Abstract
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Ewerhart, Christian (2014). Unique Equilibrium in Contests with a Continuum of Types. Economics Letters, 125(1):115-118.
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
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Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics |
Language: | English |
Date: | 23 August 2014 |
Deposited On: | 29 Aug 2014 10:14 |
Last Modified: | 24 Jan 2022 04:38 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
OA Status: | Hybrid |
Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.019 |
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