process of European integration may vary across countries. Figure 1 presents box plots showing the distribution of respondents along the three dimensions in each country. Negative values indicate stronger fears, and countries are arranged according to the position of the median citizen. On the one hand, the results do not reveal very strong contrasts with respect to the *polarization* of public opinion. In other words, the differing views regarding European integration suggest that a potential for the politicization of the issue seems to exist throughout Western Europe. At the same time, the results indicate that national publics differ rather strongly in their *median position*. This is particularly true with respect to the cultural dimension.




Figure 1: Distribution of respondents along the cultural, economic, and enlargement dimensions in the 15 old EU member states

If we assume that governments have generally been friendly towards European integration, then a particularly strong *potential for cultural opposition* against the EU appears to exist in Portugal, Ireland, Greece. Cultural fears are also widespread in the public in Great Britain, but since the major parties are not very Europhile either, the potential for parties challenging the mainstream parties is not necessarily large. Furthermore, while the median citizen in Belgium and France does not reveal strong cultural fears, the rather polarized nature of public opinion in these countries suggests that certain segments of the populace are more sceptical. Consequently, it is plausible to assume a rather large potential for parties challenging the pro-European mainstream. In Denmark, a smaller group of strongly fearful citizens seems to exist. With respect to the *enlargement and economic dimensions*, France, Belgium and Greece again stand out for rather sceptic publics. Additionally, a number of countries that exhibited little cultural Euroscepticism reveal stronger fears related to the economic dimension (Spain) or the enlargement dimension (Luxemburg), or both

(Germany). Overall, however, the economic dimension seems to constitute less of a potential for contestation of the integration process than the cultural dimension. The enlargement dimension, on the other hand, also reveals significant political potentials.

The preceding section advanced the hypothesis that no fundamental incompatibility is to be expected between citizen orientations vis-à-vis the EU and national cleavage dimensions. As the empirical analysis has revealed, this is the case at least for two of the three dimensions underlying respondents' orientations regarding the EU. Accordingly, the structure of national conflicts does not preclude a politicization of the EU along the economic and cultural dimensions. This may actually be the reason for what Mair (2000) has called the "limited impact" of European integration on national party systems, namely, the near absence of parties that are exclusively concerned with the issue of European integration. On the other hand, whether or not voters are given a meaningful choice regarding the future of the integration process very much depends on the configuration of the national party system.

## The Mobilization of Opposition Against European Unification by National Political Parties

The next step is to assess in how far the dimensions found to underlie citizens' orientations regarding the European Union have been mobilized by political parties. This question will be approached by positioning party electorates in the political space formed by the economic and cultural EU-dimensions, using respondent's scores from the factor analysis carried out in the preceding section. The analysis thus focuses on the mobilization of the cultural and economic fears associated with European integration, and leaves aside for the moment the question of enlargement. I will return to this dimension in a later section.

As I have argued, the ideological basis of party positions regarding the economic and cultural dimensions of integration is rooted in national conflicts: The traditional state-market cleavage on the one hand and the new cultural division between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values on the other.



Contrary to the purely historical cleavage approach taken by Marks and Wilson (2000), however, I argue that positions regarding the EU cannot solely be deduced from parties' cleavage position, but are a result of their ideological credentials in interaction with the strategic context of competition in the party system. *The mobilization of the economic and cultural opposition against the integration project thus depends chiefly on the configuration of the party system.* While this mobilization is likely to occur through reciprocal mass-elite linkages between parties and their constituencies (Steenbergen et al. 2007), it is important to acknowledge – in line with the perspective developed by Kriesi et al. (2006) – that a differentiation in parties' political offer opens the way for genuine *realignments* based on the EU issue, both within the left and right ideological blocks.

