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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61224

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick (2014). Mechanism design and intentions. Working paper series / Department of Economics 66, University of Zurich.

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We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been designed under the assumption that agents are selfish can still be implemented. For the case where precise information about social preferences is available, we show that any tension between efficiency, incentive-compatibility, and voluntary participation may disappear. Impossibility results such as the one by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) are then turned into possibility results. We also provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of kindness sensations.


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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C70, C72, D02, D03, D82, D86
Uncontrolled Keywords:Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Reciprocity
Date:April 2014
Deposited On:14 Mar 2012 11:34
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:44
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:46
Additional Information:Revised version
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp066.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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