Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

The temptation of social ties: When interpersonal network transactions hurt firm performance


Brandes, Leif; Brechot, Marc; Franck, Egon (2012). The temptation of social ties: When interpersonal network transactions hurt firm performance. ISU Working Paper Series 159, University of Zurich.

Abstract

We introduce agency concerns to social capital theory and predict that managers can use individual social capital to reduce personal effort costs, which is not in the best interest of the firm. To test this prediction, we collect data on all 8,019 hiring decisions from general managers in the National Basketball Association between 1981 and 2011. We find that managers have a clear preference for hiring players through social ties. The probability that a manager hires players from an NBA franchise to which he is socially tied is 27.6% higher than for an untied franchise. To isolate the motivation for this behavior, we complement our data with information on the sporting performance of teams. In line with agency theory, we find that the hiring of players through social ties reduces team performance. The effect is large: on average, each social-tie player reduces team winning percentage by 5.4%. Overall, this paper documents first empirical evidence that decision makers’ use of individual social capital can lead to reduced firm-level performance.

Abstract

We introduce agency concerns to social capital theory and predict that managers can use individual social capital to reduce personal effort costs, which is not in the best interest of the firm. To test this prediction, we collect data on all 8,019 hiring decisions from general managers in the National Basketball Association between 1981 and 2011. We find that managers have a clear preference for hiring players through social ties. The probability that a manager hires players from an NBA franchise to which he is socially tied is 27.6% higher than for an untied franchise. To isolate the motivation for this behavior, we complement our data with information on the sporting performance of teams. In line with agency theory, we find that the hiring of players through social ties reduces team performance. The effect is large: on average, each social-tie player reduces team winning percentage by 5.4%. Overall, this paper documents first empirical evidence that decision makers’ use of individual social capital can lead to reduced firm-level performance.

Statistics

Citations

1 citation in Microsoft Academic

Downloads

43 downloads since deposited on 12 Dec 2012
8 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2012
Deposited On:12 Dec 2012 10:31
Last Modified:17 Feb 2018 00:16
Series Name:ISU Working Paper Series
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://ideas.repec.org/p/iso/wpaper/0159.html
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:7637

Download

Download PDF  'The temptation of social ties: When interpersonal network transactions hurt firm performance'.
Preview
Filetype: PDF
Size: 569kB