Wichardt, Philipp C; Schunk, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W (2008). Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 398, University of Zurich.
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2008 |
| Deposited On: | 29 Nov 2011 22:47 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Nov 2020 07:15 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
| ISSN: | 1424-0459 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Official URL: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
Wichardt, Philipp C