Publication: The Agency of CoCos: Why Contingent Convertible Bonds Aren’t for Everyone
The Agency of CoCos: Why Contingent Convertible Bonds Aren’t for Everyone
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Goncharenko, R., Ongena, S., & Rauf, A. (2021). The Agency of CoCos: Why Contingent Convertible Bonds Aren’t for Everyone. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 48, 100882. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100882
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Some regulators grant contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) the status of “going-concern” capital. Theory, however, suggests that CoCos can induce debt overhang, thereby amplifying the leverage ratchet effect. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence consistent with this theory. Our results suggest that banks with more volatile assets (riskier banks) (i) are less likely to issue CoCos, (ii) conditional on having CoCos outstanding are less likely to issue equity, and (iii) prefer issuing equity over CoCos. Since riskier banks suffer
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Goncharenko, R., Ongena, S., & Rauf, A. (2021). The Agency of CoCos: Why Contingent Convertible Bonds Aren’t for Everyone. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 48, 100882. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100882