Publication: Mediated subgame perfect equilibrium
Mediated subgame perfect equilibrium
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Ewerhart, C., & Zeng, H. (2026). Mediated subgame perfect equilibrium (No. 484; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
Abstract
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Abstract
This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect equilibrium (MSPE). It is shown that the revelation principle holds. We introduce an effective correlated minimax value, which can be conveniently determined as the solution of a linear program, and use it to derive necessary and sufficient conditions
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C73
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Ewerhart, C., & Zeng, H. (2026). Mediated subgame perfect equilibrium (No. 484; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
