Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes


Alesina, Alberto; Wagner, Alexander F (2006). Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(4):770-799.

Abstract

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.

Abstract

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.

Statistics

Citations

Dimensions.ai Metrics
55 citations in Web of Science®
69 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Language:English
Date:2006
Deposited On:30 Apr 2014 16:11
Last Modified:30 Jul 2020 13:23
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:1542-4766
OA Status:Closed
Free access at:Related URL. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.4.770
Related URLs:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=431680
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:3497

Download

Full text not available from this repository.
View at publisher

Get full-text in a library