The mainstream parties of the left and right have generally been favourable to the integration process. Because they have commonly been in government, they have also participated in the making of the European polity, committing them to a pragmatic stance. Economic and culturally based reservations regarding the EU can only find expression where there is a division both within the political right, as well as within the political left. In particular, the mobilization of the cultural or identity-based fears connected to the EU depends on the existence of a right-wing populist party. Strategically, the populist right faces no dilemma as long as it does not participate in government, since its clear and decisive position along the new cultural divide makes it easy to adopt cultural Euroscepticism. On the political left, given a strong commitment of the mayor Social Democrat or Socialist parties to the integration process, some alternative to these parties must exist for economic fears to become a determinant of partisan alignments. I expect this to be the case where a Communist or extreme left party exists (or a socialist party as an alternative to the social democrats, as in the Netherlands). Extreme left parties are defined here as being located at the state-interventionist extreme of the party spectrum along the state-market cleavage. If party electorates are located in the two-dimensional space of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU, three patterns emerge, which I discuss in turn.

### *Countries with significant right-wing populist parties*

In a *first group of countries*, the cultural dimension has been more strongly mobilized due to the efforts of a successful right-wing populist party that rallies those voters who perceive European integration as a cultural threat. These are the cases of *France, Austria, and Belgium*, presented in Figure 2. Along the horizontal axis, voters to the left feel economically threatened, while those on the right do not. This reflects the hypothesis that state interventionist attitudes are related to economic fears stemming from European integration, while those with economically liberal attitudes should not perceive such a threat. Along the vertical axis, respondents at the top end do not feel culturally threatened by the integration process, while those to the bottom of the axis feel strongly threatened.

In France, Austria, and Belgium, voters of the extreme right differ markedly from those supporting other parties in their position along the cultural dimension of European integration, and this location corresponds to the extreme position this electorate typically occupies on the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension of conflict at the national level (see Bornschier 2005, 2010). Beyond this commonality, there are also some differences between the three countries. Despite the stronger mobilization of cultural anxieties, *France* presents something of the master case, in which cultural *and* economic fears have been mobilized by different political actors. In fact, we saw in Figure 1 that both potentials are rather strong in France. However, it is not the small groupings of the extreme left, but the much larger Communist party that receives votes from citizens who feel particularly threatened in economic terms. This is consistent with prior findings using French data, indicating that within the left, the communists mobilize voters that feel economically threatened by European integration, while the Socialists receive support from those who are economically leftist, but do not feel threatened by the EU (Bornschier 2008).

The results show that a similar division exists within the right in France: Those who vote for the Front National are concerned with the cultural implications of European integration and differ strongly from those who support parties of the mainstream right. Note that the Front National's voters do not stand out for their economic fears related to the integration process, indicating that the party's




Figure 2: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – France, Austria, and Belgium

mobilization is almost purely cultural. The populist right faces some competition in the cultural domain, however. On the one hand, small independent groupings and spin-offs of the right differ from the mainstream right in this respect. Furthermore, the voters of the extreme left, contrary to expectations, stand out just as much for their cultural as for their economic fears. However, differing from the Front National's quite substantial vote share, only 2% of the respondents declare that they would vote

for one of the formations of the extreme left. Furthermore, the position of the extreme left is not consistent with analyses of later elections, which show a rather centrist location of this electorate along the EU-dimension (Bornschieer 2010).

In *Austria*, the voters of the Freedom Party also clearly stand out for their cultural anxieties. While this is also the electorate that feels most threatened in economic terms, these voters are more distinct from those of the other parties in their cultural than in their economic orientations. However, the economic potential for opposition against the EU being stronger than the cultural one, as Figure 1 has shown, and in the absence of a split within the left block, the Freedom Party seems to succeed in rallying economic Eurosceptics as well. Preferences for the other parties are weakly structured by orientations regarding the EU, although the differences that we do observe are in line with expectations: Voters of the left are more concerned with a loss of social security than those of the conservatives or the (short-lived) Liberal Forum. The ecologists rally voters that are not particularly concerned with either of the two threats, which is consistent with their libertarian-universalistic profile along the national dimensions of competition (see Dolezal 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). Finally, those who declare they would cast a blanc ballot in a general election also stand out for their opposition against the process of European integration, indicating a political potential not mobilized by the Freedom Party.

