Publication: The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
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Klose, B. S., & Kovenock, D. J. (2013). The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities (No. 118; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well-established qualitative results concerning the set of equilibria of the first-price all-pay auction w
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Klose, B. S., & Kovenock, D. J. (2013). The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities (No. 118; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
