Grossmann, M (2015). Evolutionarily stable strategies in sports contests. Journal of Sports Economics, 16(1):108-121.
Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.
Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2015 |
| Deposited On: | 19 Mar 2013 13:56 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Jan 2022 00:00 |
| Publisher: | SAGE Publications |
| ISSN: | 1527-0025 |
| OA Status: | Closed |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002512470957 |
| Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:7976 |
Grossmann, M