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Betting on Own Knowledge: Experimental Test of Overconfidence


Blavatskyy, Pavlo R (2008). Betting on Own Knowledge: Experimental Test of Overconfidence. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 358, University of Zurich.

Abstract

"This paper presents a new incentive compatible method for measuring confidence in own knowledge. This method consists of two parts. First, an individual answers several general knowledge questions. Second, the individual chooses among three alternatives: 1) one question is selected at random and the individual receives a payoff if he or she has answered this question correctly; 2) the individual receives the same payoff with a probability equal to the percentage of correctly answerednquestions; 3) either the first or the second alternative is selected. The choice of thenfirst (second) alternative reveals overconfidence (underconfidence). The individual is well calibrated if he or she chooses the third alternative. Experimental results show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about their ownnknowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. Their confidence in own knowledge does not depend on their attitude towards risk/ambiguity."

Abstract

"This paper presents a new incentive compatible method for measuring confidence in own knowledge. This method consists of two parts. First, an individual answers several general knowledge questions. Second, the individual chooses among three alternatives: 1) one question is selected at random and the individual receives a payoff if he or she has answered this question correctly; 2) the individual receives the same payoff with a probability equal to the percentage of correctly answerednquestions; 3) either the first or the second alternative is selected. The choice of thenfirst (second) alternative reveals overconfidence (underconfidence). The individual is well calibrated if he or she chooses the third alternative. Experimental results show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about their ownnknowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. Their confidence in own knowledge does not depend on their attitude towards risk/ambiguity."

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:January 2008
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:27 Nov 2020 07:15
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html