Abstract
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Ewerhart, Christian (2014). Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types. Working paper series / Department of Economics 159, University of Zurich.
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Item Type: | Working Paper |
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Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C7, D7, D8 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Rent-seeking, private information, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, existence, uniqueness, Marktgleichgewicht, Wettbewerb, Gleichgewichtstheorie, Ressourcenallokation |
Language: | English |
Date: | May 2014 |
Deposited On: | 26 May 2014 15:10 |
Last Modified: | 16 Mar 2022 08:06 |
Series Name: | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
Number of Pages: | 11 |
ISSN: | 1664-7041 (P) 1664-705X (E) |
OA Status: | Green |
Free access at: | Official URL. An embargo period may apply. |
Official URL: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp159.pdf |
Related URLs: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php |
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