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Freges Adverbialtheorie des Urteilens


Pfisterer, C C (2012). Freges Adverbialtheorie des Urteilens. In: Petersen, Oliver; Borchers, Dagmar; Spitzley, Thomas; Stöckler, Manfred. GAP.7-Proceedings: Nachdenken und Vordenken - Herausforderungen an die Philosophie. Online-Veröffentlichung der Universität Duisburg-Essen: GAP-Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, 305-314.

Abstract

The present paper examines Frege’s notion of judgement, particularly the relation between judgement and truth and the possibility of false judgements. In the first section I will argue that the performance of a judgement consists neither in predicating truth nor in referring to the True; nor do we judge in thinking the Fregean sense of the word “true” in addition to a thought. The second section discusses two problems arising from Frege’s standard definition of judgement as acknowledging the truth of a thought. First, I shall argue that judgements do not imply truth; i.e. Frege’s use of “acknowledge” is not factive. Second, judgements are not comprised of an act of merely entertaining a thought and an act of acknowledging its truth; i.e. judgements are not cumulative. Rather, a judgement is one single act of acknowledging a thought as true or thinking truly. For this reason, the last section offers a new interpretation which takes Frege’s adverbial definition very serious. I will show that adverbialism with regards to judgements has no factive reading and allows for the normativity of truth. Hence, the adverbial theory of judgement fits logical inferences as well as spontaneous judgements.

Abstract

The present paper examines Frege’s notion of judgement, particularly the relation between judgement and truth and the possibility of false judgements. In the first section I will argue that the performance of a judgement consists neither in predicating truth nor in referring to the True; nor do we judge in thinking the Fregean sense of the word “true” in addition to a thought. The second section discusses two problems arising from Frege’s standard definition of judgement as acknowledging the truth of a thought. First, I shall argue that judgements do not imply truth; i.e. Frege’s use of “acknowledge” is not factive. Second, judgements are not comprised of an act of merely entertaining a thought and an act of acknowledging its truth; i.e. judgements are not cumulative. Rather, a judgement is one single act of acknowledging a thought as true or thinking truly. For this reason, the last section offers a new interpretation which takes Frege’s adverbial definition very serious. I will show that adverbialism with regards to judgements has no factive reading and allows for the normativity of truth. Hence, the adverbial theory of judgement fits logical inferences as well as spontaneous judgements.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Book Section, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:German
Date:2012
Deposited On:10 Jan 2013 09:35
Last Modified:26 Aug 2021 11:54
Publisher:GAP-Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie
ISBN:978-3-00-036440-2
OA Status:Closed
Free access at:Official URL. An embargo period may apply.
Official URL:http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-29983/Proceeding_GAP7_Nachdenken_Vordenken.pdf
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