Köhler, Wolfgang R (2008). Job Design and Randomization in Principal Agent Models. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 381, University of Zurich.
We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.
We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2008 |
| Deposited On: | 29 Nov 2011 22:47 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Nov 2020 07:15 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| ISSN: | 1424-0459 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Official URL: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
Köhler, Wolfgang R