Publication: Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
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Ewerhart, C., & Lareida, J. (2023). Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests (No. 279; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite t
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Ewerhart, C., & Lareida, J. (2023). Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests (No. 279; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
