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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games


Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke (2005). A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 238, University of Zurich.

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:December 2005
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:31
Last Modified:27 Nov 2020 07:14
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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