The *Belgian* case is not too different from the Austrian one, with the right-wing populist Vlaams Blok clearly mobilizing cultural perceptions of threat related to European integration. Contrary to Austria, party electorates differ more strongly along the cultural dimension.<sup>4</sup> The ecologists, who are generally the group of voters with the most consistent libertarian-universalistic outlook in Western Europe (Bornschieer 2010, Kriesi et al. 2008), also feel least threatened by European integration in cultural terms. They form the counter-pole to those supportive of the Vlaams Blok. No party seems to mobilize economic perceptions of threat, and those who vote for the populist right are also rather concerned with economic fears related to the EU. The major parties' electorates, on the other hand, do not differ much in their orientations.

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<sup>4</sup> The position of the Communists and of the Volksunie makes the economic dimension appear quite polarized as well; these positions are somewhat unexpected, and it has to be kept in mind that these are miniscule formations.

*Predictable positions, but feeble politicization in the majority of countries on the Western European continent*

In a second group of countries, party electorates take more or less the expected positions relative to one another, but at the same time differ far less in their positions than in the countries just discussed. This pattern is found in *the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy*. Figure 3 shows the example of the configurations in three countries. In none of these countries did a significant right-wing populist party exist in the mid-1990s, and no party has attracted an over-proportional number of voters who feel culturally threatened by the EU. Economic fears have not been strongly mobilized in these countries either. Let us discuss the examples of Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy in turn.

In *Germany*, the electorates of the major parties lie quite close to one another.<sup>5</sup> The left-wing PDS, on the other hand, attracts the vote of those who most strongly see the achievements of the welfare state as endangered by European integration. As we have seen earlier on, the economic potentials for contesting the EU are rather strong in Germany, in contrast to the cultural potential. Overall, as the hypothesized relationship between the state-market cleavage and the economic dimension of European integration would lead us to expect, those who vote for parties of the right feel less of an economic threat than those who vote for the left. In the cultural domain, those who support the Free Democrats and Ecologists feel least threatened, while voters of the Christian Democratic Union parties perceive somewhat more of a threat. The extreme right attracts voters who are quite distinct from those of the other parties in exhibiting strong identity-related fears. However, this electorate is much smaller than that of the populist right in other countries. Because of their outmoded program and their ties to the fascist past, the parties of the extreme right are highly unlikely to attract more than the hard core of xenophobic authoritarians (Bornschieer 2010).

In the *Netherlands*, the positions of most parties are also rather centrist. The configuration shows that the Euroscepticism that became manifest in the recent rejection of the constitutional treaty has not been stirred by political parties. The quite marginal extreme right-wing Centrumdemokraten take an unexpected position and do

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<sup>5</sup> I do not differentiate between Western and Eastern Germany; the results from an analysis excluding Eastern German respondents do not differ significantly from those for unified Germany.

not attract voters preoccupied with a loss of identity entailed in European integration. Contrary to successful parties of the extreme right, which mobilize along the cultural dimension (Bornschieer 2010), the voters of the Centrumdemokraten stand out for their economic orientations regarding the EU. A number of (fundamentalist) protestant and pensioniers' parties occupy the position we would expect from a right-wing populist party, but these parties do not fit in this category and have a rather limited appeal.




Figure 3: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy

The case of *Italy*, finally, points to an interesting point of variation within this second group of countries. First of all, we notice that while economic perceptions of fear are not very pronounced, the voters of the Rifondazione Comunista nonetheless feel more of a threat from economic integration than the other voters. This underlines the hypothesis that a split within the left opens the way for a differentiation along the economic dimension. Interestingly, while party electorates lie close to one another, we note that those in favour of the left-wing PDS are less sceptical regarding the economic implications of European integration than those supporting mainstream parties of the right such as the Christian Democrats and the Forza Italia. This is a pattern characteristic of Southern Europe, and also to be found in Spain and Portugal: The mainstream right's electorate perceives more of an economic threat than voters of the left. It is noteworthy, however, that this phenomenon limited to countries in which electorates differ little along the economic dimension.

Overall, despite differing attitudes in the populace, the countries in this group lack a modern right-wing populist party that could mobilize cultural fears related to European integration. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the crucial condition for the mobilization of economic Euroscepticism actually exists in a number of countries. The German, the Italian, the Dutch and the Spanish party systems all exhibit a split within the left and one component attracting voters more reluctant of economic integration. At the same time, the voters of the PDS, the Rifondazione Comunista, the Dutch Socialists and of the Spanish Izquierda Unida are not very distant from those of the other parties. This could change, however, should issues related to European integration gain a more prominent role in these countries.

