Publication: Knowledge, Modal Robustness, and Mathematical Platonism
Knowledge, Modal Robustness, and Mathematical Platonism
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Gaultier, B. (2025). Knowledge, Modal Robustness, and Mathematical Platonism. Episteme, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.15
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The intuition that knowledge requires the satisfaction of some sort of anti-luck condition is widely shared. I examine the claim that modal robustness is sufficient for satisfying this condition: for a true belief to be non-luckily true, it is sufficient that this belief is safe and sensitive. I argue that this claim is false by arguing that, at least when it comes to beliefs in necessary truths, satisfying the anti-luck condition requires satisfying a non-modal condition. I also advance a plausible candidate for this condition and ar
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Gaultier, B. (2025). Knowledge, Modal Robustness, and Mathematical Platonism. Episteme, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.15
