Publication: The complementarity between trust and contract enforcement
Date
Date
Date
2024
Working Paper
Abstract
Abstract
Abstract
Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to some risk of exploitation. In such circumstances, trust - defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others - seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are substitutes. We show, however, that tru
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Additional indexing
Creators (Authors)
Series Name
Series Name
Series Name
Working paper series / Department of Economics
Item Type
Item Type
Item Type
Working Paper
JEL Classification
JEL Classification
JEL Classification
C91
D02
D91
E02
D02
D91
E02
Keywords
Trust, contract enforcement, complementarity, equilibrium selection, causal effect, screening, belief distortions, institutions
Scope
Scope
Scope
Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language
Language
Language
English
Publication date
Publication date
Publication date
2024-10
Date available
Date available
Date available
2021-01-06
Number of pages
Number of pages
Number of pages
91
ISSN or e-ISSN
ISSN or e-ISSN
ISSN or e-ISSN
1664-705X
Additional Information
Additional Information
Additional Information
Revised version; Former title: The complementary nature of trust and contract enforcement
OA Status
OA Status
OA Status
Green
Other Identification Number
Other Identification Number
Other Identification Number
merlin-id:20439
Metrics
Citations
Green Open Access
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