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Asymmetric reduced form auctions


Mierendorff, Konrad (2011). Asymmetric reduced form auctions. Economics Letters, 110(1):41-44.

Abstract

This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.

Abstract

This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.

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12 citations in Web of Science®
15 citations in Scopus®
14 citations in Microsoft Academic
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Language:English
Date:2011
Deposited On:20 Jan 2011 13:50
Last Modified:04 Mar 2020 23:46
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019

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