Navigation auf zora.uzh.ch

Search ZORA

ZORA (Zurich Open Repository and Archive)

Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions

Nyborg, Kjell G; Sundaresan, Suresh (1996). Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(1):63-104.

Abstract

We use wehn-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, wehn-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Accounting
Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Social Sciences & Humanities > Strategy and Management
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Date:1996
Deposited On:08 Aug 2012 11:11
Last Modified:06 Feb 2025 02:42
Publisher:Elsevier
Number of Pages:42
ISSN:0304-405X
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00871-B
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6930

Metadata Export

Statistics

Citations

Dimensions.ai Metrics
69 citations in Web of Science®
83 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

3 downloads since deposited on 08 Aug 2012
0 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Authors, Affiliations, Collaborations

Similar Publications