Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Browse by Creators

Navigate back| Up a level
Export as
Number of items: 6.

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom (2018). The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation - an empirical investigation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(1):232-274.

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom (2015). The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation. Working paper series / Department of Economics 189, University of Zurich.

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom (2014). Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation. Working paper series / Department of Economics 171, University of Zurich.

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom (2013). The Lure of authority: motivation and incentive effects of power. American Economic Review, 103(4):1325-1359.

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger Andreas; Wilkening, Tom (2012). The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power. Working paper series / Department of Economics 99, University of Zurich.

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger Andreas; Wilkening, Tom (2012). The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power. UBS Center Working Paper Series 2, University of Zurich : UBS International Center of Economics in Society.

This list was generated on Sat Nov 17 12:18:25 2018 CET.