Publication: Robust stochastic stability
Robust stochastic stability
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Alós-Ferrer, C., & Netzer, N. (2014). Robust stochastic stability (No. 63; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of st
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Alós-Ferrer, C., & Netzer, N. (2014). Robust stochastic stability (No. 63; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
