The present paper examines Frege’s notion of judgement, particularly the relation between judgement and truth and the possibility of false judgements. In the first section I will argue that the performance of a judgement consists neither in predicating truth nor in referring to the True; nor do we judge in thinking the Fregean sense of the word “true” in addition to a thought. The second section discusses two problems arising from Frege’s standard definition of judgement as acknowledging the truth of a thought. First, I shall argue that judgements do not imply truth; i.e. Frege’s use of “acknowledge” is not factive. Second, judgements are not comprised of an act of merely entertaining a thought and an act of acknowledging its truth; i.e. judgements are not cumulative. Rather, a judgement is one single act of acknowledging a thought as true or thinking truly. For this reason, the last section offers a new interpretation which takes Frege’s adverbial definition very serious. I will show that adverbialism with re- gards to judgements has no factive reading and allows for the normativity of truth. Hence, the adverbial theory of judgement fits logical inferences as well as spontaneous judgements.