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Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex


Köhler, Wolfgang R (2005). Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 255, University of Zurich.

Abstract

I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

Abstract

I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:October 2005
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:31
Last Modified:10 Aug 2018 05:34
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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