#### *Cultural opposition from the left: Scandinavia, Portugal, and Greece*

In the countries so far, the hypothesis of a rather close association between national dimensions of conflict and dimensions of contestation in the EU was generally supported. In the Nordic and in two of the Southern European countries, however, party positions differ from the predictions made earlier on. Figure 4 shows the configurations in *Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal*. In these countries, as well as in *Finland and Greece*, a split within the left exists and (at least) one component rallies ideologically distinct voters with respect to their orientations regarding the EU. In

Scandinavia, the dominance of the class cleavage and the low electoral threshold has allowed various small communist and left-socialist parties to emerge, allowing political formations such as the Danish Red-Green Unity List to campaign against European integration (Klingemann 2005: 267-274). However, contrary to the cases discussed so far, these party systems feature leftist parties that *mobilize not only economic, but also cultural perceptions of threat* related to European integration. The



Figure 4: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal



United Democratic Coalition (an alliance between Communists and Greens) in *Portugal* and in the Communist party in *Greece* attract voters who stand out above all for their cultural fears (Figure 4 shows the example of Portugal). The electorates of the other major parties, on the other hand, hardly differ in their position.

The *Scandinavian pattern* differs even more fundamentally from those found so far. In general, supporters of right-wing parties – conservative and liberal – stand out for being much less concerned with the cultural implications of European integration than voters of the left. The position of Left Parties in Sweden and Finland and of the Red-Green coalition in Denmark suggests that the two dimensions are more strongly related than elsewhere: For these voters, economic and cultural Euroscepticism go hand in hand. In fact, in an analysis of party positions regarding the accession referenda in Scandinavia, Jahn (1999) shows that conservative and liberal parties' pro-market orientation translated into an unambiguously approving stance towards the EU. The Social Democrats' location along the state-market cleavage, on the other hand, suggests an ambiguous position characterized by internal divisions. However, as many left-wing parties, they have switched to positive stances regarding the Union since state interventionist economic policies no longer appear feasible at the national level, and instead require an EU-wide approach (Johansson, Raunio 2001).

In a region where international cooperation has for long been regarded as a threat to national sovereignty, and where the parties of the right do not mobilize the defence of national sovereignty, opposition to the EU is mobilized by unlikely candidates: New Left and – the exception being Finland – Ecologist parties. In fact, Jahn's (1999) analysis shows that parties that have historically been leftist, urban and ecologist or post-materialist oppose European integration, while all parties that are materialist and urban based supported accession, including the Social Democrats. Left-Socialist parties in Scandinavia have a tradition of being opposed to European integration due to their pacifist orientation, their rejection of central control, and the perception of the EU as a "capitalist" project (Christensen 1996, Jahn 1999), just as Ecologist parties fear that the EU dilutes environmental standards (Jahn 1999, Johansson, Raunio 2001).

Knutsen's (1995: 484; 1990) analysis of materialist-postmaterialist value orientations shows that the Left Party and the Ecologist party in Sweden, as well as the Green and Socialist parties in Denmark stand out for their postmaterialist

electorate – while Figure 4 shows that they also attract those voters that feel most strongly threatened by the EU in cultural terms. The association between economically leftist and culturally protectionist positions found in the analysis presented here further suggests that citizens’ national identity in these countries is heavily stamped by the uniqueness of the Scandinavian welfare state (see also Raunio 2007). Indeed, even if social policy were to become more strongly regulated at the European level, this would not guarantee the level and universalistic character of social protection prevalent in these countries. As non-government parties, Left-Socialist and Ecologist parties have thus been able to mobilize both economic and cultural fears. An analysis based on the European Election Study 2004 (data not shown here) shows that the Eurosceptic “June Lists” that ran in the 2004 European elections in Denmark and Sweden drew heavily on voters that declare having supported the Social Democrat or the Socialist party in the last general election.

