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How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment


Zhang, Jingjing; Casari, Marco (2012). How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment. Economic Inquiry, 50(2):502-515.

Abstract

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals'. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality, and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group.

Abstract

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals'. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality, and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > General Business, Management and Accounting
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Language:English
Date:2012
Deposited On:28 Mar 2011 13:03
Last Modified:23 Jan 2022 18:50
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:0095-2583
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00362.x
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