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"Auf diese Weise nun gebe ich selbst meine Stimme ab" - Einige Bemerkungen zu Platons später Ideenlehre unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des ´Timaios´


Ferber, Rafael (1998). "Auf diese Weise nun gebe ich selbst meine Stimme ab" - Einige Bemerkungen zu Platons später Ideenlehre unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des ´Timaios´. Gymnasium: Zeitschrift für Kultur der Antike und Humanistische Bildung, 105:419-444.

Abstract

From a philosophical point of view, the so-called "Theory of Ideas" is the central topic in Plato’s dialogues; however in Plato's dialogues Plato's "perhaps only direct argument for the existence of forms [ideas] is in Timaeus 510D-E” (Charles Kahn).The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question: why did Plato in the "Timaeus" defend the existence of the Ideas despite the objections in the "Parmenides"? He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the "Parmenides", the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of space as “substantialized extension”.
First (I) it is shown that Plato remained, in dialogues, like the "Sophist" and "Politicus", faithful to the “Theory of Ideas” despite his criticism in the "Parmenides". The common theme in the trilogy of the "Theaetetus", "Sophist" and "Politicus" is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute, that is, something like Platonic Ideas. The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of Platonic Ideas in the "Timaeus" (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of the Platonic ideas in the "Parmenides". In this criticism sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the "Timaeus" shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance beside the Ideas.

Abstract

From a philosophical point of view, the so-called "Theory of Ideas" is the central topic in Plato’s dialogues; however in Plato's dialogues Plato's "perhaps only direct argument for the existence of forms [ideas] is in Timaeus 510D-E” (Charles Kahn).The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question: why did Plato in the "Timaeus" defend the existence of the Ideas despite the objections in the "Parmenides"? He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the "Parmenides", the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of space as “substantialized extension”.
First (I) it is shown that Plato remained, in dialogues, like the "Sophist" and "Politicus", faithful to the “Theory of Ideas” despite his criticism in the "Parmenides". The common theme in the trilogy of the "Theaetetus", "Sophist" and "Politicus" is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute, that is, something like Platonic Ideas. The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of Platonic Ideas in the "Timaeus" (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of the Platonic ideas in the "Parmenides". In this criticism sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the "Timaeus" shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance beside the Ideas.

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Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:German
Date:1998
Deposited On:18 Mar 2013 14:12
Last Modified:19 Aug 2021 17:24
Publisher:Winter
ISSN:0342-5231
Additional Information:Shortened English version "Why did Plato maintain the 'Theory of Ideas' in the 'Timaeus' “ in:“Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum”, Granada, Selected papers, ed. by T. Calvo/L. Brisson, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 1997, pp.179-186. Italian version: “Perché Platone nel Timeo torna a sostenere la dottrina delle idee“, in: Elenchos, Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico, 18, 1997, pp. 5-27. Repr. with modifications of the German version in: Rafael Ferber (2020), Platonische Aufsätze, Berlin / Boston, Walter de Gruyter, 239-237. But the "only direct argument” (Tim.51d3-51e6) seems to be interestingly flawed. Cf. Ferber, Rafael; Hiltbrunner, Thomas, Enthält das Argument für die Existenz der Ideen, Ti 31d3-52a7, einen Fehler?" in: Gymnasium, 112, 2005,pp.461-467:: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/64891
OA Status:Green
Related URLs:http://www.gymnasium.hu-berlin.de/gym_105.html
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-64891

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