The *Danish* configuration further qualifies the hypothesis concerning the mobilization of opposition against European integration by right-wing populist parties. In fact, the voters of the *Fremskridtspartiet* (Progress Party) are not located in an extreme position along the cultural dimension. This may have to do with the deviance already found in other Scandinavian countries: The cultural line of conflict at the national level seems to be related differently to culturally based evaluations of the EU than in continental European countries. The finding may, however, also reflect the fact that the Scandinavian Progress Parties are not unequivocal members of the right-wing populist party family (on this debate, see Mudde 2007, Chapter 2), similarly to the *Centrumdemokraten* in the Netherlands. In 1995, Pia Kjærsgaard left the Progress Party and founded the Danish People’s Party, generally considered a member of the right-wing populist party family. It will therefore be an interesting question whether the Danish People’s Party will begin to mobilize citizens exhibiting culturally motivated Euroscepticism, as the other exponents of this party family do. This analysis will have to await more recent data. In *Sweden*, a right-wing party mobilizing cultural Euroscepticism existed in the 1990s. However, *New Democracy* was short-lived and is considered a neo-liberal populist, and not a right-wing populist party by Mudde (2007: 47-8). Moreover, in openly supporting membership in the EU (Jahn 1999: 586), the party’s profile was in disarray with the Eurosceptic orientations of its voters put in evidence in Figure 4.

What clearly emerges as an important result from the various cases discussed here is the necessity to differentiate within the group of extreme right parties, and in particular the older from the most recent exponents, which I have termed (extreme) right-wing populist. Only this sub-group of the wider extreme right party family, as defined at the outset of this chapter, has an appeal broad enough to gain more than marginal voter shares (Bornschieer 2005, 2010). Furthermore, opposition against the EU only seems to be an integral part of this sub-group's programmatic profile.

## The Dimensionality of European Orientations after the Eastward Enlargement of 2004

With the accession of ten new member states in 2004, the fifth enlargement of the EU has brought the largest number of new members into the Union so far. What is the dimensionality of orientations regarding the EU since the enlargement is off the agenda, at least for the immediate future? In this final section, I probe into the structure of attitudes after this round of enlargement using Eurobarometer 62 from 2004. Because none of the Eurobarometer surveys after the mid-1990s provides both detailed information on citizens' attitudes regarding the EU, as well as on their national party preferences, this brief analysis is solely concerned with the dimensionality of EU-orientations.

The items used in the following analyses come from a battery of questions that is identical to the one used in the prior analysis, pertaining to respondents' fears associated with European integration. Because of the more limited number of items as well as the much smaller sample as compared to the analysis in the mid-1990s, a one-dimensional structure emerges. Most probably, this is due to the fact that respondents answer the questions on their fears rather uniformly due to the design of the question battery.<sup>6</sup> As can be seen in Table 1, the same tendency existed in 1996, with the first dimension explaining most of the variance before the solution was rotated. Because it seems plausible that the one-dimensional structure of orientations is at least partially a

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<sup>6</sup> The battery starts with the question, "Concerning the building of Europe or the EU, are you currently afraid of...", followed by the list of specific objects. Respondents answer the question for one object after the other, and the choice is between "currently afraid", "not currently afraid" and "don't know".

result of the design of the battery of questions, and since the Eigenvalue of the second factor is barely below 1, it makes sense to enforce a two-dimensional solution in order to compare these results with those found in 1996. For reasons of comparability, I exclude the new member states. Furthermore, Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the Scandinavian and the other twelve countries separately, in order to assess some of the hypotheses developed in the preceding section.

The results of the factor analysis for twelve of the fifteen old member states presented in Table 2 reveal a cultural and an economic dimension structuring attitudes regarding the EU. The economic dimension is unrelated to questions of identity and instead centres on fears regarding the welfare state, the transfer of jobs to other countries, and economic crises. The cultural dimension is stamped above all by fears pertaining to national identity and language, although some economic items show secondary loadings on this factor, above all the preservation of the national welfare state. Nonetheless, there is a clear correspondence in these countries between the two dimensions found to structure competition in national party systems across Western Europe and the orientations of citizens vis-à-vis the European integration process.

