Publication: Matching with externalities
Matching with externalities
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Pycia, M., & Yenmez, M. B. (2021). Matching with externalities (No. 392; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872676
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We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable m
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Pycia, M., & Yenmez, M. B. (2021). Matching with externalities (No. 392; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872676
