Publication: In defence of the normative account of ignorance
In defence of the normative account of ignorance
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Meylan, A. (2024). In defence of the normative account of ignorance. Erkenntnis, 89(1), 207–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7
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The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
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Meylan, A. (2024). In defence of the normative account of ignorance. Erkenntnis, 89(1), 207–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7