Table 2: Rotated factor analysis of citizens' orientations regarding the EU in twelve member states, excluding the Scandinavian countries, 2004

	Economic dimension	Cultural dimension
Loss of identity	0.19	0.82
Loss of language	0.09	0.84
Social security	0.59	0.40
Transfer of jobs	0.77	-0.01
Pay more and more	0.68	0.28
Economic crisis	0.63	0.30
Eigenvalues		
- before rotation	2.61	0.93
- after rotation	1.85	1.69
R-square (after rotation)	30.8%	28.2%
N	10161	

*Source:* Eurobarometer 62

The analysis of the mobilization of the cultural and economic potentials in the Scandinavian countries in the preceding section suggested that citizens may see

European integration as a threat for their identity because economic integration endangers their distinctive type of welfare regime. A separate factor analysis of the orientations of citizens in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, lends support to this hypothesis, as the results in Table 3 show. In these three countries, fears regarding the national welfare state as well as economic crises in general are not associated with the economic, but with the cultural dimension. The economic dimension, on the other hand, is more narrowly defined than in the rest of Western Europe. It is characterized by attitudes regarding economic competition – namely, the fear that jobs may be transferred to other countries – and the apprehension of having to pay more and more for the EU. Interestingly, fears pertaining to the welfare state are only weakly related to this economic competition dimension.

Table 3: Rotated factor analysis of citizens' orientations regarding the EU in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, 2004

	Cultural/welfare dimension	Economic competition
Loss of identity	0.81	0.08
Loss of language	0.75	0.07
Social security	0.63	0.32
Economic crisis	0.63	0.28
Transfer of jobs	0.02	0.86
Pay more and more	0.30	0.70
Eigenvalue		
- before rotation	2.51	0.96
- after rotation	2.05	1.42
R-square	34.1%	23.7%
N	2609	

*Source:* Eurobarometer 62

The analysis thus reveals differences in the structure of attitudes regarding the European Union depending on the national context. Most notably, the pattern found in Scandinavia is specific. In the light of the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian welfare regime, it is quite plausible that commitment to their system of social protection forms an integral part of the national identity of Scandinavians. On the other hand, despite the fact that parties of the extreme left mobilize cultural fears in Portugal and Greece,

these countries do not differ from continental Europe in the structure of their citizens' orientations, as a separate factor analysis for the southern European countries reveals (results not shown here). This makes sense since the welfare regime in these countries is close to the continental European or Christian Democratic type, and not to the universalistic Scandinavian model.

## Conclusion

The analysis presented in this paper has put in evidence three potentials for opposition against European integration in mass publics across the 15 old member states. Two of these – one representing an economic and one a culturally or identity-related form of Euroscepticism – are theoretically related to the dimensions of conflict prevalent at the national level. Consequently, we may expect national parties to take up and politically represent these potentials. The third potential was constituted in the mid-1990s by citizens sceptical of the eastward enlargement of the EU. With the question of enlargement more or less off the agenda for the time being, an analysis of citizen orientations in 2004 has confirmed that distinctive economic and a cultural dimensions structuring citizen attitudes vis-à-vis the European Union can be distinguished.

It has been the fusion of economic and cultural Euroscepticism in referendum campaigns that have led to the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands, and that has put a halt to the integration process. For the most part, however, the two motives for opposing the EU are mobilized by different political parties and also have strongly diverging implications for the future of the EU. The culturally or identity-based resistance against European integration is theoretically closely related to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community. These conceptions have been constructed and mobilized by right-wing populist parties, who see cultural pluralism as a danger to the distinct cultural traditions of national communities, and supra-national integration as a threat to the autonomy of the traditional political community. Thus, divergence in perceptions of cultural threat deriving from European unification mirror the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values, which prior research has

shown to be one of the two most important dimensions of opposition in a number of Western European countries, namely in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain.

While many citizens lie somewhere in the middle ground between universalistic and communitarian understandings of community, the traditionalist-communitarian conception in its extreme form seems incompatible with a European identity, which implies the emergence of a post-traditionalist political community. Hence, citizens holding such values may well support a Europe of nations, but they are unlikely to accord legitimacy to an EU that, since Maastricht and the eastward enlargement, increasingly impinges on individuals' life situation, as well as on the distribution of resources, as set out in Fuchs (2008). In other words, the scepticism of citizens holding strongly traditionalist-communitarian values vis-à-vis the EU is likely to be fundamental.

