# Axiomatization of a Preference for Most Probable Winner

Blavatskyy, Pavlo R (2005). Axiomatization of a Preference for Most Probable Winner. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 230, University of Zurich.

## Abstract

In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L1 tonlottery L2 when the probability that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than thenprobability that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be rationalizednby three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symmetry) and one less standard axiom (a fanning-in). A preference for the most probable winner can be represented by a skewsymmetric bilinear utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret theory when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret aversion isnreplaced with a preference for a win. The empirical evidence supporting the proposed systemnof axioms is discussed.

## Abstract

In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L1 tonlottery L2 when the probability that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than thenprobability that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be rationalizednby three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symmetry) and one less standard axiom (a fanning-in). A preference for the most probable winner can be represented by a skewsymmetric bilinear utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret theory when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret aversion isnreplaced with a preference for a win. The empirical evidence supporting the proposed systemnof axioms is discussed.