Publication: Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry
Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry
Date
Date
Date
Citations
Ranehill, E., Schneider, F., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry (No. 103; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
Abstract
Abstract
Abstract
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously varying growth rates on cooperation. Slow growth yields higher cooperation rates and welfare than fast growth, both for incumbents and entrants, which is consistent with optimistic self-reinforcing beliefs persisting under slower growth. Allowing
Metrics
Downloads
Views
Citations
Additional indexing
Creators (Authors)
Series Name
Series Name
Series Name
Item Type
Item Type
Item Type
JEL Classification
JEL Classification
JEL Classification
C72
Keywords
Scope
Scope
Scope
Language
Language
Language
Publication date
Publication date
Publication date
Date available
Date available
Date available
Number of pages
Number of pages
Number of pages
ISSN or e-ISSN
ISSN or e-ISSN
ISSN or e-ISSN
Additional Information
Additional Information
Additional Information
OA Status
OA Status
OA Status
Other Identification Number
Other Identification Number
Other Identification Number
Metrics
Downloads
Views
Citations
Citations
Ranehill, E., Schneider, F., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry (No. 103; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