On the other hand, different perceptions of fears related to social security and the transfer of jobs to other member countries mirror contrasting attitudes concerning the desired extent of market regulation at the European level. The resulting potential for political conflict thus reproduces the state-market cleavage at a higher level. In national politics, distributive conflicts have proven much more amenable to political compromise and pacification than cultural conflicts, which are often of an either-or nature. To the extent that parties take up voters' contrasting positions on this issue, this conflict can be processed by the democratic institutions at the national and EU levels, and a legitimate compromise may be achieved. The prerequisite for the acceptance of majority decisions that have redistributive effects and impinge on the distribution of life chances, however, is the existence of a European identity that creates a certain degree of solidarity between citizens living in different member countries of the EU.

In terms of the mobilization of the economic and cultural potentials for contestation of European integration, three patterns emerge. In a number of countries, namely in Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy, contrasting attitudes regarding the EU remain weakly mobilized, and the differences in European outlook between electorates correspondingly small. In the mid-1990s, this also applied to Britain, although the Conservatives mobilized Euroscepticism later on in the 1990s (Kriesi, Frey 2008). It also has to be kept in mind that the UK Independence Party has been

highly successful in that country at least in the 2004 European elections. Despite the feeble degree of polarization, a potential for the representation of contrasting attitudes regarding the EU exists in these countries, since the national and European dimensions prove to be related. In fact, the attitudes party electorates take concerning the two European dimensions of conflict are those that we would predict in knowledge of their positions concerning the two national dimensions of conflict. With the exception of Britain, the major parties in these countries have not mobilized on the issue of European integration, however, either because they are internally divided, or because no political actor has politicized the issue in the national arena.

Where alternatives to the established major parties of the left and right parties exist, however, contrasting attitudes regarding the integration project have been mobilized, although electorates do not differ in outlook to the same degree in all of these cases. This hypothesis has been strongly confirmed both for economic and for culturally based opposition against the EU. A split within the left ideological block has permitted left-wing parties to mobilize economic Euroscepticism in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, as well as in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. While the mobilization of economic opposition remains modest to date, the cultural dimension has been mobilized far more strongly in those cases where right-wing populist parties have achieved an electoral breakthrough. In this distinct group of countries, parties of the populist right rally voters who are distinct by virtue of their culturally based scepticism regarding the EU. This is the case of those supporting the *French Front National*, the *Austrian Freedom Party* and the *Vlaams Blok* in Belgium. The mobilization of these parties is likely to represent the most severe threat for the formation of a European identity. Furthermore, in the *French case*, where a split exists both within the left and within the right, and where both dimensions have been politicized rather strongly, the economic logic of mobilization of the Communists and the cultural mobilization logic of the Front National are clearly distinguishable.

While these results are in line with expectations, a third group of countries features left-wing parties whose voters are characterized both by economic, and by cultural fears associated with European integration. This suggests that the two orientations may go hand in hand for certain groups of voters. In Denmark, Sweden and Finland, this is part of a more general specificity. *In Scandinavia, cultural fears are generally more widespread among the voters of the left than among voters of the right.* As opposed to theoretical expectations, the cultural dimension at the national level and



cultural orientations regarding the EU are related inversely to the pattern found in the rest of Western Europe. In other words, cultural liberalism is associated with cultural Euroscepticism, which seems to derive from the perception that universalistic and ecologist values can be more effectively defended at the national than at the EU level. Thus, the European project may be viewed differently in the various national contexts. Furthermore, those who believe their economic interests are better protected by national welfare states than with supranational integration may also develop an identity-based Euroscepticism. Contrary to an opposition against European integration that stems from traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, however, this is not necessarily an opposition of principle against the EU. Rather, whether these fears will be tempered if EU membership and economic integration prove to be compatible with the variety of national welfare regimes that exist in Europe.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the mobilization of cultural Euroscepticism by extreme left-wing parties in Portugal and Greece merits further research.

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<sup>7</sup> The „varieties of capitalism“ perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001) suggests that this is the case.

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